Treglown, In re

• Decision Date: 27 February 1968
• Citation: 156 N.W.2d 363,38 Wis.2d 317
• Parties: In the Matter of the Hospitalization of John TREGLOWN, Central State Hospital. Thedore TREGLOWN and Rachel Treglown, Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 363

156 N.W.2d 363

38 Wis.2d 317

In the Matter of the Hospitalization of John TREGLOWN Central State Hospital Thedore TREGLOWN and Rachel Treglown, Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 27, 1968.

Morse, Morse & Roggensack, Lancaster, for appellants.

Charles C. Lubcke, Collection & Deportation Counsel, James R. Pleyte and Robert H. Kletzien, Asst. Counsel, Madison, for respondent.

ROBERT W. HANSEN, Justice.

Are these parents liable for the maintenance costs of their minor son during his confinement at Central State Hospital on a commitment made pursuant to Sec. 957.11(3) Stats.? The trial judge answered this question, Yes. This Court answers the question, No, and this decision sets forth the reasoning for the differing conclusion.

This action is brought under the provisions of Sec. 46.10(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes providing:

'(2) Any * * * patient in any charitable or curative institution of the state * * * in which the state is chargeable with all or a part of the patient's maintenance * * * and in the case of a minor child the father or mother of the patient, and their property and estates, including their homesteads, shall be liable for such patient's maintenance not exceeding the actual per capita cost thereof * * * and the department may bring action for the enforcement of such liability.'

The trial judge found that 'The liability of parents for the treatment of a minor child, as established by Sec. 46.10(2) Wis. Stats., exists if the institution designated is a charitable or curative institution. The Court finds that Central State Hospital is such an institution.'

Under the cases heretofore decided, it appears clear that the Central State Hospital at Waupun cannot be thus designated as a 'charitable or curative institution' in all situations, regardless of the nature and purpose of the commitment in a particular case. Neither can the Central State Hospital be found to be not a 'charitable or curative institution' in all cases and situations. In each category of cases at least, the court must inquire into the exact purpose and nature of the commitment made to determine whether Sec. 46.10(2), Stats. applies. The answer of this Court has been different in different situations.

In Guardianship of Sprain, ¹ Sprain, who was charged with murder, was sent to Central State Hospital for observation as to his sanity. After five months, he was returned to court. He was found to be insane. His trial was postponed indefinitely. He was committed to Central State Hospital and remained there for nearly five years. The State Board of Control, acting under the statutory equivalent of Sec. 46.10(2), Stats., ² sought to charge his estate for his maintenance for the five month observation period and the five year confinement as insane period. The guardian objected only to the charge for the five month observation period. The court concluded that the estate could not be charged for hospitalization expenses during the five month period while the patient was held for observation because he was held under a criminal warrant and the purpose of such confinement was incidental to his prosecution for a crime. While liability for the longer period was not disputed, the court approved charges against the estate for the period of confinement following his being found insane and his re-commitment to the Central State Hospital for hospitalization as insane.

In Guardianship of Gardner, ³ Gardner had been convicted of statutory rape, sentenced to the state penitentiary for a ten year term. While serving his sentence, he was adjudged insane and transferred to the Central State Hospital. The state made claim against his estate for maintenance costs while he was confined at Central State Hospital. This court denied the liability of the estate deeming the hospital confinement directly referrable to his incarceration, noting that his prison sentence was running during his detention period in the hospital. This holds that there is no estate liability for maintenance of a patient at Central State Hospital transferred there from prison for confinement coinciding with his prison sentence.

In Guardianship of Radoll, ⁴ Radoll was charged with assault while armed with intent to murder. He was committed to Central State Hospital for a period of observation not to exceed thirty days. At the termination of this observation period, he was returned to court, adjudged insane. All proceedings were stayed and he was committed to the Central State Hospital for the criminally insane until he recovered and could face trial. The State Board of Control filed claim for care and maintenance at the hospital of the incompetent. Once again, this court stated that guardian was not liable for care and support of the ward during the observation period. Once again, this court stated that the guardian was liable where, upon a finding of present insanity, the trial was postponed and the incompetent was confined in the Central State Hospital for the insane until he recovered and could face trial.

Viewed together, these three cases hold (1) No estate liability for maintenance at Central State Hospital when the patient was committed for observation to determine his sanity to stand trial; (2) Estate liability for maintenance at Central State Hospital when, on a finding of present insanity, proceedings are stayed and the patient has been committed until able to stand trial; (3) No estate liability for maintenance at Central State Hospital when the patient was committed after having been sentenced to prison and while serving his term.

For the first time, the case now before us presents a fourth situation--the question of parental liability for maintenance costs at Central State Hospital for a minor child committed because of his acquittal based on insanity at the time of the commission of an alleged crime. The trial judge in this case concluded: 'Upon the finding of not guilty it follows that any commitment has no criminal implications whatsoever and that the person so committed stands in the relationship as if committed under Sec. 51.05, Wis.Stats.' We feel that there are significant differences between commitments under Sec. 51.05, Stats. and the statute involved in the present case, Sec. 957.11(3), particularly in the provisions governing release.

Under the Mental Health Act, Ch. 51, Stats., upon a finding by court or jury of insanity from a medical standpoint sufficient for civil commitment, the person is committed to a hospital for treatment until recovered. ⁵ Recovery from mental illness is the sole test for release. In fact, in some cases, the patient, confined in a treatment facility in a civil commitment proceeding, may be released before fully recovered. Sec. 51.11(5) provides that the court may order discharge of a patient if it determines that he is no longer 'in need of care and treatment.' Under Sec. 51.12(4) the superintendent of any state or county hospital or mental health center, with the approval of the department of health and social services necessary outside of Milwaukee County, may discharge any patient who in his judgment is recovered or who is not recovered but whose discharge will not be detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to the patient. Under Sec. 51.13(1)(2) the superintendents of certain state mental institutions may grant conditional releases to patients if, in their opinion, 'it is proper to do so,' or upon the written recommendation of the visiting physician. This emphasis upon release as soon as recovery or the welfare of the patient permits establishes the nature and purpose of the confinement: treatment for the illness involved.

In the case of commitments made under Sec. 957.13, as involved in the Sprain and Radoll cases, supra, the provisions for release are less flexible but the clear test is the recovery of the patient. Commitment under this statute is made only where the court finds that the defendant '* * * as a result of mental illness or deficiency lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.' Recovery from such incapability of understanding is the sole test for return to the court to face further proceedings. Sec. 957.13(3) provides: 'When the hospital superintendent considers that the defendant has recovered sufficiently to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense the hospital superintendent shall notify the committing court thereof. The court shall thereupon issue an order remanding the defendant to the custody of the sheriff pending further proceedings in the cause, but if the court finds that the defendant has not so recovered the defendant shall be recommitted to the hospital.' The mandatory provisions for return to court upon sufficient recovery establish that commitments under this statutory provision are made for treatment alone. No factor other than insufficiency of recovery justifies further confinement.

Two sub-sections of Sec. 957.11 must be read together in seeking to determine whether the automatic commitments to Central State Hospital, following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, are made for treatment with recovery the prerequisite to release. They are:

'(3) If found not guilty because insane or not guilty because feeble-minded, the defendant shall be committed to the central state hospital or to an institution designated by the state department of public welfare, there to be detained until discharged in accordance with law.

'(4) . . . No person so committed shall be discharged unless the court, in addition to finding him sane and mentally responsible, also finds that he is not likely...