Traynham v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 July 1912
• Citation: 75 S.E. 381,92 S.C. 43
• Parties: TRAYNHAM v. CHARLESTON & W. C. RY. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

75 S.E. 381

92 S.C. 43

TRAYNHAM v. CHARLESTON & W. C. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 13, 1912

"To be officially reported."

On rehearing. Reversed.

For former opinion, see 71 S.E. 813.

F Barron Grier, of Greenwood, and Simpson, Cooper & Babb, of Laurens, for appellant. W. R. Richey, of Laurens, for respondent.

GARY C.J.

This is an action for the recovery of a statutory penalty and for damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of an unreasonable delay on the part of the defendant in transporting certain articles of merchandise.

The allegations of the complaint, material to the consideration of the questions involved, are as follows: "That heretofore, to wit, on the 4th day of March, 1907, the Ashepoe Fertilizer Company delivered to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company at Charleston, S. C., ten tons of guano, consigned to Z. R. Traynham, at Barksdale, in Laurens county, and state aforesaid. That at Yemassee in the state aforesaid, on March 5, 1907, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company delivered the car containing said guano to the defendant the Charleston and Western Carolina Railway Company for transportation to the plaintiff at Barksdale S.C. That the distance between Yemassee and Barksdale, both of which are in the state of South Carolina, is not over 200 miles by the nearest railroad route. That although the said car of guano was received by the defendant on March 5, 1907 and the defendant was requested to make prompt shipment thereof, the said car of guano was not delivered to the plaintiff, until the 6th day of April, 1907. That, by and under the statute law of South Carolina, all common carriers doing business in this state are required to transport to its destination all freight received by them for transportation, not exceeding the following limit, *** and for failure to comply with the said statute, such common carrier so failing shall be subject to a penalty of $5 per day for every day of delay in excess of the time hereinabove limited."

The defendant denied that the delivery of the guano at its destination was unreasonably delayed, and alleged that the delay was caused by an unusually heavy movement of freight at that time over the line of the defendant, which caused its yards and tracks to be blocked at the transfer points, and made it impossible to reach the car and move it at an earlier day. The defendant also alleged that the shipment was subject to the laws relating to interstate commerce, and not to state legislation, by reason of the fact that the defendant's line of railway, over which the guano was being transported, lies partly in the state of South Carolina and partly in the state of Georgia. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $60, and the defendant appealed.

The testimony shows that the shipment began and terminated at its destination in this state; that a part of defendant's line, over which it was necessary for it to transport the goods, lies within the state of Georgia.

The first question that will be considered is whether it was an interstate or an intrastate shipment. The cases of Sternberger v. Railway, 29 S.C. 510, 7 S.E. 836, 2 L. R. A. 105; State v. Holleyman, 55 S.C. 207, 31 S.E. 362, 33 S.E. 366, 45 L. R. A. 567; Frasier & Co. v. Railway, 81 S.C. 162, 62 S.E. 14; Hunter v. Railway, 81 S.C. 169, 62 S.E. 13; and Hanley v. Kansas City Ry., 187 U.S. 617, 23 S.Ct. 214, 47 L.Ed. 333, determine beyond question that it was an interstate shipment.

In the case of Hunter v. Railway, 81 S.C. 169, 62 S.E. 13, the same railroad company was involved, and the facts in every respect were similar to those now under consideration, except in that case the delay occurred in the state of Georgia. The title of the act then and now before us for interpretation is: "An act to prevent delays, in the transportation of freight, by railroads in this state." The first section provides: "That from and after May 1, 1904, all railroad companies, doing business in this state, shall transport to its destination all freight received by them for transportation within the state. ***" 24 St. at Large, p. 671. In that case the court used this language: "Construing the words 'transportation within the state' according to their exact and natural meaning, they do not embrace interstate transportation. (Citing authorities.) The statute, therefore, cannot have operation beyond the territory of the state, and should not be so construed as to interfere substantially with transportation in its interstate feature. *** Transportation is a part of commerce, and it must be held that the transportation in this instance was not wholly within the state, but was in part within the state of Georgia, and was therefore interstate transportation." If no other language had been used by the court in that case, it would be unnecessary to cite authorities to show that the statute of this state is inapplicable. But the court left open the question whether a case is embraced within the terms of the statute when the delay takes place wholly in this state.

In Hanley v. Kansas City Ry., 187 U.S. 617, 23 S.Ct. 214, 47 L.Ed. 333, the court quotes with approval the following language from Pacific Coast S. S. Co. v. Railroad Commissioners (C. C.) 18 F. 10, 9 Sawy. 253: "To bring the transportation within the control of the state as part of its domestic commerce, the subject transported must be within the entire voyage under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state."

An interstate transportation is continuous in its nature, and, if a state statute could have the effect of breaking the continuity of transportation, it would necessarily interfere with interstate commerce. State v. Holleyman, 55 S.C. 207, 31 S.E. 362, 33 S.E. 366, 45 L. R. A. 567. As an interstate transportation must be regarded as an entirety, it is difficult to conceive how a delay may take place within a state without being affected by causes operating at some other place on the line of railroad, even in another state. It would certainly be an onerous burden on interstate commerce to hold that a shipment, during its actual transportation, could be subjected to state legislation at any point on the line whatever, before it reached its destination.

It is the judgment of this court that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed.

WATTS, J., and ERNEST GARY, COPES, PRINCE, SPAIN, FRANK B. GARY, and SHIPP, Circuit Judges, concur.

GAGE, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

Granting that the shipment was betwixt the states, the mixed issue made is this: Does the requirement of the statute that the car of fertilizers should not be halted in this state except for "good and sufficient cause" constitute a burden upon or hindrance of the carriage of the fertilizers? The testimony does not prove it as a fact, and no just inference shows it as the law.

In my judgment the statute is a valid exercise of the state's power now, and the result below was right and ought to be affirmed.

HYDRICK J. (dissenting).

Lest others may be unjustly criticized for my shortcoming, I want to say that I am solely responsible for the delay in the filing of the decision of the court in this case. The opinion of the Chief Justice was prepared before the case was heard by the court en banc. The opinion of Mr. Justice FRASER was prepared and sent to me within a few weeks thereafter. Since then the papers have been in my hands. Circumstances beyond my control have prevented the preparation of this opinion at an earlier date. I venture to think, however, that the importance of the question involved to the people of this state justifies the taking of all the time that was necessary for its thorough consideration.

The action was brought to recover the penalty of $5 a day which the statute of this state (25 Stat. p. 490) allows consignees, who are injured by the delay, to recover of carriers for every day of unreasonable delay in the transportation of freight within this state. The defendant received the shipment March 5th, but failed to carry it to destination till April 6, 1907, a delay of more than 30 days, notwithstanding the distance between the points of shipment and destination is not over 200 miles. Notwithstanding both points are within this state, defendant's road runs for a distance of some 20 miles outside the state and through the city of Augusta, Ga. This circumstance affords the defense chiefly relied upon, to wit, that the shipment was interstate, and therefore the state statute does not apply, and, if it does, that it is void, because it is an unlawful interference with and burden upon interstate commerce.

The court instructed the jury as follows: "If the jury find that the car was delayed in South Carolina by reason of conditions existing on the road of defendant in the state of Georgia, then you must find for the defendant. If the jury find that the delay in the shipment occurred wholly within this state, then I charge you that the plaintiff is entitled to recover $5 per day for every day the car was delayed in this state, less the time allowed by the statute, Sundays excluded, provided you find that the delay was not brought about by good and sufficient cause. If you find that the delay was brought about by good and sufficient cause, you must find for the defendant, or, if you find that the delay occurred in the state of Georgia, you must find for the defendant." Under these instructions, the verdict of the jury settles the questions of fact in plaintiff's favor that the shipment was unreasonably delayed while it was within this state, and that the delay was due to conditions existing wholly within this state. The questions raised by the expressions, other than the validity of the statute, as applied to the...