Trovato v. DeVeau
| Decision Date | 21 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97–748.,97–748. |
| Citation | 736 A.2d 1212,143 N.H. 523 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | Mary C. TROVATO, Executrix of the Estate of William B. Bolton v. Thomas H. DeVEAU. |
Nixon, Raiche, Manning & Casinghino, P.A., of Manchester (David L. Nixon and Leslie C. Nixon, on the brief, and Ms. Nixon orally), for the plaintiff.
Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., of Manchester , for the defendant.
This is an interlocutory appeal without ruling from the Superior Court (Sullivan, J.). See Sup.Ct. R. 9. The plaintiff, the Estate of William B. Bolton (estate), challenges the constitutionality of RSA 556:13 (1997), which governs the damages recoverable for wrongful death. The transferred question inquires:
Whether RSA 556:13, which caps at $50,000.00 the damages recoverable in a wrongful death action, where the decedent was not survived by a spouse, child, parent or other dependant relative, violates the rights of the representative of the estate under the New Hampshire or United States Constitution.
We conclude that RSA 556:13 is unconstitutional under the New Hampshire Constitution. Because the Federal Constitution is not more favorable to the plaintiff than the State Constitution in this area, we do not engage in a separate federal analysis. See Carson v. Maurer , 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980).
We accept the statement of the case presented in the interlocutory transfer. See State v. Johnson , 134 N.H. 498, 499, 594 A.2d 1288, 1289 (1991). It reveals that William B. Bolton died in December 1996 as a result of an automobile accident allegedly caused by the defendant, Thomas H. DeVeau. At the time of his death, Bolton was not survived by a spouse, child, parent or other dependent relative. The estate filed a wrongful death action in which it sought to recover more than $100,000 in medical bills and other damages in excess of the statutory cap. Relying on the cap, the defendant paid $50,000, plus fees, into the superior court in full settlement of the action and thereafter filed a motion to dismiss. The superior court delayed ruling on the motion and transferred the pending question to this court.
The estate argues that the $50,000 cap for a decedent who is not survived by any dependent relative violates Part I, Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution and abridges its right to equal protection of the law. The estate asserts that the cap arbitrarily distinguishes between decedents who are not survived by dependent relatives and those who are, between decedents whose death is causally related to the tort injury and decedents whose death is due to unrelated causes, and between individuals who survive the injury and those who do not. The estate does not challenge the reasonableness of the cap, and therefore, we do not address the adequacy of the monetary limit.
Part I, Article 14 provides:
Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.
We have described this provision as "basically an equal protection clause [because] it implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to the courts both for relief and for defense under like conditions and with like protection and without discrimination." State v. Basinow , 117 N.H. 176, 177, 371 A.2d 458, 459 (1977) (quotations omitted). The purpose of this provision is "to make civil remedies readily available, and to guard against arbitrary and discriminatory infringements on access to the courts." Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester , 119 N.H. 661, 665, 406 A.2d 704, 706 (1979), appeal dismissed , 445 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1304, 63 L.Ed.2d 754 (1980). Part I, Article 14 does not, however, "guarantee that all injured persons will receive full compensation for their injuries." Id . Rather, its grant is necessarily relative, only requiring a remedy that conforms to the statutory and common law rights applicable at the time of the injury. See Opinion of the Justices , 113 N.H. 205, 210, 304 A.2d 881, 885 (1973). The nature of the right to recover for wrongful death can be understood only by looking at its history. See, e.g., Hall v. Gillins , 13 Ill.2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1958).
New Hampshire has never recognized a common law cause of action for wrongful death. See Wyatt v. Williams , 43 N.H. 102, 108 (1861) ; see also Hebert v. Hebert , 120 N.H. 369, 370, 415 A.2d 679, 680 (1980). Accordingly, the legislature did not abolish any right when it enacted the first of a series of wrongful death acts, Laws 1850, 953:7, leading to our present statute, RSA 556:9 – :14 (1997) (amended 1997, 1998). See Cogger v. Trudell , 35 Wis.2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146, 151 (1967). Rather, the legislature created both a right and a remedy that did not previously exist. Therefore, the right to recover for wrongful death is a creature of statute and exists "only to the extent and in the manner provided by the legislature." Hebert , 120 N.H. at 370, 415 A.2d at 680. Even legislatively created rights, however, must be constitutional. See, e.g., Gould v. Concord Hospital , 126 N.H. 405, 409, 493 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1985) (); see also Park v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. , 121 N.H. 894, 899, 436 A.2d 1136, 1139 (1981) ().
To review whether the $50,000 wrongful death cap satisfies Part I, Article 14, we must first determine the proper level of constitutional scrutiny to be utilized. Carson , 120 N.H. at 931–32, 424 A.2d at 830. The appropriate standard of review is necessarily controlled by the nature of the underlying right. Id . The estate argues that because its right to recover for Bolton's injuries and resultant death is an important substantive one, we should apply a middle tier standard of review. The defendant contends that because the legislature merely limited recovery for a statutorily created action, a rational basis test is more appropriate. This court, however, previously resolved the debate and elected to apply a middle tier standard to an estate's right to recover under the wrongful death statute. Gould, 126 N.H. at 408–09, 493 A.2d at 1196. Accordingly, we utilize middle tier scrutiny to review the statutory cap before us. Id .
Middle tier scrutiny requires us to determine whether the classifications created by the statutory cap are reasonable, not arbitrary, and have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the statute. Carson , 120 N.H. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830–31. The statute need not be perfectly tailored to satisfy this standard of review. City of Dover v. Imperial Cas. & Indemn. Co. , 133 N.H. 109, 119, 575 A.2d 1280, 1286 (1990). There must, however, be a reasonable nexus between the classifications created by the cap and the object of the legislation. See id . at 120, 575 A.2d at 1286.
The estate's challenge to the statutory cap is twofold. First, the estate challenges the distinction within the cap provision itself, see RSA 556:13, between decedents who are not survived by dependent relatives and those who are. Second, the estate challenges two distinctions outside the cap provision, see RSA 556:9 – :14, between: (1) decedents whose death is causally related to a tort injury and decedents whose death is due to unrelated causes; and (2) individuals who survive the injury and those who do not. We address each claim in turn.
With respect to the distinction within RSA 556:13, we conclude that the statutory cap satisfies middle tier scrutiny. While RSA 556:13, on its face, sheds no light on the purpose of the cap, a review of the statute's legislative history, Chagnon v. Union–Leader Corp ., 104 N.H. 472, 476, 190 A.2d 721, 724 (1963) (), and prior amendments, Del Norte, Inc. v. Provencher , 142 N.H. 535, 538, 703 A.2d 890, 892 (1997) (), reveals a legislative intent to limit wrongful death recovery for decedents without dependent relatives on the basis of a compensatory purpose. The cap recognizes that dependent and non-dependent relatives have different compensation needs as a result of a decedent's wrongful death, and it reflects the legislature's judgment that non-dependent relatives do not suffer the same economic injury as dependent relatives. In fact, when an amendment was proposed in 1973 by the house of representatives to abolish any limitation on recovery in wrongful death actions, see N.H.H.R. Jour. 604 (1973), the senate rejected the effort and retained a limitation on recovery for estates whose decedents were not survived by dependent relatives. See N.H.S. Jour . 994 (1973). As Senator Bradley explained:
The thinking here is that if a person doesn't have a close relative or a person who is dependent on him, there isn't really anyone to be compensated for the wrongdoing and allowing the sum in excess of $50,000.00 would be punitive rather than compensatory which is the basic philosophy of the wrongful death statute.
Id. at 982. Based on this history, we hold that maintaining a limitation on damages for estates without dependent relatives, while eliminating any cap for estates with dependent relatives, bears a fair and substantial relationship to the compensatory purpose of the statute.
In addition, limiting damages does not impose an unreasonable restriction on private rights. See Carson , 120 N.H. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830–31 (). In fact, it expands private rights. The benefits available through the wrongful death statute, whether unlimited...
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