Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 August 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. 93-1664,93-1680 and 93-8204,s. 93-1664
• Citation: 31 F.3d 224
• Parties: , 128 Lab.Cas. P 11,160, 9 IER Cases 1377, 9 IER Cases 1536, 9 IER Cases 1754 John HALKIAS, et al., Plaintiffs, John Halkias and Barry Jackson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. John Anthony CUREINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Alvin STAUDT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GLASTRON, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 224

31 F.3d 224

63 USLW 2138, 128 Lab.Cas. P 11,160,

9 IER Cases 1377,

9 IER Cases 1536, 9 IER Cases 1754

John HALKIAS, et al., Plaintiffs, John Halkias and Barry Jackson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

John Anthony CUREINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Alvin STAUDT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly

situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GLASTRON, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 93-1664, 93-1680 and 93-8204.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 24, 1994.

Rehearing En Banc Ordered

Sept. 22, 1994.

Art Brender, Ft. Worth, TX, for appellants in Nos. 93-1664, 93-1680.

Kary L. Moss, Exec. Dir., Detroit, MI, for amicus--Texas AFL-CIO, et al. in Nos. 93-1664, 93-1680.

Paul D. Inman, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Dallas, TX, for appellee in No. 93-1664.

Paul David Inman, Karl G. Nelson, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Dallas, TX, for appellee in No. 93-1680.

Randal C. Gray, New Braunfels, TX, for appellant in No. 93-8204.

Kary L. Moss, Exec. Dir., Barbara Harvey, NLG, Detroit, MI, for amicus--Texas AFL-CIO & Atomic Workers.

Ellen E. McLaughlin, Lee P. Schafer Seyfarth Shaw Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, for appellee in No. 93-8204.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before WISDOM, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

These appeals present an issue of first impression in our circuit: the limitations period for an action under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 2101-2109. Both district courts applied the six-month period provided by Sec. 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b). We AFFIRM.

I.

Two of the actions (Halkias' and Cureington's) are against General Dynamics Corporation one (Staudt's), against Glastron, Inc. They concern not receiving timely notice in advance of a layoff, contrary to WARN, referred to by many as a "plant closing" law. E.g., 134 Cong. Rec. S8546 (June 24, 1988) (Senator Grassley); id. at S8665 (June 28, 1988) (Senator Specter). ¹

WARN requires a business that employs more than 100 workers to provide at least 60 days' written notice before a "plant closing" or a "mass layoff". 29 U.S.C. Secs. 2101-02; see also id. Sec. 2101(a)(3)-(4) (defining "plant closing" and "mass layoff"). Failure to provide such notice results in the business' liability to those who suffered an "employment loss" for back pay and benefits for each day of the violation. Id. Sec. 2104(a)(1); see also id. Sec. 2101(a)(6) (defining "employment loss" as termination, layoff exceeding six months, or reduction of hours of work by more than 50 percent for six months). WARN provides for a federal action to recover these damages, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 2104(a)(5), but does not include a limitations period.

A.

1.

On January 7, 1991, the Department of Defense cancelled a contract with General Dynamics, prompting it, one day later, to institute a "mass layoff" at its facilities in Texas, Oklahoma, and Missouri. ² Halkias was one of the affected employees at the Fort Worth, Texas, facility. Almost two years later, on November 24, 1992, he and other General Dynamics employees at the Fort Worth and Oklahoma (Tulsa) facilities filed a class action in district court, claiming that they were laid off in violation of WARN. ³ In its final form, the action was on behalf of approximately 2,000 former salaried, non-union General Dynamics employees at the two facilities. ⁴

General Dynamics moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the six-month limitations period applicable to unfair labor practice claims under Sec. 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b), should be borrowed, and if so, Halkias' action was time-barred. The district court agreed.

2.

Cureington's appeal arises out of the same facts; indeed, the parties to his action agreed to transfer it to the district court adjudicating Halkias', because the claim was identical to, and embraced by, Halkias' class action. ⁵ Although Cureington's action was never formally consolidated with Halkias', the district court dismissed Cureington's complaint sua sponte, because he failed to file within the six-month period.

B.

Staudt's class action against Glastron alleged that it "laid off" over 250 employees at its New Braunfels, Texas, facility between October 31 and December 31, 1990; but Staudt did not file suit until December 17, 1992, approximately two years later. ⁶ Glastron's motion to dismiss, on the basis that the action was barred by the limitations period that should be borrowed from the NLRA, was granted.

II.

As noted, we address an issue of first impression for our court: the WARN limitations period. ⁷ District courts addressing it are divided: like the district courts in these cases, some have applied the NLRA's six-month period; ⁸ others, state limitations periods. ⁹ The Second and Third Circuits, which are the only other circuits to have addressed this issue, rejected the NLRA period and held that a state limitations period was appropriate. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53 (3d Cir.1994); United Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir.1993). Most reluctantly, we part company with our sister circuits, and hold that the NLRA period should be applied.

A.

Congress' failure to provide a limitations period for WARN "is often the case in federal civil law". DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). In such a case,

we do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there be no time limit on actions at all; rather, our task is to "borrow" the most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source. We have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law.

Id. (footnote omitted). The task of borrowing an appropriate limitations period has been accurately characterized as "a matter of which round peg to stuff in a square hole." Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Cir.1990) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250, 111 S.Ct. 2887, 115 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1991). Due to the many competing reasons for borrowing various periods, this case is no exception. Indeed, it is a classic example.

Complicating our task is the need to consider whether a federal limitations period provides a superior vehicle for WARN's enforcement. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162, 103 S.Ct. at 2289 ("state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law"). To be sure, the Court continues to caution that "resort to state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods." Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294; accord Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2778, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (plurality) ("It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, a court 'borrows' or 'absorbs' the local time limitation most analogous to the case at hand.") (citations omitted). ¹⁰ But, under appropriate conditions, we may look to federal law to borrow the period. ¹¹

The Court has stated that:

when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from state law.

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294; accord Lampf, 501 U.S. at 356, 111 S.Ct. at 2778 (plurality).

Consistent with the trend towards utilization of federal limitations periods, discussed in note 11, supra, our court has borrowed the NLRA's limitations period in a number of cases since DelCostello. See, e.g., Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 901 F.2d 404, 410-14 (5th Cir.) (applying period to claim for breach of duty of fair representation under Railway Labor Act), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895, 111 S.Ct. 244, 112 L.Ed.2d 203 (1990); Trial v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 896 F.2d 120, 124-26 (5th Cir.1990) (same); Aluminum, Brick & Glassworkers Int'l Union Local 674 v. A.P. Green Refractories, Inc., 895 F.2d 1053, 1054-55 (5th Cir.1990) (applying period to "pure" Sec. 301 actions under Labor Management Relations Act); Coyle v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 838 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (5th Cir.1988) (applying period to breach of contract claim against union under Sec. 2 of Railway Labor Act).

The decision to apply a federal, rather than a state, period is a "delicate" one. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 356, 111 S.Ct. at 2778 (plurality). In DelCostello, the Court selected the NLRA's limitations period after giving due consideration to whether the state period might hinder the federal policy at issue, DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162-69, 103 S.Ct. at 2289-93, and noting the "family resemblance" between the federal statute at issue and the NLRA. Id. at 170-71, 103 S.Ct. at 2293-94. In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987), the Court considered whether a uniform period is desirable, id. at 148-49, 107 S.Ct. at 2763, and whether a federal statute provided a "far closer analogy ... than any state law alternative", paying particular attention to the "similarities in purpose and structure" between the two federal statutes. Id. at 150, 152, 107 S.Ct. at 2764, 2765. It also focused on litigation practicalities, particularly the potential for forum shopping generated by application of diverse state periods. Id. at 153-54, 107 S.Ct. at 2765-66.

In Lampf, a plurality of ...