Tromba v. Harwood Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. 2901,2901
• Parties: Maria C. TROMBA v. HARWOOD MANUFACTURING CO. Eq.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 186

177 A.2d 186

94 R.I. 3

Maria C. TROMBA v. HARWOOD MANUFACTURING CO.

Eq. No. 2901.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 24, 1962.

Hector D. Laudati, Joseph G. Miller, Providence, for petitioner.

Francis V. Reynolds, Richard P. McMahon, Providence, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is an employee's original petition for compensation under the workmen's compensation act. The case was heard by a single commissioner, who thereafter found that the petitioner on January 21, 1960 had sustained injuries to her head and back arising out of and in the course of her employment with the respondent. He further found that she had been incapacitated by such injuries from that date until June 13, 1960, at which time her earning capacity had fully returned. The trial commissioner entered a decree setting out these findings and ordering the respondent to pay to the petitioner compensation for total incapacity from the date of the injury to June 13, 1960. The respondent appealed therefrom and from a decree of the full commission reversing the decision of the single commissioner the petitioner has appealed to this court.

It is not disputed that petitioner was in the employ of respondent on January 21, 1960, but there is, however, a conflict in the evidence relating to the place at which she fell. According to her testimony, she had been driven from her home to respondent's plant that morning, arriving shortly before eight o'clock. She alighted from the automobile and proceeded to cross the sidewalk toward the doorway through which she usually entered the building. It was snowing lightly, and the sidewalk was icy. According to her testimony, she had just reached the doorway and had grasped the doorknob in her hand and started to push the door open when she slipped, lost her grip on the knob, and fell to the sidewalk.

Her testimony was contradicted by that of an adjuster employed by the insurance carrier in this case. He had interviewed petitioner in the presence of her daughter a short time after the fall. He testified that petitioner had told him that after alighting from the automobile she had taken two steps across the sidewalk when she slipped and fell. He testified specifically that she did not tell him that at the time she fell she had reached the door and was grasping the knob thereof.

Upon a consideration of the evidence thus adduced, the commission concluded that petitioner did not fall while upon the premises of the employer. This finding was in part stated: 'At no time before she fell was the petitioner physically upon the premises of the respondent * * *.' It is well settled that pursuant to the terms of the statute this court is bound by the findings of the commission where they are supported by any legal evidence in the absence of fraud. De Conti v. A. D. Juilliard & Co., 85 R.I. 424, 427, 132 A.2d 74.

In view of the conclusiveness upon this court of the commission's finding, the precise issue presented to us for decision relates to the compensability of an employee's incapacity resulting from an injury sustained by such employee while traveling on a public way in order to reach his place of employment. The petitioner and respondent have each directed our attention to numerous cases in support of their respective contentions on this issue. These cases serve best, perhaps, to emphasize the existence of widely divergent views as to the compensability of incapacity resulting from injuries so sustained.

The view that appears to be supported by the weight of authority is that generally such incapacity is not compensable. Typical of statements expressing this view is that set out in Katz v. Katz, 137 Conn. 134, 75 A.2d 57. The Connecticut court said therein at page 138, 75 A.2d at page 59: 'It is not disputed that the general principle is well established in this state that employees whose area of employment is within defined limits are not regarded as in the course of their employment while going to and returning from work upon the public highways and that the risks incidental to travel on such highways ordinarily do not arise out of their employment. * * * There are, however, well-recognized exceptions to this rule.'

There is no unanimity of opinion as to what constitutes the exceptions to which the Connecticut court refers. In Dinsmore's Case, 143 Me. 344, 62 A.2d 205, 208, the supreme court of Maine, in commenting upon the conflicting views concerning the compensability of injuries so sustained, concluded that there was but one general rule that could be formulated from the decisions, namely, 'that each case of this nature must be dealt with and decided on its own facts and circumstances.' There has been a widespread acceptance of this policy of considering these cases each on its own merits. For example, petitioner has directed our attention to Cohn v. Morningstar Nicol, Inc., 265 App.Div. 579, 41 N.Y.S.2d 466, wherein a divided court held that an employee who, being on her way to work along a public highway, had reached the foot of a stairway customarily used to enter the employer's plant, was poised to mount the first step in that stairway, slipped on an icy walk and was injured did sustain such injury in the course of her employment. However, in that same jurisdiction in Funarie v. Mohawk Club, 257 App.Div. 887, 12 N.Y.S.2d 58, and in Amento v. Bond Stores, Inc., 274 App.Div. 863, 82 N.Y.S.2d 1, it was held that injuries sustained by employees who while on their way to work slipped on public sidewalks were not sustained in the course of their employment and therefore were not compensable. In Cohn v. Morningstar Nicol, Inc., supra...