Trought v. Richardson, 853SC419
| Decision Date | 21 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 853SC419,853SC419 |
| Citation | 78 N.C.App. 758,338 S.E.2d 617 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 1 IER Cases 750 Betty TROUGHT v. Jack RICHARDSON, Fred Brown, and Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc. |
Solberg and Bates-Smith by Patrice Solberg, Chapel Hill, for plaintiff-appellant.
Mullins and Van Hoy, Charlotte, by Philip M. Van Hoy and James T. Cheatham, Greenville, for defendant-appellees.
The judgment does not dispose of all claims and is interlocutory. In our discretion we shall determine the appeal.
The plaintiff's first claim is to an invasion of her privacy. There are several types of claims for invasion of privacy which have been recognized by the courts in this country. See W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 117, at 849 (5th ed. 1984). One type is an appropriation, for the defendant's benefit, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. This type of claim was recognized in Flake v. News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) and Barr v. Telephone Co., 13 N.C.App. 388, 185 S.E.2d 714 (1972). The plaintiff does not contend that her privacy was invaded by an appropriation. The plaintiff apparently contends that her privacy was invaded by a public disclosure of private facts or by publicity which placed her in a false light in the public eye. Our Supreme Court held in Renwick v. News and Observer, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984) that there is no claim for a false light invasion of privacy in this state. If the plaintiff has a claim it is for an invasion of privacy by a public disclosure of private facts. We have not found a case in this state which deals with such a claim but there are cases from other jurisdictions and there is textbook authority on this type of claim. See Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, supra.
As we understand the invasion of privacy by a public disclosure of private facts as this tort has developed in other jurisdictions the plaintiff has not stated a claim in this case. The tort consists of the disclosure to the public of facts which are true which disclosure would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. In this case the individual defendants are alleged to have told other employees of the hospital and one person not an employee who attended an employees' meeting that the plaintiff was discharged for a "lack of credibility." We do not believe this is the type of public disclosure which is required for a claim for invasion of privacy. The individual defendants told a group composed, with one exception, of the plaintiff's fellow employees of the reason for her discharge. In determining whether the plaintiff had a claim we have to assume that the reasons given by Brown and Richardson to the other employees were true. The individual defendants had the right to make this much of a public disclosure without being held liable. It was not error to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy.
The plaintiff alleged two separate claims for wrongful discharge, denominating one of these claims "a" and the other as "b". In her wrongful discharge-a claim she alleged that she was discharged for complying with state law and the hospital policies. She alleged this is a violation of the covenant of good faith implied in any employment contract. Plaintiff did not have a contract for any definite term. She could be discharged at any time by the defendant hospital. In Sides v. Duke Hospital, 74 N.C.App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985) this Court made an exception to this rule in a case in which the plaintiff alleged she was discharged for refusing to commit perjury. In this case there is no such allegation. She alleges that she was discharged for following state law and hospital policy in transferring two licensed practical nurses. Whether this is so is a matter for interpretation. We do not believe this allegation is sufficient to come within or enlarge the exception created by Sides. See Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C.App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985). It was not error to dismiss the...
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Frazier v. First Union Nat. Bank
...and outrageous conduct (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe emotional distress to another. See Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C.App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617, 620, review denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986). Only when the conduct "exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by d......
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Ihekwu v. City of Durham, N.C.
...ordinances." Id. (citing Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C.App. 410, 417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1992)); Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C.App. 758, 760, 338 S.E.2d 617, 618, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 Plaintiff alleges that the City's ordinance, which gave Plaintiff n......
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Norman v. Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 1:02 CV 918.
...representations, constituted a contract binding on TradeWinds. Norman argues that his case should be aligned with Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C.App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617 (1986), in which the court reversed dismissal on a wrongful discharge claim, on the basis that a policy manual had become ......
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Lorbacher v. Housing Authority of City of Raleigh
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