Trinidad-Jorge v. United States
| Decision Date | 26 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 18-1382(PG),Related Crim. No. 16-282[11](PG) |
| Citation | 462 F.Supp.3d 102 |
| Parties | José TRINIDAD-JORGE, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Jose Trinidad-Jorge, Adelanto, CA, pro se.
Antonio L. Perez-Alonso, Mariana E. Bauza, United States Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for Respondent.
Before the court is petitioner Jose Trinidad-Jorge's ("Petitioner" or "Trinidad-Jorge") motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Docket No. 1), the government's opposition thereto (Docket No. 18), and Petitioner's reply (Docket No. 25). For the reasons set forth below, the motion to vacate is DENIED .
On May 9, 2016, a grand jury returned a multicount indictment charging Petitioner and forty-nine others of conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One or "the RICO count")1 and of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count Two). Per the indictment, Trinidad-Jorge was a member of a criminal organization known as La Asociación Pro-Derechos y Rehabilitación del Confinado or La Asociación ÑETA2 ("La Asociación ÑETA" or the "enterprise"). See Indictment, Case No. 16-cr-282, Docket No. 3. More than that, the indictment tags Trinidad-Jorge as a member of "El Liderato Máximo" (or the "Maximum Leadership"), and thus, a top-leader of the organization. See id. at pages 9-10. These high-ranking members had a number of responsibilities, such as: (1) purchasing and overseeing the distribution of large quantities of drugs within the Puerto Rico prisons; (2) controlling the income generated by the gang's illicit acts, and; (3) authorizing and ordering the murders of other inmates as means to intimidate, protect, advance and even discipline. Id. The RICO and drug conspiracies were ongoing and began on a date unknown, not later than in or about the year 2005, and continued up until the return of the indictment. Id. at pages 13, 20.
Trinidad-Jorge signed a plea agreement with the government in which he agreed to plead guilty to Count One. See Plea Agreement , Case No. 16-cr-282, Docket No. 1015. The parties agreed to a total offense level of 32 but did not stipulate a criminal history category for the Petitioner. See id. at p. 4. The Plea Agreement also stated that Trinidad-Jorge could face a maximum sentence of up to life in prison and that the court had the authority to impose any sentence within the statutory maximum regardless of the agreement's recommendations. See id. at pages 2-3.
The amended Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), filed on October 23, 2017, deemed the total offense level to be 33 and established a criminal history category of VI for Trinidad-Jorge. See Amended PSR, Case No. 16-cr-282, Docket No. 1455. No formal objections to the PSR were filed by Petitioner. However, on December 15, 2017, he filed a sentencing memorandum complaining that his criminal history was "overrepresented," among other claims. See Case No. 16-cr-282, Docket No. 1602.
At the sentencing hearing held on December 18, 2017, the court adopted a total offense level of 32 in accordance with the plea agreement, and a criminal history category of VI. Hence, the guideline range was 210 to 262 months. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing , Case No. 16-cr-282, Docket No. 2307 at page 20. The court sentenced Petitioner to the lower end of this range, that is, to 210 months of imprisonment to be served concurrently with any other sentence he was then serving at the state level. See id. at 24.
Consistent with the terms of his plea agreement, Petitioner did not appeal. Nevertheless, on June 18, 2018, Petitioner filed the pending motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 requesting that this court vacate his sentence. He grounds his request on a claim that he received inefficient assistance of counsel. See Docket No. 1. He sustains that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) misadvising him as to his criminal history category and (2) failing to object to errors in the PSR. See Docket No. 1 at 4.
According to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (a) ; Hill v. United States 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417, (1962) ; Barreto-Barreto v. United States, 551 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 2008) ; David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998).
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused have a right to the assistance of counsel for their defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. It has long been recognized that "the right to counsel means the right to effective legal assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ). Counsel can deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance by failing to render "adequate legal assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) ). Where, as here, a petitioner moves to vacate his sentence on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, he must show that "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Id.
"In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a ‘[petitioner] must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that it prejudiced his defense.’ " Rojas-Medina v. United States, 924 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2010) ). "To show that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, [petitioner] must demonstrate that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms." Walker v. Medeiros, 911 F.3d 629, 633 (1st Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2015) ). "This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," and "a court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Petitioner must also show that he was prejudiced by counsel's "constitutionally deficient" representation. As to the prejudice prong, a petitioner must establish that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different ...." Rivera v. Thompson, 879 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). In the present context, "[t]o satisfy the prejudice requirement, the [petitioner] must show ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty.’ " United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 641 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ).
As discussed, a petitioner must demonstrate both incompetence and prejudice. "This two-pronged inquiry has equal relevance with respect to ineffective assistance claims in both tried cases and cases resolved by guilty pleas." Miller, 911 F.3d at 641 (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. 366 ). "A [petitioner's] failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland analysis obviates the need for a court to consider the remaining prong." Tevlin v. Spencer, 621 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). Thus, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 679, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Against this backdrop, the court will address Petitioner's claims in turn.
Trinidad-Jorge claims that he was deprived of his Sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his attorney allegedly misadvised him regarding his criminal history category. See Docket No. 1 at p. 4. Specifically, Petitioner contends that he signed the plea agreement because his attorney told him that he would be sentenced as a criminal history category II. However, the court categorized Trinidad-Jorge as a criminal history category VI and sentenced him as such. See Case No. 16-cr-282, Docket No. 1643. In response, the government argues that Petitioner's claims are unavailing because he fails to show prejudice and because the record shows that he was cognizant of his potential exposure when he signed his plea agreement. See Docket No. 18. The court agrees with the government.
"[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult judgments." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). "Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court's judgment might be on given facts." Id. at 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441. Hence, the Supreme Court has "long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel."...
To continue reading
Request your trial