Travis v. Dickey, Co.
| Decision Date | 09 January 1924 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 13372 |
| Parties | TRAVIS v. DICKEY, Co. Treas., et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. Property--"Personal Property"--Statutes.
Personal property, as defined by sections 8394 to 8398, inclusive, Comp. Stat. 1921, is every kind of property that is not real property.
2. Taxation--"Personal Property"--Statute.
Personal property for the purpose of taxation, as defined by section 9583, Comp. Stat. 1921, is:
* * *"
3. Same--Ad Valorem Taxation.
Personal property subject to ad valorem taxation, as defined by section 9574, Comp. Stat. 1921, is: "All property in this state, whether real or personal, including the property of corporations, banks and bankers, except such as is exempt. * * *"
4. Same--Oil Tank Cars--Liability.
Oil tank cars owned by a person or corporation domiciled within this state and not used as a public service corporation, nor as a common carrier as defined by law, are personal property and subject to an ad valorem tax, as defined by statutes referred to in sections 1, 2, and 3 hereof.
5. Same--Applicability of Gross Receipts Tax Law.
Oil tank cars owned as personal property by an individual domiciled in this state and leased to a domestic corporation of this state for the exclusive purpose of transporting its own petroleum products are not a "public service" concern nor "common carriers" as defined by law, and are not taxable under section 9981, Comp. Stat. 1921.
6. Taxation--Liability of Personal Property--Domicile of Owner as Situs.
In theory of the law, and in the absence of proof that personal property has an actual taxable situs elsewhere, and in the absence of intervention for or claim to such tax by some other state or some other municipality than that of the owner's domicile, it is taxable to the owner thereof in the county of his domicile.
7. Same--Assessed Valuation--Validity--Fair Cash Value.
In the absence of proof that personal property is not taxed above its fair cash value, as defined by statute and the Constitution, the judgment of the county court assessing property at what is adjudged to be the fair cash value thereof will not be reversed solely upon the ground that other personal property may have been taxed upon a basis apparently less than its fair cash value.
Error from County Court, Tulsa County; Z. I. J. Holt, Judge.
Proceedings for assessment of omitted property of M. R. Travis. From judgment of county court sustaining action of Wayne L. Dickey, county treasurer, in listing property for taxation, Travis appeals, making the county treasurer, the board of county commissioners, and W. M. Gulager, tax ferret, defendants in error. Affirmed.
W. D. Humphrey and Humphrey & Campbell, for plaintiff in error.
Chas. B. Rogers, Special Counsel for Wayne L. Dickey, Treasurer.
W. F. Seaver, County Attorney, for defendants in error.
¶1 This case involves the question of the right of Tulsa county to impose an ad valorem tax upon oil tank cars, owned by plaintiff in error, whose domicile is in Tulsa county, the cars in question having been leased to the Empire Refineries, Inc., of Bartlesville, Okla., and kept anti used by said company in exporting its petroleum products out of Bartlesville. It might be stated in this connection that the cars in question were not listed by the county assessor in the regular course of his assessment, lint were later discovered and added to the tax list by the tax ferret as omitted property, but there is no objection made to the procedure had by him, the only contention being whether or not they were subject to ad valorem taxation in Tulsa county. The right of Tulsa county to impose an ad valorem tax upon the class of tank cars involved herein depends upon the following conditions, viz.:
¶2 First: That such tank cars are lawfully taxable upon an ad valorem basis.Second: That the owner of such cars is domiciled in Tulsa county.Third: That such cars have a taxable situs within said county and state.
¶3 If the law determines all of the foregoing conditions in the affirmative, then Tulsa county has lawfully imposed the tax under consideration, and may lawfully collect the same. The first condition is determined by constitutional and statutory provisions, there being no decisions of this court upon the exact question involved.
¶4 The first provision of the statute pertinent to a determination of the question, that is, whether tank cars of the kind involved are subject to an ad valorem tax, is section 8399, Comp. Stat. 1921, formerly section 6594, Rev. Laws, 1910, and reads as follows:
"Every kind of property that is not real is personal."
¶5 Sections 8394 to 8398, inclusive, Comp. Stat. 1921, classify property as: First, real or immovable; second, personal or movable. Then, after defining real property, land, fixtures, and appurtenances belonging to the land, it concludes in section 8499, supra, as follows:
"Every kind of property that is not real is personal."
¶6 We must conclude, therefore, that the tank cars in question, not being real property, nor land, nor fixtures, nor appurtenances belonging to real property, are personal property.
¶7 Section 9583, Comp. Stat. 1921, formerly section 7305, Rev. Laws 1910, in defining personal property subject to taxation, provides:
* * *"
¶8 Therefore, we see that the tank cars in question are personal property and are included within the section, supra, on personal property for the purpose of taxation.
¶9 Section 9574, Comp. Stat. 1921, the same being section 1, act 1915, page 64, amendatory of section 7302, Rev. Laws 1910, defines what property shall be subject to an ad valorem tax as follows:
"All property in this state, whether real or personal, including the property of corporations, banks and bankers, except such as is exempt, shall be subject to taxation. * * *"
¶10 The above section is a part of article 1, c. 84, the same being the chapter on revenue and taxation, Comp. Stat. 1921. The article then goes on to define and exempt certain properties from taxation, the class of tank cars in question being a class of property not exempt, and as they come within the term "personal property," as defined by article 1, c. 77, Comp. Stat. 1921, and within the definition of personal property for the purpose of ad valorem taxation, as defined by article 1, c. 84, Comp. Stat. 1921, it is obvious that such cars were proper subjects of an ad valorem taxation, and in the absence of some provision of statute expressly providing a different method of classifying and taxing same, they were subject to an ad valorem tax.
¶11 We must bear in mind, however, that the Legislature is empowered by the Constitution to classify property and provide for different methods of taxing different classes. See section 22, art. 10, of the Oklahoma Constitution; also In re Gross Production Tax, 53 Okla. 24, 154 P. 362; Trustees', etc., Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 P. 293.
¶12 But it is not pointed out to us, by either plaintiff or defendant in error, nor have we been able to find that the Legislature has seen fit to or has placed this peculiar kind of cars into a different class for the purpose of taxation, and providing a specific means for assessing and taxing same. Plaintiff in error contends that section 1, subd. B. Sess. Laws 1915, the same being section 9976, Comp. Stat. 1921, defines the kind or class of cars under consideration, and that section 6 of said subdivision B, the same being section 9981, Comp. Stat. 1921, provides a specific means of assessing and taxing such class of cars. It is true that section 9981, supra, provides a specific method for assessing the property defined in section 9976, supra, but the portion of said section 9976 pertinent to plaintiff in error's contention is as follows:
"For the purpose of calculating the taxable value of its property in this state, on or before the first day of December, annually, every transportation and transmission company, operating interstate lines in or through the state, as defined in the Constitution, * * * shall make out and file with the State Auditor a statement, * * * showing: * * *"
¶13 Now, it must be observed from the foregoing statute that the "transportation" or "transmission" companies provided for or defined in 9976, supra, and for which said section 9981, supra, provides a specific means of taxing, are such "transportation" or "transmission" companies only as are defined in the Constitution.
¶14 Section 34, art. 9, of the Constitution defines transportation companies as follows:
¶15 It will be seen that the above constitutional definition includes such persons or corporations only as are engaged as a "common carrier," not only as a "common carrier," but...
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