Tri-State Hotel Co. v. Londerholm
| Decision Date | 11 December 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 44409,TRI-STATE,44409 |
| Citation | 195 Kan. 748,408 P.2d 877 |
| Parties | HOTEL CO., Inc., d/b/a the River Club, Ronald L. Mires, d/b/a the Charter Room, William V. Tiemeyer, d/b/a the Pheasant Club, Vernon M. Smart, d/b/a Palace Club, R. C. McCormick (an individual and member of The River Club); and Carl Murrell (an individual and member of El Matador Club), Appellants, v. Robert C. LONDERHOLM, Attorney General of Kansas, Keith Sanborn, County Attorney of Sedgwick County, Kansas, J. R. Cheney, Director of Alcoholic Beverage Control, and Park McGee, Assistant Attorney General and Attorney for the Director of Aicoholic Beverage Control, Appellees. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. While Sections 1 and 2 of our Bill of Rights declare a political truth, they are given much the same effect as the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to due process and equal protection of the law. Equal protection of the law under Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill of Rights permits the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in the classification made by the legislature under the police power of the state and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis.
2. Pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a state may authorize or prohibit the consumption of alcoholic liquor and adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate its policy in the exercise of the police power, unfettered by the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.
3. Every legislative Act comes before the supreme court surrounded with the presumption of constitutionality. That presumption continues until the Act under review clearly appears to contravene some provision of the Constitution. All doubts of invalidity must be resolved in favor of the law. It is not the province of the supreme court to weigh the desirability of social or economic policy underlying the statute or to question its wisdom; those are purely legislative matters.
4. The regulation of the consumption of alcoholic liquor is entirely within the police power of the state, and the subject matter being one attendant with danger, the legislature is empowered to authorize or prohibit its consumption as it deems essential so as to limit its evil propensities to the utmost degree. What the legislature may entirely withhold, it may grant upon such terms as it may see fit.
5. Article 15, Section 10 of the Constitution of Kansas is authorizing in nature and does not abridge or limit the power of the legislature to determine the extent or places or conditions to which or upon which alcoholic liquor may be consumed in the state.
6. Being authorized by Article 15, Section 10 of the Constitution of Kansas to regulate the sale of alcoholic liquor, the legislature has the power to define what is not a sale so long as what is defined does not constitute an 'open saloon' in violation of that section.
7. A liquor pool authorized by Sections 1(d), 16 and 18 of Chapter 316, Laws of 1965, to be maintained in a licensed class A club does not constitute the sale of alcoholic liquor on the premises of the club in violation of Article 15, Section 10 of the Constitution of Kansas prohibiting an 'open saloon' as defined in K.S.A. 41-803.
8. Chapter 316, Laws 1965, which defines and regulates places where alcoholic liquor may be lawfully consumed in the state, classifies a 'club' into two categories: Class A clubs operated not for profit but owned and controlled exclusively for the use of their members for the promotion of a common objective, and class B clubs operated for the profit of the management, and imposes conditions for the licensing and operation of class B clubs different from class A clubs, such as requiring a minimum annual membership fee, a waiting period on applications for membership, proof of good moral character and denying the right to maintain a liquor pool, is examined and it is held to be a valid exercise of the policy power of the state. It is further held that the legislature's use of the profit-non-profit classification affording different treatment of the two classes of clubs was based upon reasoning apparently sound, supported by experience which was verified, and bears a real, logical and substantial relation to the public welfare in determining places where alcoholic liquor may be lawfully consumed, and is not unconstitutional upon any of the grounds urged by the plaintiffs.
Edward F. Arn, Wichita, argued the cause, and Richard F. Mullins, Milo M. Unruh, H. R. Kuhn and Louis W. Cates, Wichita, were with him on the briefs for appellants.
Park McGee, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Atty. Gen., Topeka, and Keith Sanborn, County Atty., Wichita, were with him on the briefs for appellees.
This was an action to enjoin enforcement of the provisions of Chapter 316, Laws 1965, commonly known as 'The Private Club Act.' This Act defines four places in which alcoholic liquor may be lawfully consumed, and one of those places is a 'club' as therein defined. The Act, in turn, divides clubs into two classes designated as 'class A' and 'class B' clubs, and provides for their licensing and regulation. As Chapter 316, hereafter referred to as the Act, was interpreted by the plaintiffs, they were entitled to judgment decreeing the Act unconstitutional and to a permanent injunction against its enforcement for the reasons alleged in the petition; as interpreted by the defendants, such a judgment was unauthorized. The district court agreed with the defendants' construction of the Act, and the plaintiffs have appealed.
At the hearing on the merits for a temporary and permanent injunction, the parties stipulated to the facts, and those pertinent are summarized. The plaintiffs either operate private clubs 'for profit' or are members of 'for profit' private clubs where the members thereof may resort for the purpose of consuming alcoholic liquor. They have substantial investments in their private clubs or those in which they have memberships, and their use and enjoyment of their clubs' facilities, the right to operate them for profit, and their freedom to conduct their business and memberships therein will be affected and regulated by the Act if it is constitutional. The defendants are charged with the enforcement of the Act and will enforce its provisions against the plaintiffs unless permanently enjoined. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 through 4-A, consisting of rules, regulations, and bylaws of their various private clubs, indicate the means by which, and the extent to which, the members thereof determine which individuals, and which and how new members may be allowed to use their club premises. The defendants' Exhibit A consists of rules and regulations adopted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board pursuant to the Act, and pertains to the licensing and regulation of both class A and class B clubs, which were duly filed with the Revisor of Statutes as provided in K.S.A. 77-405 et seq. It should here be stated that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law disclosed no reference to either the plaintiffs' or the defendants' exhibits. The sole question before the district court was the constitutionality of the Act and the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law relate only to its validity.
The stipulation further disclosed that there are private clubs in the Wichita area and elsewhere, such as Country Clubs and other organizations, which could be licensed and receive the advantages of 'class A' clubs. However, the plaintiffs, being operators and members of private clubs 'for profit,' are deprived of the benefits afforded 'class A' clubs and their members under the Act. While the plaintiffs are capable of qualifying under the Act as class B clubs by reason of the 'for profit' nature of their private clubs, the Act precludes them from being licensed and receive the benefits of class A clubs.
The plaintiffs alleged in their petition that the Act was unconstitutional and void for the reasons that (1) it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it denies to them the equal protection of the law; (2) it deprives them of their property, property rights and personal privileges without due process of law and the equal protection of the law in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Kansas; (3) it is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the police power of the state and the classification provided therein has no connection with, and no relation to, the public health, morals, safety and welfare, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Kansas; (4) it creates penalties for acts done by one class of citizens, and by reason of its unjust, unreasonable, arbitrary and unlawful classification, it violates Article 2, Section 17 of the Constitution of Kansas, and (5) its provisions are vague, uncertain and ambiguous in defining rights granted and acts prohibited to either class of clubs, and by reason of such ambiguity; persons affected by the Act cannot comply with its terms, and it lacks the first essential of due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Section 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Kansas.
At the outset, and before we quote or discuss the provisions of the Act, the plaintiffs' claim that it violates the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, should be put to rest. In State v. Payne, 183 Kan. 396, 327 P.2d 1071, it was said:
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