Tri-County Highway Improvement District v. Vincennes Bridge Company

• Decision Date: 14 December 1925
• Docket Number: 59
• Parties: TRI-COUNTY HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT v. VINCENNES BRIDGE COMPANY
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

278 S.W. 627

170 Ark. 22

TRI-COUNTY HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT v. VINCENNES BRIDGE COMPANY

No. 59

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 14, 1925

Appeal from Craighead Chancery Court, Western District; Sam Frauenthal, Special Chancellor; affirmed.

Decree affirmed. Petition denied.

Horace Sloan and Arthur L. Adams, for appellant.

J. W House Jr., D. K. Hawthorne, Wm. B. Kinealy, Seymour Riddle and A. P. Patton, for appellee.

OPINION

HART, J.

Appellees, the plaintiffs in the court below, brought this suit in equity against appellants, Tri-County Highway Improvement District, its commissioners and the landowners in the district to foreclose a lien in their favor upon lands in the district for indebtedness due them under an alleged decree of the chancery court rendered by consent on November 30, 1920.

An answer was filed which attacked the validity of said decree in so far as the claims of appellees, John R. Scott Vincennes Bridge Co., and Hugh R. Carter are concerned, but did not attack the validity of said decree in so far as it relates to the other creditors of the Tri-County Highway Improvement District.

A cross-complaint was filed alleging that appellees had collected various sums on their claims which are sought to be recovered.

A bill of review was also filed for the purpose of setting aside the alleged decree of the chancery court of November 30, 1920, under which appellees are attempting to assert their lien on the lands of the district in satisfaction of their claims.

The decree of November 30, 1920, is sought to be vacated on several grounds.

First, it is insisted that said decree was rendered in vacation and is therefore a nullity.

Second, it is claimed that it is apparent from the decree itself that it is erroneous.

Third, that it is sought to be set aside upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, and also upon the ground of fraud.

Appellees interposed a plea of res judicata, and introduced evidence in support thereof.

A great volume of testimony relating to the merits of the case was introduced.

The chancellor sustained the plea of res judicata of appellees, and a decree was entered of record in accordance with his finding. To reverse that decree appellants have prosecuted this appeal.

Having reached the conclusion that the chancellor was correct in sustaining the plea of res judicata of appellees, it is not necessary to abstract the evidence on the merits of the case or to determine the issues relating thereto. Indeed, it would be improper to decide the merits of the case, for the reason that we are of the opinion that the defense of res judicata made by appellees was properly sustained by the chancery court, and that necessarily ends the cause.

The facts relating to the defense of res judicata are practically undisputed and may be briefly stated as follows:

An act creating the Tri-County Highway Improvement District was passed by the Legislature of 1919, approved March 6, 1919. Road Acts of 1919, vol. 1, 510. The act was in the usual form of the special road acts passed at that session of the Legislature. Pursuant to its terms, the commissioners met and formed plans for the construction of the proposed improvement, and did various other things looking towards carrying out the construction of the proposed improvement.

On April 17, 1920, J. W. Kuykendall and numerous other landowners in the proposed improvement district brought suit in equity against the Tri-County Highway Improvement District and the commissioners thereof for the purpose of restraining them from doing any further work on the construction of the roads and ditches provided for under the act creating the district. In their complaint they alleged that the plans and specifications prepared by the commissioners under the provisions of the act creating the district include a construction of roads and also a drainage system which are two separate and distinct improvements. They also set up facts tending to show that the assessment of benefits by the commissioners was arbitrary, discriminatory and confiscatory, and that it was well known to said commissioners and their engineers that said contemplated improvements could not be completed for anything like the amount of the assessment of benefits.

The defendants filed an answer in which they denied all of the allegations of the complaint and averred specifically that the system of drainage provided by the act was only such as would be necessary and proper for the construction of the roads provided for in the act creating the district.

On August 21, 1920, a resolution was adopted by the commissioners providing that the plans and assessments of benefits filed in the office of the clerk of the county court on March 20, 1920, were erroneous and void, in so far as any further work in making and completing said improvement was concerned. The stipulation further provided that all the work in said improvement district should be abandoned, and that the proposed improvement could not be made for the amount of benefits assessed against the lands, and that said lands would not be benefited by said improvement.

On August 24, 1920, which was a regular day of the August, 1920, term of the chancery court, a consent decree in said cause was entered of record. The chancery court found that, in accordance with the provisions of the stipulation above referred to and by the consent of the parties, the plans and assessment of benefits filed in the office of the county clerk on March 20, 1920, could not be used to complete said improvements; that the improvements contemplated in the act creating the district could not be made for the amount of the assessment of benefits, and that the affairs of the district should be wound up in the manner provided by law, the indebtedness ascertained and determined, to the end that any assessments which might be necessary upon the lands in the district might be imposed for such amounts as the district might owe.

It was decreed that all further work in the district be abandoned, and that the commissioners ascertain the amount of the indebtedness owed by the district and to whom due; that the plans and assessments which had been filed in the office of the clerk of the county court be declared null and void; that this shall not be construed as a finding regarding the validity of any work done, or as to the validity of the assessments for the purpose of extending the same against the lands as assessed to pay for the indebtedness.

It was further decreed that nothing contained in the decree should affect the rights of any other persons having claims against the district. The court reserved the right to make all such further orders and decrees as might be necessary to wind up and terminate the affairs of said district.

On the 30th day of November, 1920, a decree was entered of record which bore a heading as follows:

"Tri-County Highway Improvement District and its Commissioners, W. R. Moyer, W. A. Smith, J. A. Weaver, A. L. Salmons, Herbert Wood, W. H. Woodruff, ex parte."

This decree was entered of record in vacation in accordance with the allegations of a petition filed by the attorneys for the commissioners of the improvement district.

The decree is very lengthy, and need not be set out in full. It recites that the cause is submitted upon the petition of the Tri-County Highway Improvement District and its commissioners, a resolution of said board with reference to the claim of John R. Scott, a resolution with reference to the claim of Hugh R. Carter, and Carter & Knoch, a resolution with reference to the claim of the Vincennes Bridge Co., various other resolutions with regard to other creditors not necessary to mention, the intervention of John R. Scott, Hugh Carter, the Vincennes Bridge Co., and of numerous other creditors not affected by this suit and therefore not necessary to be more particularly referred to, the contract between said district and said John R. Scott, the contract between said commissioners and Hugh R. Carter, the contract between said district and the Vincennes Bridge Co., and numerous other contracts of said district with various creditors, the claims of said John R. Scott, Hugh R. Carter, Vincennes Bridge Co., and of various other creditors which had been filed with the commissioners.

Continuing, the decree recites that, being advised in the premises, the court finds from the pleadings and evidence that the petitioner, Tri-County Highway Improvement District, is indebted to John R. Scott, Vincennes Bridge Co., Hugh Carter, and various other creditors, in certain sums which are specifically set out, and a lien is fixed upon the real property in the district for the purpose of paying and discharging said claims in accordance with the assessment of benefits as finally revised and corrected by the commissioners of the district.

In March, 1921, by consent of the parties the decree of November 30, 1920, was modified so as to provide that all the indebtedness due by the district should not be collected by one assessment.

On the 22nd day of April, 1921, C. W. Lashbrook and numerous other landowners brought suit in equity against the Tri-County Highway Improvement District, its commissioners, John R. Scott, Hugh Carter, Vincennes Bridge Co., and numerous other creditors of said improvement district, for the purpose of setting aside the consent decree of the chancery court rendered on the 24th day of August, 1920, and the decrees rendered in vacation on November 30, 1920, and in March, 1921, above referred to.

In this complaint it is alleged that, during the year 1920, the commissioners of the district, without authority of law undertook to abandon and dissolve said district and to compromise and adjust the claims...