Travelers Ins. Companies v. Stanton

• Decision Date: 01 August 1996
• Parties: TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANIES, Appellant, v. David STANTON, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 948

645 N.Y.S.2d 948

223 A.D.2d 104

TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANIES, Appellant, v. David STANTON, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Aug. 1, 1996.

Costello, Cooney & Fearon (Amy B. Regan, of counsel), Syracuse, for appellant.

Albanese & Mulvey (Robert C. Mulvey, of counsel), Ithaca, for respondent.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and MERCURE, CREW, YESAWICH and PETERS, JJ.

CREW, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Relihan Jr., J.), entered April 27, 1995 in Tompkins County, which, inter alia, denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff, which issued a liability insurance policy to defendant's employer, the Village of Trumansburg in Tompkins County, for the period from March 1, 1988 to March 1, 1989, commenced this action seeking a declaration that, inter alia, it owes no duty to indemnify defendant for damages assessed against him in a civil action for sexual battery because public policy precludes such coverage. The underlying lawsuit was brought by the victim against the Village and defendant, a police officer, and was premised upon allegations that, in January 1989, defendant pulled over the automobile that the victim was driving and directed her to a remote area where he "forced [her] to engage in sexual relations with him against her will". The victim's claims against the Village ultimately were dismissed (see, Howe v. Village of Trumansburg, 199 A.D.2d 749, 605 N.Y.S.2d 466, lv. denied 83 N.Y.2d 753, 612 N.Y.S.2d 107, 634 N.E.2d 603). Plaintiff apparently assigned counsel to represent defendant in connection with the victim's claims against him, and she thereafter was awarded a verdict for money damages. Following the commencement of this action, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, Supreme Court denied both motions and this appeal by plaintiff ensued.

Plaintiff contends that Supreme Court erred by failing to hold that the sexual battery committed by defendant upon the victim is not insurable as a matter of public policy. While defendant agrees that there can be no coverage for intentionally inflicted injuries, he asserts that indemnification may be provided to "one whose intentional act causes an unintended injury" (Public Serv Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 399, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425 N.E.2d 810) and that questions of fact exist in this regard. In particular, defendant claims that the jury, based upon the trial court's charge, could have determined that he honestly but incorrectly believed that the sexual contact would not injure the victim and, therefore, any such injuries caused thereby would be unintentional. We disagree.

It is now well settled that where harm to the victim is inherent in the nature of the act performed, whatever injuries result are, as a matter of law, intentionally caused (see, e.g., Pistolesi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 94, 644 N.Y.S.2d 819). Here, a jury determined that defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent, and it is inconceivable that emotional harm is not of a type that " 'flows directly and immediately' " from such a wrongful act (id., at ----, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 821, quoting Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home Co. v. Fireman's Ins....