Tremblay v. Connecticut State Emp. Retirement Commission

• Decision Date: 23 March 1976
• Citation: 365 A.2d 1125,170 Conn. 410
• Parties: Robert A. TREMBLAY v. CONNECTICUT STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1125

365 A.2d 1125

170 Conn. 410

Robert A. TREMBLAY v. CONNECTICUT STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT COMMISSION et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

March 23, 1976.

Paul M. Palten, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

David J. Della-Bitta, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the appellees (defendants).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ. LONGO, Associate Justice.

The facts of this case are as follows: In August of 1968, after he had applied for a position as a fire and security officer at Bradley International Airport, the plaintiff, Robert A. Tremblay, was given the required pre-employment physical examination by the state department of health's section on health services for state employees. That examination revealed a soft systolic murmur at the apex of the plaintiff's heart and a blood pressure of 130 over 88. The murmur had been discovered and blood pressure of 140 over 80 had been recorded at a previous examination. Other tests and x-rays taken during the August examination showed no abnormalities. The examining physician concluded that hypertension was not indicated and that the soft systolic murmur was 'functional' or 'innocent.' The physician reported that the plaintiff had passed the examination, and the plaintiff was subsequently hired by the state. During the summer of 1969, in the course of his employment at the airport, two emergencies occurred. The plaintiff was called to subdue an employee who was threatening his supervisor with a knife, and the plaintiff was required to minister to a heart attack victim. He continued to work until December, 1969, when he suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized. On February 1, 1970, he was released from state service. The plaintiff applied for disability retirement benefits. He appeared before the state medical examining board in March, 1970, and the board determined that he was ineligible to receive retirement benefits. On April 13, the state employees' retirement commission voted to deny the plaintiff's application. The plaintiff's case was reconsidered by the medical board on August 26 and by the commission on September 10 and he was again found to be ineligible. The plaintiff retained counsel and a further hearing was held before the commission on May 13, 1971. The commission voted to confirm its prior denial of the plaintiff's application.

The plaintiff brought an action against the commission and the medical board, the defendants in this case, seeking a writ of mandamus directing that retirement benefits be awarded to him. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants denying the writ, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff's assignment of errors is lengthy. This court will make corrections of findings of fact where the trial court has refused to find 'a material fact which was an admitted or undisputed fact.' Practice Book § 628. Paragraphs which the plaintiff seeks to add to the finding on this ground will not be added because they are implicit in the finding or include facts not material to the issues of the case; see Charter Oak Estates, Inc. v. Kearney, 160 Conn. 522, 525, 280 A.2d 885; or because an examination of portions of the appendix, pleadings or exhibits does not disclose that facts contained in those paragraphs are admitted or undisputed. See Barnini v. Sun Oil Co., 161 Conn. 59, 60, 283 A.2d 217. Requested corrections of the finding relating to claims of law made by the plaintiff, which are relevant to this appeal, are discussed in the opinion. The plaintiff also claims that the trial court erred in reaching certain conclusions and in failing to reach others, and in rendering judgment for the defendants which is unsupported by the court's conclusions. Conclusions are to be tested by the finding and several of the conclusions attacked by the plaintiff must stand because they are legally or logically consistent with facts found. Hutensky v. Avon, 163 Conn. 433, 437, 311 A.2d 92. The other conclusions are reviewed insofar as they affect the final result. See Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, 161 Conn. 191, 200, 286 A.2d 308.

We first consider the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the determination of the plaintiff's entitlement to disability retirement benefits required the exercise of discretion by the defendants.

The legislature has delegated to the defendant commission the broad and general power to administer the state retirement system. ¹ It is aided in that task by the defendant medical board. ² That board is composed of physicians and is to make a determination of an applicant's eligibility for disability retirement benefits. The board is to report its findings to the commission, which then grants or denies the application for such benefits. The determination made by the defendants clearly represents a decision made by them on the basis of their own judgment and therefore is a matter of discretion, not ministerial duty. 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 191.

The plaintiff argues that the disposition of his particular application was a purely ministerial matter. He claims that because he passed the preemployment physical examination, the defendants had no choice but to find that he is entitled to retirement benefits. An examination of the two statutes on which the plaintiff based his claim for benefits is necessary. The first is General Statutes § 5-169(b) which provides that a member of state service who becomes permanently disabled is eligible for disability retirement if his disability is 'a result of any injury received while in the performance of his duty as a state employee.' The second statute, § 5-145a, extends to certain employees the benefit of a presumption: 'Any condition of impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in total or partial disability or death to a member of the security force . . . of the bureau of aeronautics department . . . who successfully passed a physical examination on entry in such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of such condition, shall be presumed to have been suffered in the performance of his duty.'

The plaintiff based his claim under § 5-169(b) on the evidence he had offered of the emergency situations which occurred in the summer of 1969. The board found that that evidence did not prove that the plaintiff's heart attack was sustained in the performance of his duties as a state employee, and the commission accepted that finding. This conclusion clearly required the exercise of judgment on the part of the defendants and was a matter within their discretion.

The fact that the plaintiff...