Trevathan v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.

• Citation: 944 F.2d 902
• Decision Date: 25 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-2005,91-2005
• Parties: 139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3000 NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit. Julian TREVATHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Page 902

944 F.2d 902

139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3000

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.

Julian TREVATHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 91-2005.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 4, 1991.

Decided Sept. 25, 1991.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Richard B. Kellam, Senior District Judge. (CA-90-333-NN)

Argued: John Harlow Klein, Rutter & Montagna, Norfolk, Va., for appellant.

William Clay Bell, Office of the General Counsel, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Va., for appellee.

E.D.Va., 752 F.Supp. 698.

AFFIRMED.

Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, WIDENER, Circuit Judge, and THOMAS SELBY ELLIS, III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Julian W. Trevathan sued his former employer, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company, under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. Trevathan sought to overturn an arbitration order finding that he was discharged for good cause under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect between the employer and Trevathan's union, Local 8888 of the United Steelworkers of America. We affirm the district court's finding that Trevathan lacked standing under Section 301(a) to challenge the arbitrator's decision.

I.

Julian Trevathan was an employee of Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company (the Company) for approximately 22 years, during which time he was a member of Local 8888 of the United Steelworkers of America (the Union). He served as a quality inspector at the shipyard, a position for which the Company required the employee to pass an initial acid spot test to identify various metals, followed by annual requalification tests. Trevathan took a requalification test on October 20, 1988, during which the Company alleged that he cheated by having with him a flow chart containing pertinent guidelines and procedures. Trevathan claimed that at the time he pulled out the flow chart, he had finished all he could of the test and was merely checking to see where he had made mistakes. The Company discharged Trevathan, citing Yard Rule 10 of the collective bargaining agreement in effect between Local 8888 and the Company. This provision states that the Company may discharge an employee for "falsification of Company records."

The Union filed a grievance on Trevathan's behalf against the Company, protesting Trevathan's discharge. After exhausting the relevant grievance procedure as provided by the collective bargaining agreement, the Company and Local 8888 submitted the matter to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled that the Company's discharge of Trevathan was for just cause, specifically for falsifying a company document in violation of Yard Rule 10.

Trevathan then brought an action against the Company under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia at Newport News. ¹ Trevathan's complaint asked the district court to find that the arbitrator exceeded his authority, to declare that the Company's discharge was without just cause and in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and to award damages for his loss of earnings.

Acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the district court designated a magistrate judge to conduct a hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment and to submit proposed recommendations for their disposition. Finding that Trevathan lacked standing to maintain his action, the magistrate judge recommended that the cause of action be dismissed. The magistrate judge further recommended that, with regard to the merits, the Company's motion for summary judgment be granted because the arbitrator's decision and findings drew their essence from the relevant collective bargaining agreement.

On de novo review of the magistrate judge's report, the district court adopted the report and the recommendations, granting the Company's motion for summary judgment. Trevathan v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 752 F.Supp. 698 (E.D.Va.1990). Trevathan appeals.

II.

We review summary judgments de novo on appeal. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1166-67 (4th Cir.1988); Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1127-28 (4th Cir.1987). In ruling on the granting of summary judgment for the defendant, we take as true all facts and material allegations of the plaintiff and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Otd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). Summary judgment should be granted only in those cases where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law. Charbonnages De France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414, (4th Cir.1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir.1950).

The Company advanced two grounds in support of its motion for summary judgment. First, the Company claimed that Trevathan lacked standing to maintain this suit because he was not a party to the arbitration nor to the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, the Company argued that Trevathan had no standing because he failed to allege that the Union breached its duty of fair representation or that fraud or deceit produced the arbitrator's award. Second, assuming arguendo that Trevathan did have standing, the Company maintained that the arbitrator's decision and findings drew their essence from the collective bargaining agreement in effect between the Company and the Union and thus are binding and final.

On appeal, Trevathan argues that Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), provides a jurisdictional basis for individual suits brought by employees. In response to the Company's contention that only the Union may initiate and appeal the results of arbitration proceedings, Trevathan claims that an individual employee or his union may bring such suits under Section 301(a) to protect the employee's individual rights. Trevathan further maintains that he has standing to enforce the collective bargaining agreement because the agreement embodies rights intended for his benefit as an employee and beneficiary of the agreement. Finally, Trevathan argues that an individual employee may enforce provisions in the collective bargaining agreement which limit the employer's ability to discharge an employee.

Section 301(a) of the LMRA authorizes employers and labor organizations, parties to a collective bargaining agreement, to bring an action in federal district court to enforce or remedy provisions of the agreement. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451-59 (1957); Textile Workers Union of America v. Cone Mills Corp., 268 F.2d 920, 923 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 886 (1959). Specifically, Section 301(a) provides that

(a) Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (West 1978).

When interpreting the "between an employer and a labor organization" clause of Section 301(a), the Supreme Court has consistently adopted a broad view of Section 301(a) jurisdiction. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 865 n. 7 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacations Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25 n. 28 (1983); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 29899 (1971); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra, 353 U.S. at 45159. For example, the Court in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962), held that individual employees may bring suits against their employers for alleged breaches of the collective bargaining agreement under Section 301. However, as Justice Black noted in his dissent, "the Court studiously refrain[ed] from saying when, for what kinds of breach, or under what circumstances an individual employee can bring a Section 301 action and when he must step aside for the union to prosecute his claim." 371 U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).

Clearly, an individual employee may bring an action in federal court where the union has allegedly breached its duty of fair representation to the employee. ² See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571-72 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967); Smith v. Local 7898, United Steelworkers of America, 834 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir.1987); Ash v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 800 F.2d 409, 411 (4th Cir.1986) (per curiam). In addition, the Supreme Court has noted that Section 301(a) suits "[may] encompass those [claims] seeking to vindicate 'uniquely personal' rights of employees such as wages, hours, overtime pay, and wrongful discharge." Hines, supra, 424 U.S. at 562 (citing Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198-200 (1962)).

Although the Court included wrongful discharge among its examples of uniquely personal rights, federal courts have held that an individual employee cannot appeal an arbitrator's award under Section 301(a) even where the individual employee was ultimately discharged. Painter v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 636 F.Supp. 453, 456 (W.D.Va.1986) (citing McNair v. United States Postal Services, 768 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.1985) and Vosch v. Werner Continental, Inc., 734 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, ...