Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, No. 20643
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | RHODES; LEWIS |
| Citation | 270 S.C. 386,242 S.E.2d 430 |
| Parties | TRIANGLE AUTO SPRING COMPANY, Appellant, v. Richard A. GROMLOVITZ, Nelson Marks, and Metalcraft, Inc., Respondents. |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 20643 |
Page 430
v.
Richard A. GROMLOVITZ, Nelson Marks, and Metalcraft, Inc.,
Respondents.
[270 S.C. 387] C. Ansel Gantt, Jr., of Drawdy Law Offices, Columbia, for appellant.
Page 431
Hammond A. Beale, Columbia, for respondents.
[270 S.C. 388] RHODES, Justice:
This is an appeal by Triangle Auto Spring Company (Triangle) from an order of the lower court vacating a confession of judgment enrolled in Richland County against the respondents, who are residents of Lexington County. The lower court held that a confession of judgment must initially be enrolled in the debtor's county of residence and thus, in this case, had been improperly entered in Richland. We disagree and remand for reinstatement of the judgment against respondents.
The confession of judgment which is the subject of this action and a promissory note in favor of Triangle were executed by Richard A. Gromlovitz, Nelson Marks and Metalcraft, Inc., the respondents, as consideration for the cancellation of a default judgment. This default judgment had been previously obtained against Metalcraft in an action brought by Triangle for the collection of an open account. The confession of judgment authorized the appellant to enter judgment thereon in the event of default on the promissory note. The affidavit accompanying it, which was likewise signed by the respondents, specifically authorized the Clerks of Court for both Richland and Lexington Counties "to enter up this Confession of Judgment upon presentation by the Plaintiff (Triangle)."
When the respondents subsequently defaulted on the promissory note, the confession of judgment was initially enrolled in Richland County. It was subsequently transcribed and entered in Lexington County.
The respondents brought the present action in the Richland County Court to have the judgment enrolled in that county vacated. This relief was granted by the lower court and this appeal followed.
[270 S.C. 389] The rule applicable to the enrollment of judgments by confession in this State was set out in Ex Parte Ware Furniture, 49 S.C. 20, 27 S.E. 9 (1897) wherein it was stated:
"Judgments by confession are in no wise exempt from the rule applicable to other judgments that, to be valid, they must be entered in the court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Though no adjudication is in fact required in entering a judgment of confession without action, yet it has all the qualities, incidents, and attributes of other judgments, and cannot be valid unless entered in a...
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Stearns Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Glenwood Falls, No. 4231.
...has found that a party can make a voluntary appearance without formally announcing it. See, e.g., Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 270 S.C. 386, 389-90 n. 1, 242 S.E.2d 430, 431 n. 1 (1978) (holding that consenting to a confession of judgment constitutes a voluntary appearance); Conn......
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Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Hilton Head Hotel Investors, Civil No. 9:89-cv-0662-DCN
...judgment would be filed because a confession of judgment is equivalent to a voluntary appearance. Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 242 S.E.2d 430, 431 n.1 (S.C. 1978). The settlement agreement signed by both parties indicates that Nelson's confession of judgment would be filed, if ne......
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Adams v. McDaniel, 2009 NY Slip Op 31273(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 6/3/2009), 114905/08
...has found that a parly can make a voluntary appearance without formally announcing it. See, e.g., Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 270 S.C. 386, 389-90 n. 1, 242 S.E.2d 430, 431 n. 1 (1978) (holding that consenting to a confession of judgment constitutes a voluntary appearance); Conn......
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Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., No. 24034
...The distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and venue is an important one in the law. See Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 270 S.C. 386, 242 S.E.2d 430 (1978) (distinguishing subject matter jurisdiction and venue and effect of each). The terms are not synonymous. Bambrick v. ......
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Stearns Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Glenwood Falls, No. 4231.
...has found that a party can make a voluntary appearance without formally announcing it. See, e.g., Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 270 S.C. 386, 389-90 n. 1, 242 S.E.2d 430, 431 n. 1 (1978) (holding that consenting to a confession of judgment constitutes a voluntary appearance); Conn......
-
Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Hilton Head Hotel Investors, Civil No. 9:89-cv-0662-DCN
...judgment would be filed because a confession of judgment is equivalent to a voluntary appearance. Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 242 S.E.2d 430, 431 n.1 (S.C. 1978). The settlement agreement signed by both parties indicates that Nelson's confession of judgment would be filed, if ne......
-
Adams v. McDaniel, 2009 NY Slip Op 31273(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 6/3/2009), 114905/08
...has found that a parly can make a voluntary appearance without formally announcing it. See, e.g., Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 270 S.C. 386, 389-90 n. 1, 242 S.E.2d 430, 431 n. 1 (1978) (holding that consenting to a confession of judgment constitutes a voluntary appearance); Conn......
-
Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., No. 24034
...The distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and venue is an important one in the law. See Triangle Auto Spring Co. v. Gromlovitz, 270 S.C. 386, 242 S.E.2d 430 (1978) (distinguishing subject matter jurisdiction and venue and effect of each). The terms are not synonymous. Bambrick v. ......