Trionfo v. R. J. Hellman, Inc.

Decision Date10 May 1968
Docket NumberNo. 201,201
Citation241 A.2d 554,250 Md. 12
PartiesMary E. TRIONFO et al. v. R. J. HELLMAN, INC.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Alan Edgar Harris, Baltimore, for appellants.

George D. Solter, Baltimore, for appellee.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and HORNEY, McWILLIAMS, FINAN and SINGLEY, JJ.

FINAN, Judge.

The appeal in this Boulevard law case is taken from a judgment upon directed verdict in favor of the defendant given at the conclusion of all the evidence.

The accident occurred at the intersection of Perring Parkway, the favored boulevard, and the eastbound exit ramp of the Baltimore Beltway. The Parkway is a dual highway, with two lanes in each direction and a speed limit of 50 miles per hour. The southbound slow lane is 14 feet wide, the fast lane 13 feet wide. Opposite in intersection of the exit ramp there is a sixty foot opening in the Parkway median to permit traffic so desiring to turn into the northbound lanes of the Parkway. The distance between the southbound and northbound lanes is 16 feet. The Beltway bridge over the Parkway is between 700 and 800 feet north of the intersection, and beyond that the Parkway terminates at Joppa Road, approximately 2,000 feet north of the intersection.

According to the testimony of the plaintiff-appellant, Mary E. Trionfo, at approximately 1:00 P.M. on June 25, 1965, she proceeded off of the Beltway onto the exit ramp and stopped at the stop sign on Perring Parkway. She looked right and left, but could not proceed because an employee of the State Roads Commission had stopped a black Ford in the southbound fast lane of the Parkway at the opening in the median. The employee then permitted the Ford to make its left turn into the median, during which time Mrs. Trionfo again checked traffic and, seeing nothing southbound from Joppa Road, drove across the southbound lanes. She was immediately forced to stop because the black Ford was again stopped in the median by the State Roads Commission employee. At this time, Mrs. Trionfo's car blocked both southbound lanes, and she observed the defendant's truck proceeding in the fast, or inside, southbound lane, but beyond the Beltway bridge. The Ford then cleared the intersection and Mrs. Trionfo moved up, but was unable to proceed because of approaching northbound traffic. Her car, which was over 17 feet in length, protruded more than one foot into the fast southbound lane. She claims that the defendant's truck continued toward her in the fast southbound lane, then veered toward the right curb and hit the left rear of her car. She also testified that the defendant's driver, Robinson, told her after the accident that he did see her, but that his brakes were bad and that he kept telling his boss about it.

The defendant's employee, Robinson, gave quite a different account of the accident. He testified that as he was proceeding southbound in the right or slow lane of traffic, he observed the plaintiff's car following another down the exit ramp. When he was about three truck lengths from the intersection, both cars proceeded across the southbound lanes, but the lead car was forced to stop in the median for northbound traffic, thereby trapping the Trionfo car in the fast lane and part of the slow lane. Robinson then applied his brakes and swerved toward the right his right front tire hit the curb and the truck then bounced off, struck the rear of Mrs. Trionfo's car and immediately came to a stop. Robinson admitted that his brakes were unreliable and that this fact had been conveyed to Mr. Hallman, his employment. However, Mr. Hellman testified that the brakes were in good condition at the time of the accident since they had been repaired and tightened two weeks earlier.

The appellee introduced as further evidence the testimony of one of its employees, Hannibal, who was driving his truck north on the Parkway and observed the accident from about one hundred yards away. According to Hannibal, the appellee's truck was proceeding southbound in the slow, or right, lane. He further stated on direct examination that he saw Mrs. Trionfo approach Perring Parkway and stop before crossing over the southbound lanes. However, on cross-examination, the appellants' attorney introduced prior statements of the witness Hannibal that when he first observed the Trionfo car, it was already across the southbound lanes and was stopped in the median by northbound traffic.

The defendant's motion for directed verdict was based on the dual grounds that there was no primary negligence on the part of the defendant and that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was guilty of negligence. The court instructed the jury as follows:

'* * * I now instruct you that the evidence in this case conclusively establishes, as a matter of law, that the proximate cause of the accident in question was the failure of the plaintiff to yield the right of way to the defendant's vehicle which was proceeding on Perring Parkway which is a boulevard street in Baltimore County. You are further instructed that there is no evidence in this case of any negligence on the part of the defendant which proximately caused the accident.'

From the judgment on the directed verdict in favor of the defendant the plaintiffs took this appeal. We must therefore resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the party against whom the verdict was directed and assume the truth of all evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be deduced from the evidence supporting the appellants' contention. Brown v Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 491, 204 A.2d 526 (1964); Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1, 4, 81 A.2d 47 (1951).

The facts of the instant case are close to those of Racine v. Wheeler, 245 Md. 139, 225 A.2d 444 (1967). In Racine the defendant being the unfavored driver emerged from a secondary road controlled by a stop sign and crossed the eastbound lanes of U.S. Route 40, pulling into the 26 foot median crossover to await the opportunity to turn left onto the westbound lanes of Route 40. The plaintiff's vehicle extended into the fast eastbound lane a distance of 2 to 12 inches and there was evidence that it had remained in that position for some 25 to 30 seconds prior to the collision. The plaintiff, the operator of the favored vehicle travelling on the eastbound lane, struck the defendant's car. The plaintiff in his version of the accident claimed that the defendant had crossed the highway immediately in front of him prior to the impact. The lower court in Racine, although aware of...

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