Tribbett v. Vill. of Marcellus

• Decision Date: 06 September 1940
• Docket Number: No. 57.,57.
• Parties: TRIBBETT et al. v. VILLAGE OF MARCELLUS.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

294 Mich. 607

293 N.W. 872

TRIBBETT et al.

v.VILLAGE OF MARCELLUS.

No. 57.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 6, 1940.

Action by Clark P. Tribbett and another against the Village of Marcellus for disconnection of land from the village. From an order dismissing the petition, the plaintiffs appeal.

Verdict set aside and decree ordered to be entered granting petition.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cass County, in Chancery; Glenn E. Warner, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Carroll B. Jones, of Marcellus (Earl L. Burhans, of Paw Paw, of counsel), for plaintiffs and appellants.

Clarence M. Lyle, of Cassopolis, for defendant and appellee.

John R. Rood, of Lapeer, amicus curiae.

McALLISTER, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court in chancery dismissing a petition for disconnection of land from the village of Marcellus. The trial judge held that the statute under which disconnection was sought was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs appealed; and defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the statute in question provided for no right of appeal from the court's determination.

The pertinent sections of the statute in question, Act No. 177, Pub.Acts 1939 (Comp.Laws Supp. 1940, § 2344-1 et seq.), provide as follows:

‘See. 1. The owner or owners of any area of land consisting of 1 or more tracts, lying within the corporate limits of any city or village, may have the same disconnected from such city or village under the provisions of this act if such area of land

‘(1) Contains 10 or more acres;

‘(2) Is not subdivided into city or village lots and blocks;

‘(3) Is located on the border or boundary of the city or village: Provided, however, That such disconnection shall not result in the isolation of any part of the said city or village from the remainder of such city or village.

‘(4) Shall have been for a period of 3 years next preceding the filing of the petition provided for in section 2 hereof, used for agricultural purposes only.

‘Sec. 2. The owner or owners of any such area of land who desire such disconnection shall file a petition in the circuit court of the county where the land, or the greater part thereof, is situated, and in such petition shall allege facts in support of such disconnection. The particular city or village shall be made defendant, and it, or any taxpayer, resident in such municipality, may appear and defendant against such petition. If the court finds that the allegations of said petition are true and that such area of land is entitled to disconnection under the provisions of section 1 of this act, it shall order said land disconnected from such city or village. In case of the disconnection from a city of any land which previously constituted a part of 1 or more townships, such land shall thereupon attach to and become a part of such township or townships, which shall be specified in the judgment. In case of the disconnection of any other land, the court shall determine and specify in the judgment what township or townships such land shall attach to and become a part of: Provided, however, That if by reason of city or village owned sewers, sidewalks, highways, watermains, gas mains, or other public improvements, upon or abutting said property, it would be inequitable to such city or village to grant said petition, the circuit judge may in his discretion deny the same even though petitioner has met the qualifications set forth in section 1 hereof.’

‘Sec. 5. The provisions of this act shall not apply in the case of proposed disconnection of any land from cities of over 7,000 population. The provisions of this act shall not apply in the case of proposed disconnection of any land from incorporated villages under 500 population.

‘Sec. 6. This act shall case to be in force and effect at the expiration of 1 year from the effective date thereof.’

On February 15, 1879, the legislature, by Local Act No. 269 of 1879, incorporated the village of Marcellus, the area of which consisted of a portion of Marcellus township in Cass county. No change in the village boundaries have occurred since its incorporation. At the present time the village is operating under Act No. 3, Pub.Acts 1895 (1 Comp.Laws 1929, § 1465 et seq. [Stat.Ann. § 5.1201 et seq.]). It has a population of 944 inhabitants; it maintains an electric lighting system, water works, and the usual village public services.

It is contended by the village that Act No. 177, Pub.Acts 1939, is unconstitutional on the ground that it is class legislation; that it is a local act, prohibited by article 5, § 30, of the State Constitution, 1908; that it provides a method of amending city and village charters inconsistent with sections 20 and 21 of article 8 of the Constitution; and that the statute embraces more than one object which is not expressed in its title, in violation of the Constitution, 1908, art. 5, § 21.

With reference to the claim that the statute is unconstitutional because of improper classification of cities and villages according to population and that it is, therefore, a local act rather than a general act, such contention cannot be maintained. In all cases of classification, the line must be drawn somewhere if laws are to be certain and practical in their operation. Size and population are not unreasonable standards for the legislature to adopt. Similar cases readily suggest themselves. Classification of school districts based upon population is not unconstitutional. See Chamski v. Wayne County Board of Auditors, 288 Mich. 238, 284 N.W. 711; nor are statutes providing for classification of cities and villages according to population, invalid. The fact that villages of over 7,000 inhabitants and cities with less than 500 inhabitants may receive the benefit of the statute, while cities of more than 7,000 and villages of less than 500 inhabitants do not receive such benefit, does not result in invalidity. A classification is sufficient if it is practical and reasonable, and is no reviewable unless palpably arbitrary and unreasonable.

‘If it is a reasonable and logical basis of classification considering the subject of legislation, unquestionably a specified population may be made the test of the applicability of a general legislative act; and under such conditions, the act will not be construed to be invalid as local legislation. Hayes v. Auditor General, 184 Mich. 39, 150 N.W. 331. But where the subject of legislation is such that population has no obvious relation to the purpose sought to be accomplished, an attempt to make the application of the legislative act dependent on population is unwarranted and amounts to local legislation. Attorney General v. Lacy, 180 Mich. 329, 146 N.W. 871.’ Mulloy v. Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 246 Mich. 632, 225 N.W. 615, 616.

While population alone is not the basis of classification in the statute, nevertheless the classification of villages and cities of prescribed population, even though all municipalities of like population are not subject to the same conditions, cannot be said to be an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of legislative power. It appears that, according to the census of 1930, there were about 467 cities and villages in the State. Of these, two villages had a population exceeding 7,000 and seven cities had a population of less than 500. If the classification were to be determined solely according to population in cities and villages alike, the provisions of the statute in question would present only nine exceptions out of 467 minicipalities. It could hardly be said that this fact evidences subterfuge to avoid the effect of a general act.

There can be no question that, if the act applied only to cities of less than 7,000 population, it could be sustained as constitutional; or if the act applied only to village of more than 500 population, legislative classification would be unquestioned. In the first case it could be justified on the ground that it was the legislative policy to exclude application of th act to large cities for the reason that such land should remain within the municipal limits for future development. In the latter case it could be argued that villages of less than 500 population needed to retain the land as a taxpaying support for local government because of the few sources from which village taxes could be raised. In City of Allegan v. Consumers' Power Co., 6 Cir., 71 F.2d 477, it was held that a Michigan statute, general in form, and validating bonds of cities with a population not exceeding 4,500, was a general law within the constitutional inhibition of article 5, section 30, Constitution of Michigan, 1908, prohibiting a local act. Article 8, section 20, of the Constitution of Michigan, 1908, provides: ‘This legislature shall provide by a general law for the incorporation of cities, and by a general law for the incorporation of villages.’ Statutes affecting villages may be enacted without any reference to cities. The act in question affects all villages of a certain population equally; and it affects all cities of a certain population equally. The act is general, not special, and not invalid for constitutional infringement.

‘The question of classification is primarily for the legislature and is sufficient if it is practical and reasonable. It is not reviewable unless palpably arbitrary. Straus v. Elless Co., 245 Mich. 558, 222 N.W. 752. Equal protection of the laws does not prevent a reasonable classification by legislative enactment and the ultimate decision as to the wisdom of such laws rests with the legislature. Little v. American State Bank [of Dearborn], 263 Mich. 645, 249 N.W. 22.

“A citation of cases is not necessary, nor for the general principle that a discrimination is valid if not arbitrary, and arbitrary in the legislative sense, that is, outside of that wide diescretion which a legislature may exercise. A legislative classification may rest on narrow distinctions. Legislation is addressed to evils as...