Trevino v. Stephens

Decision Date11 June 2015
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. SA-01-CA-306-XR
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
PartiesCARLOS TREVINO, TDCJ No. 999235, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Carlos Trevino filed this federal habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 challenging his July 1997, Bexar County capital murder conviction and sentence of death. The facts and circumstances of the Petitioner's capital offense and the evidence presented during both phases of Petitioner's capital murder trial are set forth in detail in this Court's original opinion denying federal habeas corpus relief. Trevino v. Thaler, 678 F.Supp.2d 445, 449-53 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, 449 F. App'x. 415 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2011), vacated and remanded, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013).

Following remand to this Court by the Fifth Circuit, Trevino v. Thaler, 740 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2014), this Court granted Petitioner's multiple requests for additional time to investigate and develop Petitioner's remaining claims for relief (ECF nos. 118 & 138 & Text Orders issued April 29, 2014, May 5, 2014, and July 3, 2014) and authorized Petitioner to expend resources in excess of the statutory cap set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3599(g)(2) for investigative and expert assistance (ECF nos. 127, 138, 149). Petitioner filed his second amended federal habeas corpus petition on February3, 2015 (ECF no. 143), asserting therein a single claim for relief, to wit, the argument that Petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate Petitioner's background and present compelling mitigating evidence. For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner is entitled to neither federal habeas corpus relief nor a Certificate of Appealability from this Court.

I. Procedural Background and the Fifth Circuit's Remand

On January 21, 2014, the Fifth Circuit remanded this cause to this Court with the following instructions:

In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Trevino v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013), we remand to the district court for full reconsideration of the Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in accordance with both Trevino and Martinez v. Ryan, —U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). If the Petitioner requests it, the district court may in its discretion stay the federal proceeding and permit the Petitioner to present his claim in state court.

Trevino v. Stephens, 740 F.3d at 378.

Petitioner now has been granted resources and time within which to develop his claim of ineffective assistance. Before denying federal habeas corpus relief initially, this Court twice stayed this federal habeas corpus action to permit Petitioner to return to state court to exhaust available state habeas corpus remedies on then-unexhausted claims. The first such stay was granted June 15, 2004. ECF no. 36. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Petitioner's second state habeas corpus application on state writ-abuse principles more than a year later. Ex parte Carlos Trevino, WR 48,153-02, 2005 WL 3119064 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2005).

Petitioner then requested and, on August 2, 2006 this Court granted, a second stay in these proceedings to permit him to return to state court and exhaust available state habeas remedies on still more then-unexhausted claims. ECF no. 54. The Petitioner's federal habeas corpus counsel thenfiled a motion for appointment of counsel on Petitioner's behalf in state court. In an Order issued August 8, 2008, this Court attempted to break the state court log jam by requesting some ruling by the state court on Petitioner's then-pending motion. ECF no. 61. When the responsible state judicial officer made clear to Petitioner's federal habeas counsel that the state court would never rule on Petitioner's motion seeking legal representation, in an Order issued October 2, 2008, this Court lamented the delay of more than two years resulting from the state trial judge's intransigence and concluded no legitimate basis existed for continuing to hold this case in abeyance. ECF no. 62.

On December 8, 2008, Petitioner filed his first amended federal habeas corpus petition and asserted eight claims for relief, three of which consisted of ineffective assistance claims and a constructive ineffective assistance claim. More specifically, in his second, third, and sixth claims, Petitioner argued his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (1) discover and employ Seanido Rey's statement of June 12, 1996 during Petitioner's trial, (2) investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence during the punishment phase of Petitioner's capital murder trial, (3) meaningfully convey the plea bargain offered to Petitioner by the prosecution, and (4) object on hearsay grounds to the inculpatory statements made by Petitioner recounted at trial by Juan Gonzales. This Court concluded that all four of these ineffective assistance complaints lacked merit. Trevino v. Thaler, 678 F.Supp.2d at 466-76. In the alternative, this Court concluded the second and third of these complaints (i.e., those contained in Petitioner's third claim in his first amended petition) were also procedurally defaulted. Id., at 467-71, 473-74.

In his fifth claim in his first amended petition, Petitioner argued he was constructively denied the effective assistance of counsel as a result, in part, of the state trial court denying Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's motion for new trial. This Court denied relief on the merits underthe AEDPA, expressly finding the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection on the merits of this claim in the course of Petitioner's first state habeas corpus proceeding was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the Petitioner's first state habeas corpus proceeding. Id.. at 480-91.

Thus, of the five claims of ineffective assistance (or constructive ineffective assistance) presented by Petitioner in his first amended federal habeas corpus petition, this Court concluded all five lacked merit under applicable federal law. Only two of those complaints of ineffective assistance were subject to alternative conclusions by this Court that they had also been procedurally defaulted, i.e., the two ineffective assistance complaints contained in Petitioner's third claim herein. The other three ineffective assistance claims were rejected on the merits by the state courts and this Court concluded those rejections were consistent with the deferential standard of review mandated by the AEDPA. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit's remand Order issued January 21, 2014 does not appear to pertain to this Court's disposition of Petitioner's ineffective assistance claims contained in Petitioner's second, fifth, or sixth claims herein.1 As best this Court can discern, the Fifth Circuit's remand Order is limited to this Court's disposition of those ineffective assistance claims which thisCourt held, in the alternative, to have been procedurally defaulted, i.e., the ineffective assistance complaints contained in Petitioner's original third claim herein.

With regard to Petitioner's complaint that his trial counsel failed to investigate Petitioner's background and present all then- available mitigating evidence, this Court originally concluded as follows:

Alternatively, this Court independently concludes Petitioner's complaint about his trial counsel's failure to more thoroughly investigate Petitioner's background and to develop the "new" mitigating evidence identified in Petitioner's pleadings herein fails to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. In making this conclusion, this Court must re-weigh the totality of Petitioner's proffered mitigating evidence, including Petitioner's "new" mitigating evidence, against the evidence in aggravation. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2542, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) ("In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.").
The evidence before the sentencing jury at Petitioner's capital murder trial was summarized in Sections I.E. and III.D.2. above. Petitioner's "new" mitigating evidence consists of double-edged evidence detailing Petitioner's history of childhood abuse and neglect (both physical and emotional), alcohol and narcotics abuse, spotty attendance and poor performance in school, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, and ensuing tendency to exercise poor judgment. Despite the foregoing, however, Petitioner also furnishes a number of affidavits that describe Petitioner as a hard-working, nonviolent, loving father. This "new" mitigating evidence must also be weighed in the context of the other, uncontradicted, evidence now before this Court, which shows (1) Petitioner's callous comments regarding Salinas before and after her murder (including Petitioner's suggestion that Gonzales should participate in the sexual assault on Salinas and Petitioner's failure to object when Rey and Cervantes suggested the need to eliminate witnesses), (2) Petitioner's participation in the violent assault upon Salinas ( i.e., holding her down while others sexually assaulted her), (3) Petitioner's subsequent directive to Gonzales not to talk to police about the incident, (4) Petitioner's nonchalant demeanor immediately following the murder upon his return to the party at the Mata residence, (5) Petitioner's many tattoos reflecting his membership in a notorious prison gang, and (6) the complete and total absence of any indication the Petitioner has ever expressed sincere contrition or genuine remorse over Salinas' murder.
The latter point cannot
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