Tri-State Transit Co., of Louisiana, Inc. v. Westbrook
Decision Date | 15 May 1944 |
Docket Number | 4-7339 |
Citation | 180 S.W.2d 121,207 Ark. 270 |
Parties | Tri-State Transit Company of Louisiana, Inc., v. Westbrook |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Hot Spring Circuit Court; Thomas E. Toler, Judge.
Reversed.
Bridges Bridges, Young & Gregory, for appellant.
Coffelt & Kirby, for appellee.
OPINION
Appellee, a Negro resident and citizen of Saline county, Arkansas, being in Monroe, Louisiana, and desiring to go to Shreveport, purchased a ticket for passage on appellants' through bus operating between Meridian, Miss., and Shreveport, La., which was due to leave Monroe about 2 o'clock a. m., January 20, 1943. While the driver of the bus was in the station attending to certain duties, appellee boarded the bus and took a seat thereon. The bus driver testified that the bus had been crowded all the way from Meridian and some passengers had been forced to stand, some twenty-five passengers were going on through, most of whom had gotten off the bus at Monroe; that it was the practice of the company to hold for their reoccupancy the seats of through passengers who temporarily left the bus at any station, and to this end additional passengers were not taken on the bus until the through passengers had returned thereto, and then the new passengers were permitted to board the bus, first surrendering their tickets to, and taking a receipt from the driver. When the driver of the bus returned and found that appellee had boarded it in his absence he directed that he get off and await his proper turn to reboard.
The testimony as to what took place immediately afterwards is in conflict.
Appellee was the sole witness testifying in his behalf as to circumstances of the rencounter, and his testimony tends to show that he was sober and behaving himself properly at the time; that he got up in obedience to the driver's order and started off the bus; that the driver stepped off in front of him and as he stepped off the bus the driver hit him over the head with a crank without any provocation or warning whatever, knocked him to the pavement and drove off and left him lying there.
Six witnesses, the bus driver and five passengers, testified on behalf of appellants and their testimony tends to show that appellee was drunk at the time, and cursed the driver when he was ordered off the bus; that he got off the bus and hit the driver with his fist, and that the driver in self-defense struck at him with the crank, which appellee knocked out of his hand; that while they were fighting, an army sergeant standing nearby picked up the crank and struck appellee over the head with it several times and ended the fight.
In this action, the jury awarded appellee $ 500 as compensatory damages and also $ 500 as punitive damages. While several assignments of error are set out in the motion for new trial, only two points are argued, to-wit: (1) error in admission of evidence on crossexamination, and (2) improper argument on the part of counsel which was not corrected by proper and suitable action on the part of the trial court. These matters are set out in full in assignments 8, 10 and 11 of the motion for new trial as follows:
The purpose of the questions propounded to Musick, the bus driver above quoted, was to disclose whether the people of his community generally accepted the doctrine, to which he himself also subscribed, that quick corporal punishment should be administered to Negroes "when they get out of line." It was within the discretion of the trial court to allow such cross-examination to test the credibility of the witness, especially so since he testified that although the Negro applied to him a vile epithet he nevertheless took no action until after he was assaulted. Hofler v. State, 16 Ark. 534; Hughes v. State, 70 Ark. 420, 68 S.W. 676; Carter v. State, 196 Ark. 746, 119 S.W.2d 913.
The argument of counsel presents a more serious question.
It has been stated generally that "the control of argument is in the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge" and "reversal rests upon (his) abuse of discretion . . . in not confining the argument within its legitimate channels." Kansas City Sou. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 74 Ark. 256, 85 S.W. 428.
In his work "Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts," Mr. Bowers, after pointing out that the term "judicial discretion" is in fact a "misnomer" and that its companion term "abuse of discretion" is "unhappily phrased" admits that such terms have "become so deeply imbedded in the legal nomenclature that any attempt to dislodge them would be futile." Later the same author says: "While trial courts are clothed with considerable discretion in controlling the arguments, little hesitancy is shown by appellate courts in reviewing the action taken below, and reversals are ordered, seemingly with alacrity, when it has been made to appear that prejudice resulted from improper argument of counsel." Bowers -- Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts, § 283, p. 318.
The text above quoted is in conformity with pronouncements of this court. In the early case of Vaughan v. State, 58 Ark. 353, 24 S.W. 885, the court, although stating that control of argument was within the sound discretion of the trial court, nevertheless declared that the exercise of that discretion was subject to review, and added "Whenever it occurs to us that any prejudice has most likely resulted therefrom (improper argument) we shall not hesitate to reverse on that account."
In the case of Kansas City Sou. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 74 Ark. 256, 85 S.W. 428, it was said: ...
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