Travis v. Travis
Decision Date | 11 March 1921 |
Citation | 87 So. 762,81 Fla. 309 |
Parties | TRAVIS et al. v. TRAVIS. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit by E. W. Travis and others against Sim Travis. Decree for defendant, and complainants appeal.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court
Mental weakness alone insufficient to authorize cancellation of deed. Mere mental weakness will not authorize a court of equity to set aside a deed if it does not amount to inability to comprehend the effect and nature of the transaction and is unaccompanied by evidence of imposition or undue influence.
Decree supported by conflicting evidence not reversed. Where there is conflict in the testimony, but there is evidence to support the finding of the chancellor, the decree will not be reversed unless it clearly appears to be erroneous.
Chancellor's finding will not be disturbed, where no clear preponderance in favor of either party. The finding of a chancellor on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed by an appellate court where the mind cannot repose with entire confidence and certainty on a conclusion in favor of either party.
Burden of proof of insanity rests on him who alleges it. Every person is presumed to be sane until the contrary appears, and in civil actions the burden of proof of insanity rests upon him who alleges it.
Grantor's insanity must be established by preponderance of evidence. It devloves upon him who seeks to avoid a deed on account of insanity of the grantor to establish the fact of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; C. L Wilson, judge.
James H. Finch and John M. Calhoun, both of Marianna, for appellants.
Paul Carter, of Marianna, for appellee.
The object of this suit was to set aside a deed of conveyance to certain land threin described as a cloud upon the title and for partition of the land attempted to be conveyed thereby among the complainants and the defendant.
The complainants are heirs of the grantor, and the defendant is also an heir, being a son of the grantor and brother of those of the complainants who are described in the bill as her children.
The grounds of the alleged invalidity of the deed which it is sought by this suit to have declared ineffectual to convey any title to the property described therein to the defendant are stated in the bill as follows:
By answer to the bill defendant denied that the grantor, the ancestor of complainants and defendant, was at the time of the execution of the deed mentally weak and incompetent to make a deed, denied that she was unduly influenced to do so by the defendant, and averred that the consideration paid by him for such deed was the support of the grantor by the defendant during her life, and that she was at the time of its execution in all respects competent to make the deed.
Testimony was taken, and upon a final hearing a decree was rendered by the chancellor adjudging the deed to be valid conveyance of the property to the defendant, that such property was therefore not subject to partition, and dismissing the bill. There was no specific finding upon the issue of fact presented, namely, the alleged incapacity of the grantor to make a valid deed.
There are several assignments of error, but the only question presented and argued is whether, in view of the evidence, the decree should have been for defendant; the contention being that the evidence was sufficient to establish the fact of the mental incompetency of the grantor to make a valid deed at the time of the execution of the conveyance.
This court has held that mere mental weakness will not authorize a court of equity to set aside a deed if it does not amount to inability to comprehend the effect and nature of the transaction and is not accompanied by evidence of imposition or undue influence. Clarke et al. v. Hartt et al., 56 Fla. 775, 47 So. 819; Waterman v. Higgins, 28 Fla. 660, 10 So. 97.
That the grantor in the deed under consideration was subject to what may have been insane delusions seems to be established by the evidence.
George Spooner, the first witness for complainants, who was a nearby neighbor, testified that she, the grantor, had several times told his wife that she was afraid that he, the witness, would kill her; 'that the echose had told her I was going to kill her.' He testified further that he would see her walking around her house at night with a light, and that he was 'afraid she would burn him out, kill herself, or something'; that he, with others of the community, because of their belief that she was mentally defective, and before the deed was made, initiated proceedings to have her adjudged insance and committed to the hospital for the insane at Chattahoochee, but that the proceedings were abandoned when a daughter and her husband asked to be permitted to take her and care for her in their home.
C. T. McDaniel, a witness for complainants who lived near the grantor during the latter years of her life, testified that in his opinion she was mentally unsound; and he also testified of the fear entertained and expressed by her that the witness George Spooner would kill her.
Tom Travis, one of the complainants, a son of the grantor, testified that----
Eli Banks, one of the complainants, the son-in-law into whose home the grantor was taken when the proceedings to have her adjudged insane were abandoned, in his testimony said:
Mary Banks, one of the complainants, the wife of Eli Banks and daughter of the grantor, in detailing the acts of the grantor which indicated to her, the witness, that the grantor was incompetent, said:
This witness testified further that the defendant, Sim Travis, the grantee in the deed under consideration, with whom the grantee made her home, at least acquiesced in the action taken to have her confined in the hospital for the insane on the theory that she was mentally deficient at the time. The testimony of the witness on this point is as follows:
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In Re Donnelly's Estate, in Re
... ... sustain the decree appealed from. See Sandlin v. Hunnter ... Company, 70 Fla. 514, 70 So. 553; Travis v ... Travis, 81 Fla. 309, 87 So. 762; Lucas v. Wade, ... 43 Fla. 419, 31 So. 231 ... The ... decree appealed from is affirmed ... ...
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Markell v. Hilpert
...129 Fla. 445, 176 So. 499; Kreher v. Morley, 84 Fla. 121, 92 So. 686. See also: Smith v. Dowling, 81 Fla. 867, 89 So. 315; Travis v. Travis, 81 Fla. 309, 87 So. 762; Commercial Bank of Ocala v. First National Bank, Fla. 685, 87 So. 315; Hill v. Beacham, 79 Fla. 430, 85 So. 147; Smith v. O'B......
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... ... conclusion in favor of either party. Baggott v ... Otis, 65 Fla. 447, 62 So. 362; Travis v ... Travis, 81 Fla. 309, 87 So. 762; Slorah v ... Wilcox, 59 Fla. 601, 52 So. 12 ... The ... evidence is legally sufficient to ... ...
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Mental Illness and the right to contract.
...of the transaction. Id. No further requirements were announced for the threshold to be met. However, a year later, in Travis v. Travis, 81 Fla. 309, 311-12, 87 So. 762,763 (1921), the Florida Supreme Court appeared to add to the incompetency test a requirement that the contractual transacti......