Trotman v. Velociteach Project Mgmt. Llc.Certifi Project Mgmt. Certification Training
| Decision Date | 28 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | A11A0403.,Nos. A11A0402,s. A11A0402 |
| Parties | TROTMANv.VELOCITEACH PROJECT MANAGEMENT, LLC.CertiFi Project Management Certification Training, LLCv.Velociteach Project Management, LLC. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
McGahren, Gaskill & York, Eric John Marlett, Norcross, Matthew Francis McGharen, for appellants.Robertson, Bodoh & Nasrallah, Mathew G. Nasrallah, for appellee.DOYLE, Judge.
Following a jury trial, Floyd Trotman III (in Case No. A11A0402) and CertiFi Project Management Certification Training, LLC (“CertiFi”) (in Case No. A11A0403) appeal from a judgment and other orders entered against them in a dispute arising from Trotman's continued use of training materials he obtained as a former instructor for Velociteach Project Management, LLC (“Velociteach”). We have consolidated the cases for review, and for the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate the award of attorney fees, and remand.1
Viewed in favor of the jury's verdict,2 the record shows that from 2003 to 2006, Trotman worked as an instructor for Velociteach, a company founded by Andy Crowe, which offered project management training courses to students seeking a Project Management Professional (“PMP”) credential. When Trotman's relationship with the company faltered due to a lapse in his own credentials and his unauthorized use of a company credit card, his employment was terminated, and he left the company pursuant to a confidentiality agreement in February 2006. The confidentiality agreement required Trotman to return or delete all course materials and electronic presentation slides, and it prohibited him from soliciting Velociteach customers for a period of three years. In an exit meeting, Trotman assured Velociteach staff that he had returned or deleted any Velociteach teaching materials.3 Soon thereafter, Trotman asked Velociteach if he could buy instruction kits to teach PMP classes on his own, and Velociteach declined.
In early 2006, Trotman formed his own company, CertiFi, and began teaching training courses on his own. In early 2007, after seeing Trotman in an airport, Crowe decided to search for information about Trotman on the Internet. Crowe discovered a CertiFi website listing Velociteach customers and containing marketing copy that Crowe had written for Velociteach. Crowe then enrolled a student in one of Trotman's classes to observe the course content and materials. Based on the similarities between Trotman's course materials and those he had used previously at Velociteach, Velociteach demanded that CertiFi cease operating in violation of Trotman's confidentiality agreement. Trotman refused, and Velociteach sued him and CertiFi, alleging claims for breach of contract, Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act 4 (“UDTPA”) violations, fraud, tortious interference with a business relationship, conversion, and misappropriation of trade secrets.
After discovery and the denial of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the action was eventually tried by a jury, which awarded Velociteach $13,750 (from Trotman) and $134,000 (from CertiFi). The trial court also awarded Velociteach $30,000 in attorney fees and entered a permanent injunction requiring Trotman to, inter alia, return all Velociteach materials and abstain from using Velociteach's customer lists. Trotman appeals in Case No. A11A0402, and CertiFi appeals in Case No. A11A0403.5
1. During the litigation, Velociteach obtained an interlocutory injunction that prohibited Trotman and CertiFi from using any instructional slides contained in a certain exhibit. Based on Trotman's subsequent reformulation and use of a prohibited slide, the trial court found that Trotman had violated the injunction and held him in contempt, ordering Trotman and CertiFi to provide a copy of its teaching materials to Velociteach and pay $1,012.50 in attorney fees incurred by Velociteach while pursuing the contempt motion.
On appeal, Trotman enumerates as error the trial court's interlocutory injunction, but he does not challenge the $1,012.50 attorney fee award, and the only other remedy, disclosure of his teaching materials, was permissible as part of the pending litigation. As Trotman points to no other remedy affecting him or CertiFi resulting from the contempt finding itself, this enumeration presents nothing for review.6
2. Trotman argues that the evidence and verdict did not authorize the trial court to issue a permanent injunction against him based on a violation of the UDTPA. We disagree.
7
(a) Based on the jury's verdict that Trotman violated the UDTPA, the trial court granted an injunction against Trotman that (1) prohibited him from using a specified trial exhibit containing Velociteach course materials, (2) required him to return all Velociteach property and course materials, (3) forbade him from using Velociteach's customer lists, and (4) required disclosure of each person to whom he had shown the enjoined materials. Trotman argues that because only he, and not CertiFi, was found to have violated the UDTPA, the only basis for the finding would be his failure to maintain his PMP certification. And because he later remedied the lapse in his certification, he argues that this lapse in certification could not support the injunctive relief granted by the trial court.
This argument ignores the fact that the trial evidence supported a finding that he personally violated the UDTPA, regardless of whether the jury attributed his behavior to CertiFi. The UDTPA provides as follows, in relevant part:
(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business, vocation, or occupation, he:
...
(2) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;
(3) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association with or certification by another;
...
(7) Represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;
...
(9) Advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised;
[or]
...
(12) Engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.
(b) In order to prevail in an action under this part, a complainant need not prove competition between the parties or actual confusion or misunderstanding. 8
...
At trial, there was evidence that Trotman created a misleading advertisement stating that CertiFi had developed course content over a four-year period, which would have referred to the time Trotman was with Velociteach, not CertiFi. There was also evidence that Trotman solicited former Velociteach students on behalf of CertiFi, referencing the Velociteach course and falsely holding himself out as PMP certified. Velociteach also introduced evidence that Trotman published a list of Velociteach customers and falsely represented them to be CertiFi customers. Finally, there was evidence that Trotman used nearly duplicate versions of certain Velociteach course materials without its consent. This evidence supported the jury's finding that he violated the UDTPA, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding equitable relief to Velociteach against Trotman based on the jury's finding.9
(b) Trotman also argues that an injunction against future conduct is unwarranted because his confidentiality agreement has expired, and his wrongful conduct took place in the past and is not likely to recur. This argument is misplaced. There was evidence supporting a finding that Trotman's conduct violated the UDTPA regardless of his confidentiality agreement, and the nature of the wrongful behavior was not such that it could not be repeated, i.e., by re-creating confusing or misleading marketing materials or re-using Velociteach's proprietary course materials.10 Nor was the injunction's breadth an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The injunction essentially pertained to the use of Velociteach course materials and customer list, and it did not prohibit Trotman from engaging in other PMP teaching activity. Nor was it an abuse of discretion to allow Velociteach five years to monitor Trotman's courses, because the harm to Velociteach would not diminish over time if Trotman unfairly competed with it. Accordingly, this enumeration provides no basis for reversal.11
3. Trotman next challenges the trial court's failure to give his requested jury charge on the UDTPA claim. “In order for a refusal to charge to be error, the request[ ] must be entirely correct and accurate, and adjusted to the pleadings, law, and evidence, and not otherwise covered in the general charge.” 12 Trotman's requested charge was as follows:
Although a finding of actual confusion [in the marketplace] is not necessary to prove a likelihood of confusion, it is nevertheless the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion. Coexistence in the marketplace over a significant period of time with no evidence of actual confusion raises a presumption against a likelihood of confusion; however, the presumption may be rebutted by evidence of other factors tending to support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.As support, Trotman relies on Ackerman Security Systems v. Design Security Systems,13 which included the following language: 14 The...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bearoff v. Craton
...the UDTPA and the trial court thereafter decided relief, based on the jury’s factual findings. See Trotman v. Velociteach Project Mgmt. , 311 Ga. App. 208, 211 (2), 715 S.E.2d 449 (2011) (holding that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that defendant violated the UDTPA and therefore ......
-
Edible Ip, LLC v. Google, LLC.
...names or clearly involve consumer confusion, a claim Edible IP has expressly abandoned.12 See Trotman v. Velociteach Project Mgmt., LLC , 311 Ga. App. 208, 210-11 (2) (a), 715 S.E.2d 449 (2011) (affirming grant of injunction where jury found defendant had violated the Uniform Deceptive Trad......
-
Moore v. Hullander
...one amount of fees rather than another under OCGA § 9–15–14 (b). (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Trotman v. VelociteachProject Mgmt. , 311 Ga. App. 208, 214 (6), 715 S.E.2d 449 (2011). Here, the trial court awarded a lump sum of $4,000 in attorney fees without showing the complex decis......
-
Reid v. Reid
...point and we find it persuasive. Indeed, other cases have followed this logic on similar facts. See Trotman v. Velociteach Project Mgmt. , 311 Ga. App. 208, 214 (6), 715 S.E.2d 449 (2011) ("Velociteach’s counsel submitted an affidavit with billing statements totaling $95,974.66. The trial c......