Treanor v. B. P. E. Leasing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 52902,52902
• Citation: 158 N.W.2d 4
• Parties: Donald TREANOR and Cynthia S. Treanor, by her next friend and father, Donald Treanor, Appellants, v. B.P.E. LEASING, INC., Thomas E. McPherson, and John A. Musselman, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 4

158 N.W.2d 4

Donald TREANOR and Cynthia S. Treanor, by her next friend and father, Donald Treanor, Appellants, v. B.P.E. LEASING, INC., Thomas E. McPherson, and John A. Musselman, Appellees.

No. 52902.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 9, 1968.

Richard L. Pinegar, Des Moines, for appellants.

Terrence A. Hopkins, Des Moines, for appellee, John A. Musselman.

Eugene Davis, Des Moines, for appellees, B.P.E. Leasing, Inc. and Thomas E. McPherson.

LARSON, Justice.

In their action for damages against separate defendants for personal injuries received when plaintiff Cynthia S. Treanor was involved in two separate automobile collisions less than two months apart, plaintiffs amended their petition to include a demand for partial damages which were alleged to be inseparable and indivisible. Pursuant to a motion to adjudicate points of law by one defendant, the court struck plaintiffs' amendment and ordered the causes of action against the defendants be separately docketed and tried. Upon timely application, plaintiffs were granted permission to appeal on October 18, 1967, and we now have this appeal.

Several interesting and important issues are raised herein. Although the trial court seems to have based its decision to strike plaintiffs' first amendment to petition on the ground that the allegation disclosed the personal injuries sustained 'as a result of two separate accidents, one of which occurred April 16, 1966, and the other June 9, 1966, * * * were not so closely related in point of time as to call for the application of the doctrine of inseparability of damages rendering necessary a joint judgment against separate tort-feasors * * *,' we feel there are broader questions involved which must be considered in arriving at a decision in this matter. The primary question, we believe, is whether the pleadings are sufficient to state a cause of action against these defendants upon which relief may be granted, and secondarily, whether the trial court should have found, under plaintiffs' allegations, the question of inseparability of some of the damages and injuries involved factual matters for consideration by a fact-finder and, therefore, was premature in its consideration and ruling on the issue of inseparability as a matter of law. We believe the pleadings are sufficient and that the trial court's rulings were premature.

Plaintiffs' petition contains specific counts of negligence against the individual defendants. Counts I and III relate to Cynthia's claim for injuries, and Counts II and IV relate to her father's claim for medical and dental expenses. Plaintiffs' first amendment followed defendants' motion to strike or docket the causes of action separately, based upon the contention that they were distinct, related to two separate collisions, and did not present any common question of law or fact.

In plaintiffs' amendment it was alleged: '5. That some of the injuries and damages to the Plaintiffs from and after the 9th day of June, 1966, are a result of the combined effects of the collision on April 16, 1966, and a collision on June 9, 1966, and some of the effect upon and some of the damage to the Plaintiffs as a result of each collision are inseparable and indivisible from the other.'

I. The determination of liability in a particular case may involve questions of fact and law as well as questions of social and judicial policy. Various jurisdictions take various views of these policies. We have rejected the rule that joint liability of wrongdoers, each for all and all for each, exists only where the wrong itself is joint in automobile negligence actions, and have pointed out the negligence of two or more need only concur or combine, and it is not necessary to liability that such persons act in concert or according to plan or agreement. McDonald v. Robinson, 207 Iowa 1293, 224 N.W. 820, 62 A.L.R. 1419; Law v. Hemmingsen, 249 Iowa 820, 826, 89 N.W.2d 386.

In Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 1272, 110 N.W.2d 321, 324, we recognized the correct rule of liability in consecutive collision cases is that expressed in Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33, 37, 100 A.L.R.2d 1, and citations. We said: 'The rule is, where two or more persons acting independently are guilty of consecutive acts of negligence closely related in point of time, and cause damage to another under circumstances where the damage is indivisible, i.e., it is not reasonably possible to make a division of the damage caused by the separate acts of negligence, the negligent actors are jointly and severally liable.' Therein we also pointed out that the damage is indivisible when the trier of the facts decides that they cannot make a division or apportionment thereof among the negligent actors. See Restatement of Torts, Vol. 4, § 879, and 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 257, pages 946, 947.

Most of the cases involving apportionment of damages in motor vehicle accidents found in the texts and annotations are of the so-called 'chain reaction' type of accidents. See annotations found in 100 A.L.R.2d 20--170. Our own case of Ruud v. Grimm, supra, falls into that category. However, we do not believe the rule or doctrine of indivisibility and inseparable damages should be confined to accidents that almost simultaneously occur. True, we used the words 'closely related in point of time' in Ruud v. Grimm, but the significance of that phrase apparently has been given undue emphasis. When enunciated, we had the factual situation before us in mind and did not at that time need to extend the rule beyond that necessary to resolve that situation. The better rule is that, where two or more persons acting independently are guilty of consecutive acts of negligence, causing damage to another under circumstances where the damage is indivisible, the negligent actors are jointly and severally liable. Of course, those acts that are remote or have no reasonable connection with the injury or damages claimed must be excluded. In case of doubt, here again the finder of fact must be afforded an opportunity to decide whether the consecutive acts of negligence are reasonably related to the damage alleged. In re Condemnation of Certain Land, 253 Iowa 1130, 1135, 114 N.W.2d 290. Our most recent case dealing with the time factor in separate action joinders is Meek v. Long, 258 Iowa 1309, 142 N.W.2d 385, 387, 388.

Meek v. Long, supra, did not involve the question of 'joint' tortfeasors in the ordinary sense, or successive injuries by two separate defendants, but did involve one defendant charged with two independent and tortious acts alleged...