Trice v. Bridgewater

• Decision Date: 10 April 1935
• Docket Number: No. 1834-6360.,1834-6360.
• Parties: TRICE et al. v. BRIDGEWATER.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

81 S.W.2d 63

TRICE et al. v. BRIDGEWATER.

No. 1834-6360.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

April 10, 1935.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Tenth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by M. L. Bridgewater against C. L. Trice and another. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed and remanded by the Court of Civil Appeals [51 S.W.(2d) 797], and defendants bring error.

Reversed and rendered in part; affirmed in part.

Joseph W. Hale, George Clark, and E. B. Burleson, all of Waco, for plaintiffs in error.

Cecil Glass, of Marlin, for defendant in error.

GERMAN, Commissioner.

Writ of error was granted in this case in order that this court might definitely settle a question of law concerning which there is some diversity of decision among the Courts of Civil Appeals. In order that the question may be squarely decided, we adopt the findings of fact made by the Court of Civil Appeals touching this question, on which the majority of the court held the defendant in error C. L. Trice liable for the negligence of his minor son, Wilson Trice, while driving an automobile belonging to the father and used for the business and pleasure of the family. At the time of the accident in which defendant in error M. L. Bridgewater was injured and his automobile damaged, Wilson Trice was seventeen years of age, was living with his father as a constituent member of the family, and was driving the car with the general consent of the father. It was conceded that he was a skillful and capable driver. At the time of the accident he was using the car solely for his own purposes and pleasure. The fact of his negligence and the injury to defendant in error by reason thereof was definitely determined by the findings of the jury. Upon the question of the liability of C. L. Trice for the negligence of his son, Justice Alexander dissented. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals discloses all other facts which may be essential to a full understanding of the question decided. 51 S.W.(2d) 797. While the majority of the court held C. L. Trice liable, the case was reversed and remanded because of insufficiency of evidence to show that Wilson Trice was driving the car at the time of the accident. No application for writ of error was filed by defendant in error, and we are therefore limited to a discussion of the propositions that judgment should have been rendered in favor of C. L. Trice and in favor of Wilson Trice. As to Wilson Trice, however, the ground urged for a rendition of judgment in his favor is entirely different from the ground upon which judgment in favor of C. L. Trice is urged. The liability of C. L. Trice is the dominant question considered herein.

Liability as to C. L. Trice was upheld by the majority of the Court of Civil Appeals upon what is commonly termed the "family purpose doctrine," which has recently come to find an important place in judicial literature pertaining to automobiles. The different opinions of higher courts dealing with this doctrine would fill volumes of law books. This doctrine came into existence as a creature of judicial decision in order to establish or sustain liability on the part of an automobile owner (usually the head of a family) where the ancient relationships of master and servant and principal and agent could not readily be discovered as a basis of liability. It has been inappropriately referred to for the purpose of decision in many varying circumstances, as, for instance, where some member of a family was driving the family car in direct furtherance of the father's business, or for the transportation of the father or mother, or under circumstances where no question could arise as to the use of the car being for an immediate "family" purpose. It is obvious that in such cases there was discernible a real relationship of agency as a basis for the decision. In many such cases the child was engaged in a special mission for the father, or was using the car in connection with a matter in which the father or head of the family had a direct and substantial interest. These decisions therefore properly rest upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, and not upon the "family purpose doctrine" as such.

Strictly speaking, the "family purpose doctrine" has a more restricted meaning and is regarded as applying only to a situation such as is present here. It is the doctrine in this restricted sense that has evoked such a profusion of judicial discussion, and as touching its application in this restricted sense the courts of the country are sharply divided. The doctrine in this restricted but strictly accurate sense is thus clearly and concisely stated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the case of Norton v. Hall, 149 Ark. 428, 232 S. W. 934, 935, 19 A. L. R. 384: "The substance of the doctrine is that when the father or other head of a family supplies an automobile for the use and pleasure of the family, permitting the members thereof to use it at will, those members thus using the automobile become the agents of the head of the family, and that each one using it, even for his sole personal pleasure, is carrying out the purpose for which the automobile is furnished, and is the agent or servant of the head of the family, so that the latter is liable for injuries resulting from negligence, under the doctrine of respondeat superior." (Italics ours.)

This doctrine as thus stated is now definitely rejected by the courts of some eighteen or twenty states, and has been rejected by practically every state where the decision has been made during the past few years. It is adopted in about twelve of the states, but the most recent decisions in some of the states have tended to restrict and qualify the doctrine to a very material extent. For instance, the cases of Stumpf v. Montgomery, 101 Okl. 257, 226 P. 65, 32 A. L. R. 1490, and Schmitt v. Kier, 111 Okl. 23, 238 P. 410, by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, have practically overruled the prior decision of McNeal v. McKain, 33 Okl. 449, 126 P. 742, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 775. In Missouri, in the case of Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A. 1918C, 715, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1127, the Supreme Court overruled outright the prior case of Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W. 351, which had committed that state to the doctrine and which case had been relied upon by courts of other states which had adopted it. Likewise in Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 193 P. 255, 14 A. L. R. 1083, the Supreme Court of California overruled prior decisions and definitely rejected the doctrine in that state.

While this court has not yet been called upon to unequivocally adopt or reject this doctrine, yet there was an approach to the question in the case of Cook v. Mann, 40 S. W.(2d) 72, by the Commission of Appeals, wherein it was held that the father was not liable because of the negligent acts of the son under a state of facts quite similar to the facts herein involved.

After a most careful consideration of many of the leading authorities and the weight of the argument in support of and against the reasonableness and logic of this doctrine, we have reached the conclusion that as above set out, and under the present state of facts, the doctrine should not be adopted. In other words, we hold that the mere ownership of an automobile purchased by a father for the use and pleasure of himself and family does not render him liable in damages to a third person who may be injured by reason of the negligence of his minor son while operating the automobile on the public highway in pursuit of the son's own purpose and pleasure, notwithstanding the son may have been using the car with the permission of the father.

Some of the cases, the reasoning of which has influenced us to this conclusion, are the following: Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A. 1918C, 715, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1127; Smith v. Callahan, 4 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 129, 144 A. 46, 47, 64 A. L. R. 830; Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 A. 645, 20 A. L. R. 1460; Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 193 P. 255, 14 A. L. R. 1083; Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 P. 131; Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30, 32, 5 A. L. R. 216, and Norton v. Hall, 149 Ark. 428, 232 S. W. 934, 19 A. L. R. 384. A consideration of these cases leads to the inescapable conclusion that there is no sound or logical basis in law or reason on which liability of the father for negligent acts of his son, while in pursuance of his own personal ends and pleasure, can be grounded. Shortly after the advent of the automobile, when the doctrine had its inception, it was founded almost entirely upon the theory that the automobile was a dangerous instrumentality, and the father was negligent in placing it in the hands of a minor child, regardless of his competency as a driver. This theory has long since been abandoned, although some of the courts out of deference to prior decisions have declined to overthrow the rule, but have found it necessary to resort to other foundations for upholding the doctrine.

All courts which have adopted this doctrine have recognized and admitted...