Trend Coin Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.

Decision Date27 February 1986
Docket NumberNo. 65532,65532
Citation11 Fla. L. Weekly 75,487 So.2d 1029
CourtFlorida Supreme Court
Parties11 Fla. L. Weekly 75 TREND COIN COMPANY, d/b/a the Trendline, and Precious Metal Brokers, Inc., Petitioners, v. HONEYWELL, INC. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Respondents.

Larry B. Stewart and James B. Tilghman, Jr. of Stewart, Tilghman, Fox & Bianchi, Miami; and Lawrence Fuller of Fuller and Fingold, Miami Beach,, for petitioners.

James E. Tribble of Blackwell, Walker, Fascell & Hoehl, Miami, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us to review Honeywell, Inc. v. Trend Coin Co., 449 So.2d 876 (Fla.3d DCA 1984), because of direct conflict with Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway v. Peninsular Land, Transportation & Manufacturing Co., 27 Fla. 1, 9 So. 661 (1891), and Bergen Brunswig Corp. v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 415 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), review denied, 426 So.2d 25 (Fla.1983). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

Petitioner (plaintiff below), suffered the loss of jewelry, gold, and silver inventory as the result of a burglary on March 9, 1980. Petitioner sued respondent alleging intentional misrepresentation as to a burglar alarm system, negligent design, negligent installation and service, and breach of contract. The jury returned a verdict awarding compensatory damages of more than $8 million, punitive damages of $1 million and prejudgment interest of more than $3 million. In pertinent part the district court reversed the award of prejudgment interest on the ground that the exact loss was in dispute and could not be ascertained. We recently addressed this issue in Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212 (Fla.1985), by approving Bergen Brunswig Corp. and holding, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of the loss on verdicts which liquidate damages. We disapprove the portion of the district court opinion here which holds to the contrary.

Having accepted jurisdiction of the case on the issue in conflict, we also choose to address briefly other issues raised by the parties. Petitioner urges that the district court erred in reversing for a new trial on damages and in holding that evidence of an inventory contained in an insurance application was admissible to impeach subsequent statements pertaining to the value of the loss. We see no error in the district court's decision on these points.

Respondents urge that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a twelve percent prejudgment interest rate would be applied. We agree with respondents, at least in part. Section 687.01, Florida Statutes (1979), which was effective at the time of loss, prescribed an interest rate of six percent. Chapter 82-42, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1982, amended section 687.01 by prescribing that thereafter the interest rate would be twelve percent. This amendment reflects a legislative decision that a six percent interest rate was adequate until July 1, 1982, and that thereafter a twelve percent rate was applicable. In order to carry out legislative intent the interest rate here should be computed at six percent from the date of the loss until July 1, 1982. Thereafter, interest should be computed at twelve percent. Meigs & Cope Agency, Inc. v. Koffey, 435 So.2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In so holding we recognize an apparent divergence from Board of Public Instruction v. Wright, 77 So.2d 770 (Fla.1955), where we held that the statutory rate of interest in effect at the time of maturity of bond coupons applied uniformly until the time of judgment even though the legislature changed the statutory interest rate between the time of maturing and the time of judgment. The facts on Wright are skimpy, but it appears that the primary issue was whether there should be any interest at all, and, if there was to be, whether it should be that specified in the contract or the statute. So far as we can determine, there was no issue of whether a two-tier or single tier statutory rate should apply. In any event, our holding here is consistent with legislative intent. To the degree there is conflict, we overrule Wright.

For the reasons set forth above we hold that prejudgment interest may be awarded at the effective statutory rate for the period between time of injury and time of judgment. The decision of the district court below is quashed in part, approved in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD and SHAW, JJ., concur.

ADKINS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which EHRLICH, J., concurs.

ADKINS, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in that portion of the opinion which holds that plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of the loss on verdicts which liquidate damages. I dissent from the balance of the opinion.

This jury trial took twelve days. Twenty-six witnesses appeared and fifty-five exhibits were introduced. The jury found that the value of Trend's stolen inventory on the day of the loss was $8,037,674.60 and assessed $3,171,027.72 in prejudgment interest and $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages.

Honeywell hired accountants to review all of Trend's books and records and sought to disparage the record keeping practices of Trend and to show that Trend's damage claim was unbelievable. The accountants came up with a much smaller value for the loss. Honeywell called a total of seven witnesses to testify concerning the amount of damages which Trend may have suffered. These accountants testified that Trend's tax returns showed the loss was in the $250,000--$500,000 range, that the same calculations Trend used showed the loss was only $238,000 and that, from all of their review of the records and all of the tests they performed, the loss was between $250,000 and $500,000. All of this evidence was submitted to the jury.

One of the calculations Honeywell's accountants performed showed a loss of $533,000. It was admitted that this calculation was not designed to show the market value of the loss. The accountant was only able to state that all things considered the result was "related" to or "approximately" the market value of the loss. This opinion testimony was excluded by the judge and the majority opinion says this was...

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13 cases
  • Cruise v. Graham, 92-0895
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 7, 1993
    ...is a defense to various offenses, including intentional misrepresentation, is without merit), approved in part, quashed in part, 487 So.2d 1029 (Fla.1986). Cf. Deane v. Johnston, 104 So.2d 3 (Fla.1958) (contributory negligence is not a bar to intentional torts); Acosta v. Daughtry, 268 So.2......
  • Trend Coin Co. v. Fuller, Feingold & Mallah, P.A.
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    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 31, 1989
    ...certiorari, the supreme court reversed a portion of this court's decision and remanded the cause for a new trial. Trend Coin Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 487 So.2d 1029 (Fla.1986). Prior to retrial, however, Stewart negotiated a final settlement in Trend Coin's favor in an amount slightly greate......
  • MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Siegel
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    ...legal cause, they are entitled to pre-judgment interest on the already established damage amount of $100,000. 2 Trend Coin Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 487 So.2d 1029 (Fla.1986); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212 In all other respects, the motion is denied. 1 Section 849.26 st......
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    ...an intentional tort); Honeywell, Inc. v. Trend Coin Co., 449 So.2d 876, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (same), reversed on other grounds, 487 So.2d 1029, (Fla.1986), and therefore D.O.C. is liable for the full amount of any damages caused by its false imprisonment of Hill. In the present case, howe......
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