Tristan Justice v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 15-35678
Decision Date | 21 December 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 15-35678,15-35678 |
Parties | TRISTAN JUSTICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCKWELL COLLINS, INC.; NARESH ARGARWAL, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM*Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Tristan Justice appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with his employment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's federal and state law unpaid wages claims because Justice failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was denied overtime pay to which he was entitled. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.105 (); Or. Admin. R. 839-020-0030(2)(a) ( ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's federal and state law sexual harassment claims because Justice failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the alleged conduct was by a supervisor and whether Rockwell Collins, Inc. ("Rockwell") failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441-42 (2013) ( ); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1169 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) ( ); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923-924 (9th Cir. 2000) ( ); Mains v. II Morrow, Inc., 877 P.2d 88, 93 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) ( ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's federal and state law retaliation claims for complaining about unpaid wages because Justice failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether there was a causal connection between any protected activity and an adverse action. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.060; see also Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1005-07 (9th Cir. 1999) ( ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's federal and state law retaliation claims for complaining about sexual harassment because Rockwell articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for ending Justice's contract and Justice failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether those reasons were pretextual. See Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2006) ( ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's retaliation claim for complaining about workplace safety because the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 654.062(6)(c), 659A.875(1) ( ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's racial discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because Justice failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether Rockwell discriminated against him on the basis of his race. See Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2008) ().
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Rockwell because Justice failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the employees' alleged conduct occurred within the scope of employment. See Ballinger v. Klamath P. Corp., 898 P.2d 232, 243 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) ( ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Argarwal because Justice failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether Argarwal's alleged conduct was extreme and outrageous, or that Argarwal intended to cause emotional distress. See McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 849 (Or. 1995) ( ).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Justice's claim for punitive damages against Argarwal because Justice failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether Argarwal acted with malice or a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm. See Schwarz v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 355 P.3d 931, 937-38 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) ( ).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Justice's motion to compel discovery, motion for sanctions, and motion to disqualify Argarwal's counsel. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) ( ); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1297 (9th Cir. 2000) ( ); Unified Sewerage Agency of Wash. Cnty., Or. v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1351 (9th Cir. 1981) ( ).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in striking portions of Justice's declaration. See Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2012) ( ).
Contrary to Justice's contention, the district court was not obligated to hold a competency hearing or appoint a guardian ad litem before dismissing...
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