Treglia v. Zanesky
| Decision Date | 25 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | (AC 19829) |
| Citation | 67 Conn. App. 447,788 A.2d 1263 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PATRICK A. TREGLIA v. ROBERT G. ZANESKY ET AL. |
Mihalakos, Dranginis and Peters, Js.
Ridgely W. Brown, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Joseph F. Mulvey, for the appellee (defendant Michael Treglia).
Gerald L. Garlick, for the appellee (defendant Norwalk Savings Society et al.).
Peter V. Lathouris, with whom, on the brief, was Lucas J. Thomas, for the appellee (defendant Pontos Realty, Inc.). Eric J. Stockman, for the appellee (defendant Alfred Kery).
General Statutes § 47-51 sets out formal requirements for conveyances of real property. Under that statute, if a grantor does not subscribe to a deed "with his own hand," his name may be affixed by a person with a power of attorney. The principal issue in this case is whether this statutory directive may be waived by a grantor who has designated a surrogate signer by a specific grant of authority that is not in the form of a power of attorney. This is an issue of first impression. The trial court, concluding that use of a power of attorney was not always mandatory, rendered judgment denying the grantor's claim that the absence of a power of attorney entitled him to set aside a conveyance under the circumstances of this case. We agree.
On February 3, 1993, the plaintiff, Patrick A. Treglia, brought an action to quiet title and for compensatory and punitive damages against his former attorney, Robert G. Zanesky; his brother, Michael Treglia (brother); and subsequent titleholders to the property at issue.2 The defendants filed answers, special defenses and counterclaims. In addition, some of the defendants filed cross claims against each other. The plaintiffs complaint included a claim that someone other than the plaintiff had signed the plaintiffs name to the contract and warranty deed and that his brother had wrongfully kept proceeds from the sale. The court refused to charge the jury on forgery and refused to propound an interrogatory on that issue.
Prior to trial, the defendant Norwalk Savings Society filed a motion seeking to preclude the risk of double recovery by requiring the plaintiff to make an election of remedies between his claim for monetary damages and his claimed right to a decree that would quiet title. The court denied this motion before the presentation of the evidence, but subsequently required such an election after all the evidence had been presented. Over protest, the plaintiff elected to pursue his quiet title claim.
The jury returned its verdict in favor of all the defendants in accordance with its answers to a set of interrogatories. The court accepted the verdict of the jury and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.
The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment against him. In particular, he maintains that the court improperly denied his motions for directed verdict and to set aside the verdict.
The jury's answers to the interrogatories and the record as a whole reveal the following facts.3 From 1979 to 1986, the plaintiff, his brother and their father, Frank Treglia (father), jointly owned a tract of property located in Norwalk. During that time period, all three owners had participated in making repairs to the property and in collecting rent from tenants. The plaintiff, however, had left all business transactions to his father and his brother.
In February, 1986, the plaintiff's father and brother contracted to sell the Norwalk property to the defendant Pontos Realty, Inc. (Pontos). The contract of sale, duly recorded, contained the signatures of the father and the brother, as well as the purported signature of the plaintiff. Although concededly the plaintiff did not sign his own name on the contract, the jury made no finding as to who had done so.4 The contract set the purchase price at $100,000 to be paid by a promissory note in that amount payable to the plaintiffs brother.
In accordance with the contract of sale, the property was conveyed to Pontos by a warranty deed that purported to bear the signatures of all three owners. The plaintiff was not present at the closing and, therefore, did not sign his own name. The father signed the plaintiffs name to the deed, in accordance with the grant of authority given to him by the plaintiff to affix the plaintiffs signature.
The Pontos note was secured by two mortgages, duly recorded, to the defendants Norwalk Savings Society and the redevelopment agency of the city of Norwalk. In December, 1990, the defendant Alfred Kery obtained title to a portion of the property from Pontos.
Although the plaintiff knew in 1986 that the property was on the market to be sold, he did not discover the facts of the sale to Pontos until 1990.5 Nonetheless, the jury found that he had conducted himself in a way "intended or calculated to induce" the purchasing defendants6 to believe that "they were receiving or had received good title to the property." The jury further found that the plaintiff had waited too long to raise his claim of ownership and that the purchasing defendants had been prejudiced by the plaintiff's delay.
On appeal from the judgment of the trial court, the plaintiff does not claim that the factual findings of the jury were clearly erroneous. He does, however, raise three issues of law in which he claims that the court improperly (1) refused to enforce the statutory requirement that a representative signing the name of a grantor must have a valid power of attorney, (2) required the plaintiff to elect remedies prior to submission of the case to the jury, and (3) refused to charge the jury on forgery and on related compensatory damages. The plaintiff also raises three issues in which he claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying (1) the plaintiff's motion for directed verdict on the special defenses of laches and estoppel, (2) the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of inconsistent answers to interrogatories, and (3) the plaintiffs' motions for directed verdict and to set aside the verdict as to his brother.
The plaintiff challenges the propriety of a judgment that validates a conveyance despite noncompliance with the statutory formalities for conveyance, specifically those relating to the power of attorney, set out in § 47-5 (a).7 The plaintiff argues that this statutory provision is a mandatory condition that must be met to effectuate a valid conveyance and, accordingly, that noncompliance with the formal procedure renders a conveyance null and void. We disagree.
To determine whether the trial court improperly sanctioned a departure from the statute, we engage in plenary review because this is a question of law.8 See Willow Funding Co., L.P. v. Grencom Associates, 63 Conn. App. 832, 840, 779 A.2d 174 (2001). The issue is whether a deed of conveyance may be validly signed by a grantor's representative who is someone other than an attorney "authorized for that purpose by a power executed, acknowledged and witnessed in the manner provided for conveyances...." General Statutes § 47-5 (a).9 The plaintiff argues that, without a power of attorney, a conveyance is void and therefore can be set aside at any time.
Connecticut cases have held that a conveyance of property rights is not automatically nullified by lack of adherence to certain formalities. While earlier common law required strict observance of formalities associated with the conveyance of property rights, (Emphasis added.) Ianotti v. Ciccio, 219 Conn. 36, 44, 591 A.2d 797 (1991); see also Pastine v. Altman, 93 Conn. 707, 713, 107 A. 803 (1919); Hartford & Salisbury Ore Co. v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112 (1874). In Ianotti, our Supreme Court recognized that one cotenant's attempt to convey an interest in a portion of property did not render the conveyance void. Ianotti v. Ciccio, supra, 44. Rather, under some circumstances, the conveyance may be set aside as voidable if the power to set aside has been effectively exercised. Id.
Similarly, in this case, we conclude that lack of adherence to the statutory formalities set out in § 47-5 (a) rendered the 1986 deed of conveyance voidable, but not void. We do not intend to give a carte blanche approval to any deviation from the statute. The jury here found, however, that the plaintiff "gave permission to or granted authority to his father to sign his name on the 1986 deed of conveyance."10 We find it significant that the jury's finding focused on authority to sign the plaintiffs name specifically on the 1986 deed of conveyance. This finding is particularly relevant to laying a factual foundation for the purchasing defendants' special defenses of laches and estoppel. It also establishes, however, the specific authority given to the father.
We cannot create a bright line test to distinguish permissible deviations from the statute from those that are impermissible. We conclude, therefore, that under the special circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs statutory claim is not persuasive.
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly required him to make an election of remedies prior to the court's submission of the case to the jury.11 This is a question of law and therefore merits plenary review. See Faught v. Edgewood, 63 Conn. App. 164, 172, 772 A.2d 1142, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 934, 776 A.2d 1150 (2001). We again disagree with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff argues that he may seek both monetary...
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...and, second, that delay must have prejudiced the [opposing party]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Treglia v. Zanesky, 67 Conn.App. 447, 459, 788 A.2d 1263 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 926, 793 A.2d 252 (2002). The doctrine "functions in part as a kind of `flexible' statute of limit......
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