Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Com'n

• Citation: 554 A.2d 292,210 Conn. 214
• Decision Date: 28 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13425,13425
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Henry O. BRIGGS v. STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMISSION.

Page 292

554 A.2d 292

210 Conn. 214

Henry O. BRIGGS v. STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMISSION.

No. 13425.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 4, 1989.

Decided Feb. 28, 1989.

Richard T. Sponzo, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Atty. Gen., Joseph I. Lieberman, Former Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Overend, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

Keith Bradoc Gallant, with whom were Edward Gallant and, on the brief, Betty G. Levy, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN and COVELLO, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

We limited our grant of certification in this appeal to the following issue: did the Appellate Court err in concluding that the defendant state employees retirement commission was required as a matter of law to find from the evidence that the plaintiff had become "permanently disabled from continuing to render the service in which he has been employed as the result of any injury received while in the performance of his duty as a state employee" pursuant to General Statutes § 5-169(b). As recounted in the Appellate Court's opinion, Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 13 Conn.App. 477, 538 A.2d 225 (1988), the plaintiff, Henry O. Briggs, brought an administrative appeal to the Superior Court seeking to overturn the defendant's decision denying his application for service connected disability retirement benefits pursuant to § 5-169(b). ¹ The Appellate Court found error in the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal. We reverse.

The underlying facts are fully reported in the opinion of the Appellate Court. The plaintiff, a mental health worker at Norwich Hospital, a state facility, was injured as a result of a violent attack by a patient. Id., at 478, 538 A.2d 225. In his application for service connected permanent disability retirement benefits pursuant to § 5-169(b), the plaintiff claimed that this attack had left him permanently disabled both physically and psychiatrically. Id., at 479, 538 A.2d 225. The medical examining board held two hearings on the plaintiff's application, at which the plaintiff presented medical reports, testified and responded at length to questioning by the physician members of the board. ² Id., at 479-80, 538 A.2d 225. Upon its initial consideration of the plaintiff's evidence, and again upon reconsideration after the second hearing, the board denied the plaintiff's application. Id., at 480, 538 A.2d 225. The plaintiff then filed a request for review with the defendant commission. Id.; see General Statutes § 5-155a(k). ³ The defendant's decision upheld the conclusion reached by the board in accordance with its administrative policy of deferring to the board's medical expertise with regard to medical issues. Id., at 480 and n. 5, 538 A.2d 225.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal from the defendant's decision, concluding that the board had not acted either arbitrarily or illegally in denying the plaintiff's application. Although the plaintiff renewed all of his claims of error in the Appellate Court, that court sustained the plaintiff's appeal on one ground only: that the board's decision was contrary to the evidence with regard to the alleged permanency of his psychiatric disability. ⁴ Id., at 480, 538 A.2d 225. On this issue, the Appellate Court concluded that "[t]he totality of the evidence before the board constituted substantial evidence as a matter of law that the plaintiff suffered a psychiatric disability resulting from the attack at Norwich Hospital, which rendered him permanently incapable of continuing to perform services as a mental health worker." Id., at 489, 538 A.2d 225. Accordingly, the Appellate Court found error in the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to order the defendant to grant the plaintiff's application for disability retirement benefits. Id. We agree with the trial court's resolution of this issue.

The "substantial evidence" rule governs judicial review of administrative factfinding under General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-183(g). ⁵ Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 539-41, 525 A.2d 940 (1987); Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn. 705, 713-14, 372 A.2d 110 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S.Ct. 2930, 53 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1977). An administrative finding is supported by "substantial evidence" if the record affords a " ' "substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred." ' " Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, supra, 203 Conn. at 541, 525 A.2d 940, quoting Lawrence v. Kozlowski, supra, 171 Conn. at 713, 372 A.2d 110. Such a standard of review allows less room for judicial scrutiny than does the "weight of the evidence" rule or the "clearly erroneous" rule. Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, supra. In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by "substantial evidence," a court must defer to the agency's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and to the agency's right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part. Id., 203 Conn. at 540-42, 525 A.2d 940. An agency composed of physicians is entitled, furthermore, to rely on its own expertise within the area of its professional competence. Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 428, 429 A.2d 910 (1980); Jaffe v. State Department of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 349-50, 64 A.2d 330 (1949). Basically, an agency is not "required to use in any particular fashion any of the materials presented to it so long as the conduct of the hearing is fundamentally fair. Manor Development Corporation v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 692, 697, 433 A.2d 999 (1980)." Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, supra, 203 Conn. at 542, 525 A.2d 940.

The factual issue before us is a narrow one. The medical examining board found, in accordance with the plaintiff's application, that the incident at Norwich Hospital had caused him to have a psychiatric disability, diagnosed by his psychiatrist as "[p]ost-traumatic stress disorder, chronic." Briggs v. State Employees Retirement Commission, supra, 13 Conn.App. at 485 n. 8, 538 A.2d 225. The board found, however, that the plaintiff had presented insufficient evidence of the permanency of his psychiatric condition. The board observed that the psychiatrist's initial report finding a "chronic" disability had indicated both the desirability of further treatment and that treatment had been "prematurely terminated." Id., at 483, 538 A.2d 225. A subsequent report, stemming from the same psychiatrist's reevaluation of the plaintiff approximately one year later, noted that medication had led to some improvement in the plaintiff's condition but had not alleviated other symptoms of the plaintiff's chronic stress disorder. The psychiatrist therefore expressly found the plaintiff "permanently disabled." Id., at 486-87 n. 9, 538 A.2d 225. It was this ultimate finding that the board rejected.

The Appellate Court based its conclusion that the board's finding should be overturned on two premises: first, that the board based its finding solely on its interpretation of the two reports submitted by the plaintiff's psychiatrist; and second, that the board's interpretation of these reports was untenable. Id., at 484, 487, 538 A.2d 225. In our view, the Appellate Court took too narrow a view of the independent role that § 5-169(c) assigns to the board, a board exclusively composed of physicians, in determining what constitutes a permanent disability.

Our analysis begins with the proposition that an applicant for service connected permanent disability benefits must make an affirmative showing that he or she has met the requirements of § 5-169(b). If the applicant does not immediately satisfy the burden of proof that the statute imposes, it is possible, as this case illustrates, to ask for reconsideration when additional facts concerning the applicant's condition become available. General Statutes § 5-169(d). ⁶ Until a proper factual showing has been made, however, there is no presumptive entitlement to permanent disability benefits. The board therefore had no duty to rebut the evidence produced on the plaintiff's behalf if it concluded that the plaintiff had not satisfied his burden of proof.

In evaluating the evidence before it, the board was obligated to exercise its independent judgment about the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the permanency of the plaintiff's condition. Because of its professional expertise, "the determination of the plaintiff's entitlement to disability retirement benefits required the exercise of discretion by the [board]." Tremblay v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, 170 Conn. 410, 415, 365 A.2d 1125 (1976); Riley v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, 178 Conn. 438, 441-42, 423 A.2d 87 (1979). The board was required to bring its medical judgment to bear not only on its evaluation of the reports of the plaintiff's psychiatrist, but also on its appraisal of the plaintiff's own extensive testimony about his mental condition at each of the two hearings on his application. The board expressly noted its reliance on "the testimony presented" as well as "the documentation...