Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Scott

• Decision Date: 06 January 1961
• Docket Number: No. 16157,16157
• Parties: TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Jack L. SCOTT, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 348

342 S.W.2d 348

TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Jack L. SCOTT, Appellee.

No. 16157.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

Jan. 6, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1961.

Jones, Parish, Fillmore, Robinson & Lambert, and Harold Jones, Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Mock, Spell & Schenk, and Kenneth C. Spell, Jr., Wichita Falls, for appellee.

MASSEY, Chief Justice.

The primary question posed on this appeal is whether or not, under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, Vernon's Ann.Tex.St., Art. 8306 et seq., an injured workman may secure a valid judgment for total and permanent disability when he is at time of the trial actually earning money in excess of the wages upon which his weekly compensation is calculated.

We do not consider this to be an open question in view of prior decisions upon the matter. Where there is prima facie proof in the record which supports the judgment of a trial court for compensation by reason of total and permanent incapacity, the judgment will not be reversed merely because there is evidence in the same record which establishes that the disabled employee is in fact working and earning money. This is true regardless of the amount of money being earned. Proof thereof constitutes part of the factual evidence which may and should be taken into consideration by the jury in answering the issues upon incapacity or disability, but does not, as a matter of law, preclude the award of compensation even for total and permanent disability.

We have been cited to a great many authorities in which such holding in the instant case finds support and which we will list for any future necessity of reference: Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Williams, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1927, 293 S.W. 210, writ dism.; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1928, 5 S.W.2d 181, writ dism.; Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Rollins, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1928, 8 S.W.2d 699; Norwich Union indemnity Co. v. Wilson, Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1929, 17 S.W.2d 68, writ. dism.; Aetna Life Life Ins. Co. v. Bulgier, Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1929, 19 S.W.2d 821, writ ref.; Davies v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, Tex.Com.App.1930, 29 S.W.2d 987; Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Gannon, Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1931, 38 S.W.2d 181, writ dism.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Teel, Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1931, 40 S.W.2d 201, no writ history; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dicken, Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1935, 80 S.W.2d 800, writ dism.; National Indemnity Underwriters of America v. Cherry, Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1937, 110 S.W.2d 115, no writ history; Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Roberts, Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1938, 116 S.W.2d 417, reversed on other grounds, 135 Tex. 123, 139 S.W.2d 80; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Ener, Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont 1939, 126 S.W.2d 769, writ dism., judgment correct; Southern Underwriters v. Stubblefield, Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1939, 130 S.W.2d 385, no writ history; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Daniel, Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1939, 131 S.W.2d 276, writ dism., judgment correct; Southern Underwriters v. Grimes, Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1940, 146 S.W.2d 1058, writ dism., judgment correct; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Wilder, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1943, 186 S.W.2d 1011, writ ref.; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Collins, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1944, 179 S.W.2d 525, writ ref., w. m.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mallard, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1946, 192 S.W.2d 302, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Dickerson, Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1946, 194 S.W.2d 146, writ ref. n. r. e.; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Heath, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1946, 197 S.W.2d 130, writ ref., n. r. e.; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Rose, Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1949, 217 S.W.2d 425, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Locke, Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1949, 224 S.W.2d 755, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Bonner, Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1950, 228 S.W.2d 348, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas State Highway Dept. v. Kinsler, Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont 1950, 230 S.W.2d 364, writ ref.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1950, 233 S.W.2d 171, writ ref., n. r. e.; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Brasher, Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1950, 234 S.W.2d 698, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Evers, Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1951, 242 S.W.2d 906, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Rollins, Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1953, 257 S.W.2d 851, no writ history; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Dickinson, Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1954, 266 S.W.2d Co. v. Burnes, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1955, 278 S.W.2d 934, writ ref., n. r. e.; American General Insurance Co. v. Bailey, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1956, 287 S.W.2d 290, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hadley, Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1956, 289 S.W.2d 809, no writ history; Gulf Casualty Co. v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana 1956, 290 S.W.2d 334, writ ref., n. r. e.; Consolidated Casualty Ins. Co. v. Baker, Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1956, 297 S.W.2d 706, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Goforth, Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1957, 307 S.W.2d 610, writ ref., n. r. e.; Consolidated Casualty Ins. Co. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1958, 309 S.W.2d 80, writ ref., n. r. e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1959, 323 S.W.2d 345, writ ref., n. r. e.; Muro v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1959, 329 S.W.2d 326, writ ref., n. r. e.: Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1960, 336 S.W.2d 304; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jordan, Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1960, 339 S.W.2d 235, application for writ of error pending; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Truitt, 5 Cir., 1960, 280 F.2d 784; see also 45 Tex.Jur., p. 588, 'Workmen's Compensation', sec. 161 '--Effect of Gainful Employment'.

In points of error the appellant, Trinity Universal Insurance Company, raises the points of 'no evidence', 'insufficient evidence', and 'contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence', as applied to pertinent issues in the charge and the judgment entered based upon the jury's answers thereto. By additional points of error it is asserted that the evidence establishes that the appellee, Jack L. Scott, was only partially disabled within the meaning of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law and that such was established by the testimony of Scott himself, which testimony was such that a judgment for tital and permanent disability was inhibited.

We have examined the evidence in the record, to which we were directed by the parties in their briefs, and have concluded that...