Tripp v. State, 1D17–2545
| Decision Date | 09 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D17–2545,1D17–2545 |
| Citation | 251 So.3d 982 |
| Parties | Blake Edwin TRIPP, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Justin Foster Karpf, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
An intoxicated pedestrian stumbling across a public thoroughfare in Bay County attracts the attention of a citizen, who reports the pedestrian to the sheriff's office. A county ordinance prohibits public intoxication that creates a safety risk. Law enforcement officers observe the pedestrian, Appellant, having great difficulty "keeping his bearings." The officers talk to Appellant, smell alcohol on his person, and ask Appellant for identification. Appellant is able to communicate with the officers, who check his identification as part of the investigation for a violation of the ordinance. After noticing a bulge in Appellant's front pocket, the officers ask Appellant if he possesses a firearm. Appellant tells the officers he has a gun tucked in the small of his back. Because Appellant does not have a concealed-carry permit, he is arrested and charged with the third-degree felony of carrying a concealed firearm.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the concealed firearm, arguing that the officers were conducting a welfare check, which was a consensual encounter, and the encounter was converted to an unjustified stop when the officers asked him to provide identification. Appellant argued there was insufficient evidence that he was unable to care for his own safety, as was required to support a detention under the ordinance. The State argued that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop for disorderly conduct under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), based on the report of an intoxicated pedestrian and the officers' observation of him.
The court ruled that crossing a highway under the influence of alcohol would cause an officer "to reasonably believe somebody was intoxicated in a public place, doing something that ... could be injurious to his safety." Appellant pled no contest, reserving the right to appeal the dispositive motion to suppress. The court withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Appellant on felony probation for eighteen months.
On appeal, Appellant argues there was insufficient reason for the officers to detain him based on the county ordinance, and that even if the detention was valid, the officers conducted an unlawful Terry stop by asking if he was carrying a firearm, because they lacked a valid reason to believe he was armed and dangerous. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress on two alternative grounds: (1) the police had reasonable suspicion to think Appellant had violated the county ordinance, and did not conduct an unlawful search by asking if Appellant had a weapon; and 2) even if the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant for violation of the county ordinance, they had the lawful authority to conduct a welfare check on Appellant (despite the testimony of one officer that he was not conducting a welfare check). Based on an objective review of the facts, Appellant could have been injured or caused an injury or accident in his intoxicated state, and the officers did not unconstitutionally detain or search Appellant by asking for his license and asking whether he had a weapon.
When an officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime—including a violation of a criminal ordinance—the officer may temporarily detain the person to ascertain his identity and investigate the circumstances surrounding the suspected criminal activity. § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. An investigatory stop requires more than mere suspicion; the officer must have a "well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Popple v. State , 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993).
The Bay County Code of Ordinances provides that "a person shall be guilty of disorderly conduct if ... his conduct is likely to cause public danger, alarm, disorder or nuisance, [and] he willfully ... is in a public place under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug in such a condition as to be unable to exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others." Bay Cty. Code of Ordinances 15–46(c)(6). Appellant acknowledges the evidence that he was intoxicated in public, but asserts there was insufficient reason for the officers to believe he was unable to protect his safety.
The officers received a report of public intoxication and witnessed Appellant stumbling in the crosswalk of a busy road. Although there was no traffic at the time, and Appellant did walk across the street in the proper cross walk, one officer said Appellant was "tripping over his feet" and that it was "apparent he couldn't keep his bearings." Another officer indicated he was concerned Appellant was a risk to himself. Although Appellant argues there was no evidence he had fallen down or was unable to speak, the officers' testimony showed they had more than a bare suspicion he was in such a condition as to be a risk to himself. The evidence supports a finding that, under the ordinance, the officers could lawfully detain Appellant on suspicion of disorderly conduct.
Appellant argues that even if the officers were justified in detaining him on...
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