Treweek v. City of Napa

• Decision Date: 04 December 2000
• Citation: 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 883,85 Cal.App.4th 221
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2000) MARGUERITE TREWEEK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE CITY OF NAPA, Defendant and Respondent. A087820 Filed

101 Cal.Rptr.2d 883 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2000)

MARGUERITE TREWEEK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE CITY OF NAPA, Defendant and Respondent.

A087820

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO

Filed 12/4/00

(Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-04155)

Trial Judge: Honorable Richard A. Bennett

Attorney for Appellant: Frank Worthington 2040 Jefferson St. Napa, CA 94559

Attorneys for Respondent: Thomas B. Brown, City Attorney David C. Jones, Deputy City Attorney City of Napa P.O. Box 660 Napa, CA 94559

Attorneys for Amici Curiae: Gregory P. Palmer, Richard D. Jones Law Office of Richard D. Jones 390 N. Brea Blvd., Ste. A Brea, CA 92821

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

Kline, P.J.

INTRODUCTION

"An object is what it is." So stated the Court of Appeal in Farnham v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1097, waiving aside concerns that its broad definition of "trail" under Government Code section 831.4,¹ would result in expansion of the term beyond recognition, providing a governmental entity "the incentive to call anything it wishes a 'trail' in order to qualify for section 831.4 immunity." (Id. at p. 1103.) Here, we are confronted with the question whether a public boat dock ramp is unquestionably a "trail," immunizing a city from liability for the ramp's failure. We conclude that the ramp itself is not a "trail" under section 831.4 and that therefore the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings on that ground.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Marguerite Treweek (appellant) filed a complaint against the City of Napa (City), alleging she was injured as she walked from the Napa City Dock located near the intersection of Third and Main Streets, across a boat ramp, when the ramp failed and gave way, causing her to fall. She alleged City neglected its duty to maintain the dock and the ramp in a safe condition. City asserted various immunities, including that it was immune from liability pursuant to section 831.4, asserting that the boat ramp was a recreational "trail" as defined in the statute. On the ground that under section 831.4 City could not be held liable for injuries caused by a condition of the ramp, the trial court granted City's motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissed appellant's complaint without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of City. Appellant appealed.²

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review.

"The construction and interpretation of a statute are a question of law, which the Court of Appeal considers de novo. [Citation.]" (Dowden v. Superior Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 126, 128.) "A judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard by which a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer is reviewed; the question is, assuming the truth of the pleadings, does the complaint state a cause of action. [Citation.]" (Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1797, 1803-1804.)

2. Government Code section 831.4.

Section 831.4 provides: "A public entity, public employee, or a grantor of a public easement to a public entity for any of the following purposes, is not liable for an injury caused by a condition of:

"(a) Any unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding, including animal and all types of vehicular riding, water sports, recreational or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city street or highway or (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) public street or highway of a joint highway district, boulevard district, bridge and highway district or similar district formed for the improvement or building of public streets or highways.

"(b) Any trail used for the above purposes.

"(c) Any paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk on an easement of way which has been granted to a public entity, which easement provides access to any unimproved property, so long as such public entity shall reasonably attempt to provide adequate warnings of the existence of any condition of the paved trail, walkway, path, or sidewalk which constitutes a hazard to health or safety. Warnings required by this subdivision shall only be required where pathways are paved, and such requirement shall not be construed to be a standard of care for any unpaved pathways or roads."

3. Applicability of subdivision (b).

Subdivision (a) applies only to unpaved roads; while "subdivision (c) applies to a paved trail, etc., on which an easement of way has been granted to a public entity and which provides access to an unimproved area." (Farnham v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1097, 1100.) Conceding that neither subdivision (a) nor (c) applies, City argues it is immunized by the provisions of subdivision (b), contending the ramp provides access to recreation and that the ramp may be used itself for recreational activities such as viewing the Napa River.³

Appellant argues initially that subdivision (b) does not immunize City, as it relates only to trails used for the recreational activities listed in subdivision (a) and does not extend to access trails-that is, to trails used solely for access to such activities where the trail is not itself used for a recreational activity. Appellant relies upon Giannuzzi v. State of California, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 462 (Giannuzzi), which contains dicta supporting her position. (Id. at p. 466.)

In Giannuzzi, the plaintiff motorcycle rider was injured within a state vehicular recreation park. The Court of Appeal affirmed the sustaining of the state's demurrer, holding that a trail need not provide access to anything for immunity to attach under section 831.4, subdivision (b), so long as the trail was being used for one of the activities listed in subdivision (a). Where it could be fairly inferred from the amended complaint that the plaintiff's purpose for being in the park was the recreational driving of his vehicle, and that he was injured during the course of that activity, the application of the statutory immunity was established as a matter of law. (Id. at pp. 466-467.)

In reaching that conclusion, the Giannuzzi court recognized that the statute could plausibly be read in three ways: (1) as an access statute only, in which the "above purposes" language of subdivision (b) incorporates the recreational activities specified in subdivision (a) as to which access is provided; (2) in which subdivision (b) has nothing to do with access. "According to this construction the 'above purposes' language of subdivision (b) simply picks up the recreational activities set forth in subdivision (a). As so read, a trail intended for hiking need not provide access to anything in order for the immunity to attach" (id. at p. 465, italics added); (3) in which subdivision (b) encompasses both of these constructions. Under this third alternative, "access is one 'of the above purposes' for which a trail can be used. Hunting, hiking, riding, etc.-the recreational activities listed in subdivision (a)-are also 'purposes' for which trails can be used. The immunity granted by section 381.4 attaches to both." (Ibid.) The court examined the statute's legislative history and concluded that "[t]he statute's evolution demonstrates that the second construction is the correct one." (Id. at p. 466.)

As the court explained: "When originally enacted in 1963, section 831.4 had two simple subjects of its immunity. Subdivision (a) dealt with '[a]ny unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hunting or primitive camping, recreational or scenic areas.' Subdivision (b) read in its entirety: 'Any hiking, riding, fishing or hunting trail.' (Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, 1, p. 3273; see Stats. 1968, ch. 714, 1, p. 1416.) This early fossil record reveals no mention of 'access' or 'above purposes' in subdivision (b). [] Amendments passed in 1970 expanded subdivision (a) to reach "[a]ny unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hiking, camping, hunting, riding, water sports, recreational or scenic areas,' and reframed subdivision (b) as it presently reads. (Stats. 1970, ch. 807, 2, p. 1530.) [] In 1972, subdivision (a) was further broadened by inserting the words 'including animal and all types of vehicular riding.' (Stats. 1972, ch. 1200, 2, p. 2323.) [] Subdivision (c) was added in 1979. (Stats. 1979, ch. 1010, 1, p. 3434.)" (Ibid.)

Based on this legislative history, the Court of Appeal reasoned that "[t]he exclusive emphasis of subdivisions (a) and (c) of section 831.4 is, and has always been, access. Subdivision (b), however, has since its inception had a more substantive aspect, i.e., use of trails for certain recreational activities without regard as to how the persons involved came to be at the spot where injuries occurred. It is equally apparent that the 1970 amendment recasting subdivision (b) in its current form employed the "used for the above purposes" language to serve as a shorthand incorporation by reference only of the recreational activities concurrently being expanded in subdivision (a). The only thing 'above' subdivision (b) is subdivision (a), and the most obvious 'purposes' thus incorporated would be the growing number of recreational activities listed in subdivision (a). (Id. at p. 466, italics added, fn. omitted.) The court noted that it had found nothing in the legislative history-including its review of the Governor's bill file-which was in the least inconsistent with its construction of the statute. (Id. at p. 466, fn. 3.)

The Giannuzzi court concluded that subdivision (b) precluded liability for injuries caused by the condition of trails used for the activities listed in subdivision (a). (Id. at p. 467.) As the plaintiff's purpose for being in the state vehicular recreation park was the recreational driving of his vehicle, and he was injured during the course of that activity, the application of section 831.4 was established as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 467.)⁴

Giannuzzi was followed by Armenio v. County of San Mateo, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 413 (Armenio), in which Division Five...