Treanor v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority
| Decision Date | 22 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 05 Civ. 5586(SAS).,05 Civ. 5586(SAS). |
| Citation | 414 F.Supp.2d 297 |
| Parties | Vincent TREANOR, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY and Long Island Rail Road, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Richard A. Dienst, New York, New York, for Plaintiff.
Mary Jennings Mahon, Long Island Rail Road Company, Law Department, Jamaica, New York, for Defendants.
Vincent Treanor, a former employee of the Long Island Rail Road ("LIRR"), brings this action against the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA") and the LIRR alleging employment discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law1 and the New York City Human Rights Law.2 He also claims that defendants violated the notice requirements of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA").3 The LIRR now moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the LIRR's motion to dismiss is denied.4
Treanor began working at the LIRR on or about April 12, 1989, as a car appearance maintainer.5 He was promoted to car repairman in August 1999, and then to road car inspector in June 2002.6 The LIRR learned that Treanor abused drugs and alcohol on or about October 7, 1994.7 On October 10, 2002, Treanor was involved in a work related accident which resulted in a knee injury requiring arthroscopic surgery.8 Treanor submitted to a return-to-duty physical examination, which included a drug test, on November 26, 2002.9 On November 29, 2002, Treanor tested positive for cocaine, and he was removed from service pending a Notice of Trial and Hearing for violation of the Corporate Alcohol and Substance Abuse Policy.10
At a February 14, 2003 hearing, Treanor admitted to the charge of violating the substance abuse policy, waived his right to a trial and signed a Last Chance Agreement.11 Pursuant to the agreement Treanor was required to serve an eleven month suspension and had to be certified ready to return to work by the LIRR Employee Assistance Program ("EAP").12 Failure to abide by the agreement would result in Treanor's dismissal.13 As part of his EAP recovery plan, Treanor was required to enroll in an out-patient drug treatment program at Crossings Recovery Center in Deer Park, New York.14 The cost of the program was paid for by his employer-provided health insurance.15 On May 14, 2003, Crossing Recovery Center informed Treanor that his medical insurance had been discontinued and that he would have to pay if he wished to continue in the program.16 Treanor then asked to be drug tested at the LIRR facilities because he could not afford to pay for the tests.17 Treanor was told that he could not be drug tested at the LIRR facilities and that he had to pay the costs of completing the Crossing Recovery Center program.18
On May 15, 2003, Treanor was advised for the first time by his union representative that health insurance coverage ceases when an employee has been out of work for more than six months.19 Treanor claims he was unable to complete the EAP plan without COBRA replacement insurance because he could not afford to pay for treatment and drug tests.20 On September 30, 2003, Treanor was charged with violating the Last Chance Waiver Agreement.21 At the hearing, Treanor was told that he must either resign or be terminated.22 He was informed that if he was terminated he would lose his LIRR pension, and would not be able to use the LIRR as a reference for future employment.23 On September 30, 2003, Treanor resigned.24
On May 23, 2005, Treanor filed a complaint in the Supreme Court, New York County. Treanor alleged that: (1) the Last Chance Agreement violated COBRA because the LIRR provided a last chance that it knew or should have known could not be completed because the LIRR discontinued his medical insurance;25 (2) the LIRR discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by treating him differently from other similarly situated employees in violation of the State and City Human Rights Laws;26 (3) the LIRR constructively terminated him because of his disability;27 and (4) the LIRR violated' the notice requirements of COBRA.28
The LIRR removed the case to this Court and then moved to dismiss, claiming that Treanor's complaint was untimely because it was not filed within one year and thirty days of Treanor's termination.29 The LIRR also claimed that the Complaint was defective because it failed to allege that at least thirty days had elapsed since the claims upon which the action was founded were presented to the LIRR, and that the LIRR neglected or refused to make adjustment or payment with respect to those claims.30
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a motion to dismiss should be granted only if "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'"31 The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof."32 When deciding a motion to dismiss courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor.33 Courts generally do not consider matters outside the pleadings but may consider documents attached to the pleadings, documents referenced in the pleadings, or documents that are integral to the pleadings.34
Section 1276 of the New York Public Authorities Law ("PAL") provides for a shortened limitations period and a thirty-day demand rule for tort actions against the MTA and its subsidiaries, including the LIRR.35 The statute provides, in relevant part:
(1) As a condition to the consent of the state to such suits against the [LIRR], in every action against the [LIRR] for damages, for injuries to real or personal property or for the destruction thereof or for personal injuries or death, the complaint shall contain an allegation that at least thirty days have elapsed since the demand, claim or claims upon which such action is founded were presented to a member of the [LIRR] or other officer designated for such purpose and that the [LIRR] has neglected or refused to make an adjustment or payment thereof.
(2) An action against the [LIRR] founded on tort, except an action for wrongful death, shall not be commenced more than one year after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued, nor unless a notice of claim shall have been served on the [LIRR] within the time limited by and in compliance with all the requirements of section fifty-e of the general municipal law.36
Section 1276(1) of the PAL tolls the one year limitation period of section 1276(2) for thirty days.37 As a result, the net limitation period governing a tort action against the LIRR is one year and thirty days.38 Nearly identical requirements apply to actions against the New York City Transit Authority under section 1212 of the PAL,39 and New York courts have interpreted these provisions consistently.40 These statutes were "designed for traditional tort actions" and should not be used "as a sword rather than a shield or as a trap to catch the unwary or ignorant."41
Actions to recover upon a liability "created or imposed by statute" are generally governed by the three-year statute of limitations period set forth in section 214(2) of the CPLR, "unless a different time is prescribed by law."42 This statute of limitations governs claims of employment discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law.43
Congress neglected to provide a statute of limitations for claims arising under COBRA. Accordingly, a court must apply the limitations period of the state law cause of action most analogous to the COBRA claim.44 There has not been complete agreement among federal courts on how to analogize COBRA's notice requirements to any state law.45 Some jurisdictions have determined that the best analogy is to a claim for unfair insurance practices.46 In Myers v. King's Daughters Clinic, the court held that the purpose of COBRA "was to provide employees with an opportunity to continue to receive group health insurance after the occurrence of a qualifying event, e.g. termination."47 Failing to notify an employee of his right to receive health insurance can be characterized as an unfair insurance practice. New York has a three-year statute of limitations for claims of unfair insurance practices under section 214(2) of the CPLR.48 I conclude that New York's three-year statute of limitations applies to claims under COBRA.
III. DISCUSSION
Treanor alleges that he was terminated on September 30, 2003, and that he filed this Complaint on May 23, 2005, within the three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 214(2) of the CPLR. The LIRR argues that Treanor's employment discrimination and COBRA claims are "founded on tort," and therefore time-barred under the one year and thirty day limitations period of section 1276(2) of the PAL.
Section 1276(2) of the PAL does not govern Treanor's employment discrimination claims. This Court has already held that a nearly identical section of the PAL, is "not applicable to employment discrimination claims because they are not tort actions."49 as holding accords with New York cases reasoning that a discrimination claim is not a tort because it is "a new statutory cause of action which was not cognizable at common law."50
This Court declines to follow the reasoning of Gaughan v. Nelson, a 1995 ...
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...to two out-of-state cases, viz.: Facchina v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 735 So.2d 499 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1999) and Treanor v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 414 F.Supp.2d 297, 303-05 (S.D.N.Y.2005). In Facchina, the District Court of Appeals of Florida held that a statute that created a claim for unauthori......
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