Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ansley

• Decision Date: 16 July 1938
• Parties: TRAVELERS INS. CO. v. ANSLEY.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

124 S.W.2d 37

22 Tenn.App. 456

TRAVELERS INS. CO. v. ANSLEY.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Western Section.

July 16, 1938

Petition for Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Jan. 21, 1939.

Appeal in Error from Circuit Court, Shelby County; Harry Adams Judge.

Action by Elizabeth Ansley against the Travelers Insurance Company on three policies of life insurance. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals in error.

Reversed and case remanded for new trial.

Emmett W. Braden, of Memphis (Armstrong, McCadden, Allen, Braden & Goodman, of Memphis, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

H. W Laughlin, Jr., and King, Taylor & King, all of Memphis, for defendant in error.

ANDERSON Judge.

The original plaintiff, Mrs. Ansley, as beneficiary in three policies of insurance on the life of her husband, recovered in this action against the insurer a judgment for $4,500, entered on a directed verdict in her favor, representing the aggregate of the additional indemnities provided by identical policy provisions which, in their material parts, read as follows:

"The Travelers' Insurance Company agrees to pay to the Beneficiary named in the above numbered Life Contract the amount of Additional Indemnity above stated in addition to the amount of insurance payable in the event of the death of the Insured under the said Life Contract immediately upon receipt of due proof that the death of the said Insured has resulted from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means within ninety days from the date of the accident which shall have caused such injuries and of which *** there is a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body ***"

The evidence was undisputed and the questions for decision arise upon two contentions of defendant which in substance are:

(1) That although the fatal injury was unintended, unforeseen and unexpected and therefore accidental, the means by which it was effected was not accidental within the meaning of the quoted policy provisions; and

(2) That even if the fatal injury was effected by accidental means, said injury was not evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body as required by the policy provision as a condition precedent to liability.

Whatever may be the rule elsewhere the limit of coverage of a policy insuring against death resulting from accidental means has been indicated by repeated decisions in this state.

Thus, in Stone v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 133 Tenn. 672, 182 S.W. 252, L.R.A.1916D, 536, Ann.Cas.1917A, 86, it was said:

"The general rule is that an injury is not produced by accidental means, within the meaning of this policy, where the injury is the natural result of an act or acts in which the insured intentionally engages. A person may do certain acts the result of which produces unforeseen consequences resulting in what is termed an accident; yet it does not come within the terms of this contract. The policy does not insure against an injury that may be caused by a voluntary, natural, ordinary movement, executed exactly as was intended. Therefore, to determine the matter, we look, not to the result merely, but to the means producing the result. It is not sufficient that the injury be unusual and unexpected, but the cause itself must have been unexpected and accidental."

The foregoing was quoted and approved in Scott v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 169 Tenn. 351, 87 S.W.2d 1011, where other cases announcing the same rule are referred to.

This is conceded to be the prevailing rule in this state but it is contended by the plaintiff that the facts make out a case of death resulting from an injury effected by accidental means within the purview thereof. The defendant, as stated, contends that the result only was accidental.

At the time of his death and a number of years prior thereto the insured held a responsible position with Buckeye Cotton Oil Mill. He was so constituted physically that a comparatively small quantity of intoxicating liquor, while not making him drunk, would result in his being rendered highly nervous after the effect had worn off. To relieve this condition which occurred at irregular periods only he was accustomed to taking a medicine known as "hypnotic compound" which could at that time be purchased at drug stores without a doctor's prescription.

On the evening of November 27, 1936 the insured, accompanied by his wife and other friends, went to the Claridge Hotel in Memphis to attend a dance. During the course of the evening the insured had several drinks of gin and beer. He was not rendered noticeably intoxicated but nevertheless was so nervous on the following day, which was Saturday, that he remained in bed. On Saturday night Mrs. Ansley called a neighborhood drug store and ordered some of the medicine referred to. It arrived in a two ounce bottle on which was the direction "two teaspoonsful as needed." The insured was given a dose about 7:30 P. M. He awoke around midnight and being still in a highly nervous condition was given another dose of two teaspoonsful. He then slept until about six o'clock the following morning when he got up. He ate no breakfast and shortly went back to bed.

He apparently took some more of the medicine himself before 12 o'clock noon. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon he got up for the purpose of going to his place of employment. Before leaving his home he was given another dose of two teaspoonsful by his wife. He had planned to go out to dinner with his family and about 6 o'clock P. M. he called Mrs. Ansley by phone telling her that he would return about 6:30 o'clock for that purpose. When he arrived his wife noticed that he had a peculiar look about his eyes--that his eyes "looked kind of glassy." He informed her that he felt well enough to keep the dinner engagement but being dubious about the matter Mrs. Ansley called Mr. Tapp, a friend of the family, and requested him to come to their home. In about ten minutes thereafter Mr. Tapp arrived in company with Mr. Parker, another friend. When they arrived the insured was sitting on a bed with his overcoat on. He shortly arose, went to the bathroom, poured some of the medicine [just how much does not appear], into a glass, mixed water with it and drank it. After doing this, according to Tapp, "he staggered back, and I put my arm on his shoulder and we went back in the bed room and sat down on the side of the bed and he said a few more words and laid back down on the bed and went into a deep sleep, and his mouth flew open, and he snored. I called another fellow in, and then called the drug store, and called the doctor." When the doctor arrived he found the insured in a serious condition. "He had a pallor and his pulse was thready and weak, respiration shallow." Asked to describe his condition in lay language the doctor testified that "It is just like a shock *** A condition of shock."

He was immediately carried to a hospital in an ambulance where his stomach was washed out and he was given cathartics and adrenalin, a heart stimulant. He died while on "the emergency table."

The medicine taken by the insured contained cannabis, a stimulant, chloral hydrate, a sedative, potassium bromide, a sedative, and extract hyoscyamus, a stimulant. The maximum dose is two teaspoonsful. Ten to fifteen grains have been known to kill a person. Its effect depends in a measure on the physical condition of the one taking it. "One person may take it and have no effect and another person may have an idiosyncracy for it." Such was the testimony of a medical expert.

The expert evidence was to the further effect that the insured died from "chloral and bromide poisoning" resulting from the cumulative effect of the medicine.

There is no evidence to warrant the conclusion that the insured took the medicine with suicidal intent. In fact as stated the defendant concedes that the result, that is, his death, was unexpected, unforeseen and unusual and therefore accidental. But it is forcefully insisted that the means by which this result was accomplished was not accidental and that therefore under the rule prevailing in this state a recovery was not warranted. The argument is that the intention of the insured was to take the identical substance in the identical quantity that he did take; that "in a natural and voluntary movement he drank that portion of the medicine that he poured into the glass"; that "there was nothing unexpected or unforeseen or unusual in any of his movements in taking this medicine"; that "there is not the slightest indication that this medicine had become tainted, deteriorated or undergone some chemical change of which Mr. Ansley did not know"; that therefore though the result was unintended the means producing it was not accidental. In short it is insisted that the death was the natural result of an act in which the insured intentionally engaged and therefore there was no liability under our cases. Ramsey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 143 Tenn. 42, 223 S.W. 841, 10 A.L.R. 651.

The case principally relied upon by the defendant is that of Scott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra. That case was before the court upon an appeal from the action of the trial judge in sustaining a demurrer to the declaration. The material averment was that the insured "suffered death from the effects of a sunstroke and fall, receiving a severe injury to the back of his head in addition to prostration from the sunstroke, while firing a boiler," etc. It was further averred that the injury that occasioned the insured's death was "unforeseen, unexpected fortuitous, and accidental". There was no averment that the external means--the heat present in the boiler room--was unforeseen, unexpected or...