Trotter v. Trotter
| Decision Date | 08 September 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 46365,46365,2 |
| Parties | F. Morris TROTTER, Respondent, v. Mildred E. TROTTER, Helen N. Patton, St. Louis Union Trust Company, a corporation, Third Baptist Church, Euclid Baptist Church, Missouri Baptist Children's Home, Baptist Old Folks Home, Boys Town of Missouri, Inc., and Imperial Council of the Ancient Arabic Knights of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine For North America, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Tralles, Hoffmeister & Gilpin, Fred J. Hoffmeister, St. Louis, for appellants.
Carter & Fitzsimmons, Clayton, for plaintiff (respondent).
This is an appeal from a decree which terminated two living trusts created by the plaintiff, F. Morris Trotter, and required the defendant trustees, St. Louis Union Trust Company and Mildred E. Trotter, to pay over to him all of the corpus and undistributed income thereof freed of all claims by defendants founded on such trust indentures. The value of each trust is far in excess of $7,500, so that appellate jursidiction is vested in this court. Art. V, Sec. 3, Const. of Mo.1945, V.A.M.S.
In one of the trusts grantor and his (then) wife, Mildred E., are named as beneficiaries to receive, 'in monthly or other convenient installments, the entire net in come derived therefrom, in equal portions * * * as long as they shall live, and upon the death of either of them, all the net income shall be paid to such survivor as long as he or she shall live.' Upon the death of the survivor of them, grantor's (then mother-in-law, Helen N. Patton, is named as successor beneficiary; and upon the death of the last surviving beneficiary above named, the property then constituting the trust estate shall be distributed free from trust to seven named charitable beneficiaries in equal shares.
In the other trust Helen N. Patton is named as life beneficiary to receive the income. Upon her death the trust continues for the benefit of grantor's (then) wife, Mildred E., for life. Upon the death of Mildred E., and after the death of Helen N. Patton, the trust continues for the benefit of grantor for life; upon the death of the last survivor of Helen N. Patton, Mildred E., and grantor, the same disposition of the trust property is made as in the case of the other trust, i. e., to the seven named charities.
Both trust indentures contain identical sections eight, reading as follows: 'This trust is hereby created, and the interests hereunder are vested, with the express understanding and condition, that the Grantor shall have no power to alter or amend the terms of this agreement, or to revoke this agreement in whole or in part, so that this trust shall be irrevocable, and the Grantor shall have no power to free any sums of money, securities or other property made subject hereto from the terms of this trust at any time.'
Plaintiff sought the relief granted by the trial court on these grounds, as alleged in paragraphs 4 and 6, respectively, of his petition:
(4) That he 'had no independent legal advice as to the nature and extent of the legal rights that would be created and terminated by the indentures of trust; that prior to the execution of the two trust indentures, the defendant, the St. Louis Union Trust Company summoned to its offices an attorney of its own selection who advised the plaintiff that the trusts were not irrevocable and could be broken; that the plaintiff acting on this advice and under the mistaken belief as to the legal effect of the trust indentures, duly executed the trust indentures * * * never intending to place the money and other assets that now constitute the corpus of said trusts forever out of his control and beyond his powers of enjoyment.'
(6) That plaintiff's 'motives, intentions and objectives in creating such trusts was so that the benefits that would accrue therefrom, should accrue to the defendants, Mildred E. Trotter and Helen N. Patton, so long as, and only so long as the marriage relationship between plaintiff and Mildred E. Trotter should exist; that the defendant, Mildred E. Trotter, by having the legal bonds of that marriage severed, has rendered it impossible for the achievement of the intentions, motives and objectives that plaintiff had in mind when these trusts were established.'
In jointly answering the foregoing paragraphs of plaintiff's petition, Mildred E. Trotter, Helen N. Patton and St. Louis Union Trust Company averred:
'4. [T]hat prior to and at the time of the execution of the two trust indentures referred to in plaintiff's petition, plaintiff did have legal advice from his own counsel and on the advice of and in the presence of his said counsel, conferences were had with officials of defendant St. Louis Union Trust Company, at which conferences all of the facts relative to the trusts which plaintiff desired to enter into were fully discussed; that plaintiff was further advised by his counsel as to his legal rights and obligations under the trust instruments which he contemplated executing and that plaintiff was particularly advised that said trusts would be irrevocable and could under no circumstances be revoked or terminated during his lifetime; that after being so advised, plaintiff stated that it was his intention to proceed with the execution of the two irrevocable trusts and instructed his counsel to proceed accordingly.
As orginally filed, the petition contained the further allegation that during the marriage plaintiff was dominated by his wife and mother-in law and while under such domination which amounted to duress, he executed the trust instruments. Before trial, this ground was expressly withdrawn and voluntarily stricken from the petition.
In our view, this is a fact case, and determinable accordingly. The defendants contend that the decree is not supported by the evidence and is against the weight of the evidence. On appeal in an equity case the appellate court tries it de novo on the record as made in the trial court; as it is sometimes expressed, the reviewing court weighs the evidence and arrives at its own conclusion as to its weight, but takes into account the trial chancellor's position to judge the credibility and characteristics of the witnesses. Peine v. Sater, Mo., 289 S.W.2d 101, 102; McCoy v. McCoy, 360 Mo. 199, 205, 227 S.W.2d 698, 703.
The creation of the trusts stemmed from a wholly unexpected inheritance of approximately 1,000 shares of General Motors stock which plaintiff-grantor received in 1950 from the estate of an uncle who had lately died in Florida. The trust instruments were executed September 6, 1951. Plaintiff and his wife were married in 1944. Thereafter, and prior to the execution of the trust instruments, plaintiff's mother-in-law, Mrs. Helen N. Patton, lived with them in St. Louis in what is conceded to have been an entirely happy and congenial family relationship. Plaintiff and his wife were divorced June 28, 1955, on her crossbill in an action filed by the husband. Plaintiff was 51 years of age at the time of the trial. He had had a high school and business college education. At the time of his marriage, and until April, 1952, he was employed at St. Louis Dairy Company as a clerk in the credit department at a salary of $300 per month, adjusting customer complaints about bills. When he came into his unexpected inheritance, the Trotters were 'flabbergasted,' as she put it, and discussions in the household immediately followed as to what to do with the money. From the record it is apparent that plaintiff did not want the responsibility of handling so much money, and the idea of discussing the problem with Mr. Bryan Gross, then Assistant Vice President (formerly Trust Officer) of St. Louis Union Trust Company was suggested either by Mrs. Patton or plaintiff's wife. Gross and Mrs. Patton were old friends, having been reared in the same Gasconade County community and attended the same country school. Plaintiff quoted Mrs. Patton as saying she thought Mr. Gross would 'give us good advice in the setting up of this trust.' Conferences with Mr. Gross followed, first, by Mrs. Trotter alone (she testified--and plaintiff substantially admitted--that this was done at his request because of his inability to get away from his job at the dairy during office hours), and later with plaintiff himself. Plaintiff admitted that it was upon the advice and insistence of Gross not to put the whole of the inheritance in the trusts (as originally contemplated by plaintiff) that a block of 300 shares was withheld...
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