Trcka v. Atzenhoffer Chevrolet Co.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 6:21-CV-00035 |
| Parties | JOHN TRCKA, Plaintiff, v. ATZENHOFFER CHEVROLET COMPANY, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Plaintiff John Trcka was the manager of the used cars department for the Defendant, Atzenhoffer Chevrolet Company, Inc. (“Atzenhoffer”). On June 21, 2019, he had a medical procedure related to his cancer treatment. A week later, he was fired. Trcka alleges that he was fired because of his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) and the corresponding state statute, the Texas Commission of Human Rights Act (the “TCHRA”). Atzenhoffer denies these claims and asserts that Trcka was discharged for performance related issues.
Pending before the Court are Atzenhoffer's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 16), and Atzenhoffer's Objections to Plaintiff Trcka's Summary Judgment Evidence, (Dkt. No 22). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Atzenhoffer's Motion for Summary Judgement and OVERRULES Atzenhoffer's Objections to Plaintiff Trcka's Summary Judgment Evidence.
John Trcka was hired in December 2005 to work at Atzenhoffer, a car dealership. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2); (Dkt. No. 19 at 1). Over the course of his tenure at Atzenhoffer, Trcka held various sales and finance positions until he was ultimately promoted to sales manager over the used cars department in June 2013.[2] (Dkt. No. 1 at 2); (Dkt. No. 19 at 1). Sometime around April 2019, Trcka was diagnosed with skin cancer. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2). On June 21, 2019, Trcka underwent a medical procedure related to his cancer treatment. (Dkt No. 16 at 4). At that time, Trcka had only informed Troy York, Atzenhoffer's general sales manager, of his scheduled medical procedure, and York did not share that information with anyone else. (Dkt. No. 16 at 5); (See Dkt. No. 19 at 5). After the procedure, Trcka returned to work on June 24, 2019. (Dkt. No. 16 at 4). Atzenhoffer fired Trcka on June 28, 2019. (Dkt. No. 16 at 4); (Dkt. No. 19 at 5).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law,” and “a fact issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Renwick v. PNK Lake Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and identifying the record evidence “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2253, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam).
If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the nonmovant's] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,” summary judgment is appropriate. Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The nonmovant's burden “will not be satisfied by ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.'” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). But the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
As a preliminary matter, Atzenhoffer objects to certain evidence offered by Trcka. (Dkt. No. 22). Of these objections, only the first is relevant to this Motion. Atzenhoffer objects to the use of a report, entitled the Dominion Snapshot, (Dkt. No. 19-5 at 1), as not being a credible source of Atzenhoffer's performance or profitability. (Dkt. No. 22 at 1). The Court overrules Atzenhoffer's objection to the entire report because it is overbroad. The report provides context and data relevant to Atzenhoffer's basis for firing Trcka.
The Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the remainder of Atzenhoffer's objections to the summary judgment evidence and will only consider admissible evidence in addressing the merits of the Motion.[3] Accordingly, the Court overrules Atzenhoffer's remaining objections. See Villa v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't, No. 2:19-CV-00256, 2021 WL 1179271, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2021); Mission Toxicology, LLC v. Unitedhealthcare Ins. Co., 499 F.Supp.3d 350, 359 (W.D. Tex. 2020) ().
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual based on the individual's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). “An employee may use ‘direct or circumstantial evidence, or both' to establish a case of discrimination.” Gosby v. Apache Indus. Servs., Inc., 30 F.4th 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2019)). Here, Trcka offers only circumstantial evidence in support of his discrimination claim.[5]
Courts proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm in circumstantial evidence cases. Villa, 2021 WL 1179271, at *13 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). This framework first requires a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision.” Id. (citation omitted). If the employer articulates such a reason, the plaintiff may overcome summary judgment only by demonstrating that the employer's purported explanation is a “pretext” for, in this case, disability discrimination. McMichael v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 934 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2019).
The Parties disagree over whether Trcka has established a prima facie case of disability discrimination. “To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he was qualified for the job; [and] (3) that he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability.” LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d at 697 (alternations in original) (quoting Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Atzenhoffer argues that Trcka has failed to present a “prima facie case for discrimination because he cannot establish that he suffers from a disability under the ADA.” (Dkt. No. 16 at 9). Atzenhoffer asserts that Trcka's alleged disability is “three (3) spots of skin tissue containing non-aggressive malignant melanoma removed from his back on one (1) occasion[,]” and that Trcka “was cleared of the cancerous skin tissue and never diagnosed or treated for non-aggressive malignant melanoma after that one (1) occasion.” (Id. at 1). Atzenhoffer contends that, under the ADA, Trcka must show that he suffers from “an impairment that has actually and substantially limited [his] major life activities,]” which Trcka has failed to do. (Id. at 9-11). Further, Atzenhoffer points out that the individuals making the decisions regarding Trcka's employment did not know of his alleged disability, and as a result, Trcka's discharge could not have been on account of his disability. (Id. at 14-15).
Trcka argues in response that his cancer constitutes an actual disability because “the growth of cancer cells inhibits normal cell growth, which is considered a major bodily function under the ADA.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 3). Trcka also argues that he was “regarded as” disabled by Atzenhoffer because Atzenhoffer's general sales manager, Troy York, was aware of his cancer diagnosis. (Id. at 4). Trcka asserts that he was “significantly out-performing” Jeremy Arnold, the manager of the new cars department, who was not disabled and later promoted despite his department's low performance. (Id. at 6, 9-10). And Trcka contends that the close temporal proximity between the disclosure of his cancer to the general sales manager and his firing is “sufficient . . . to establish a prima facie case” of discrimination. (Id. at 10).
The first quesion is whether Trcka has a disability as defined by the ADA. Under the ADA, a person is disabled if he has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities[.]” 42 U.S.C § 12102(1)(A). The ADA defines a major life activity in two ways. ...
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