Trs. of Sailors' Snug Harbor in City of New York v. Carmody

Decision Date05 May 1914
PartiesTRUSTEES OF SAILORS' SNUG HARBOR IN CITY OF NEW YORK et al. v. CARMODY, Atty. Gen.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by the Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor and others against Thomas Carmody, Attorney General. A judgment dismissing the complaint (77 Misc. Rep. 494,137 N. Y. Supp. 968) was reversed by the Appellate Division, and the cause remanded (158 App. Div. 738,144 N. Y. Supp. 24), and the Attorney General appeals by permission on a certified question, namely: ‘Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?’ Order of Appellate Division affirmed, and question answered in the affirmative.

Thomas Carmody, Atty. Gen. (Henry Selden Bacon, of Rochester, of counsel), for appellant.

Lewis L. Delafield, of New York City, for respondents.

HOGAN, J.

The complaint in this action is voluminous, covering 35 pages of the record. A determination of the sufficiency of the same does not require an analysis of each paragraph, and reference will be made to the same only so far as necessary to outline the cause of action.

Robert Richard Randall died in the city of New York on or about January 5, 1801, leaving a last will and testament, which was duly admitted to probate July 10, 1801. By the terms of the sixth clause of said will all of the rest, residue, and remainder of the estate of the decedent, both real and personal, was devised and bequeathed to the chancellor of the state of New York and other officials named therein, and their successors in office forever, to, for, and upon the uses, trusts, intents, and purposes, and subject to the directions and appointments mentioned therein, out of the rents, issues, and profits of the said real and personal estate to erect and build upon some eligible part of the land upon which the testator resided an asylum or marine hospital to be called the Sailors' Snug Harbor for the purpose of maintaining and supporting aged, decrepit, and worn-out sailors. The testator declared his intention that the institution directed to be created should be perpetual; that the officers named therein and their successors should forever continue to have the superintendence of the same, and be the governors thereof; that it was his will and desire that if his intention could not legally be carried out without an act of the Legislature, the parties named as trustees in the will should apply for such an act of the Legislature to incorporate themselves for the purposes specified.

The testator further declared:

‘And I do further declare it to be (my) will and intention that the said rest, residue, and remainder of my real and personal estate should be, at all events, applied for the uses and purposes above set forth; and that it is my desire that all courts of law and equity will so construe this, my said will, as to have the said estate appropriated to the above uses, and that the same should in no case, for want of legal form or otherwise, be so construed as that my relations, or any other persons, should heir, possess or enjoy my property, except in the manner and for the uses hereinabove specified.’

The testator left personal property and real estate in the state of New York. The trustees named in the will and their successors in office were designated by the testator as executors thereof. Pursuant to the directions contained therein, the executors and trustees made application to the Legislature of the state of New York, and in 1806 did procure the enactment of chapter 4 of the Laws of 1806, which by its preamble referred to the last will and testament of Robert Richard Randall and the provisions thereof relating to the Sailors' Snug Harbor, and provided that the officers nominated in the will as trustees and their successors were constituted a body corporate in fact and in name under the name and style of the trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor of the city of New York,’ and by that name they and their successors should have continued succession, be capable in law of suing and being sued, of holding and disposing of the real and personal estate devised and bequeathed to them under the will of Mr. Randall, which was declared to be vested in them and their successors for the purposes therein expressed according to the intentions of the will, and should be capable of purchasing, holding, and conveying any other real and personal estate for the use and benefit of the corporation in such manner as they, or a majority of them, deemed would be most conducive to the interests of the institution, to make rules and regulations for the government of the corporation and the management of its business. The Legislature further declared that the statute should be taken to be a public act, and be construed in all courts and places benignly and favorably for the purposes therein intended.

By chapter 69 of the Laws of 1814 the act of 1806 was amended so as to define the personnel of some of the individuals named as trustees and executors in said will and in the act of 1806. In 1823 the Legislature enacted chapter 276 of the laws of that year, upon the petition of the trustees, which act had reference to their authority over the real estate and the purchase of additional lands for the erection of the asylum.

In 1830 the trustees had in addition to the real estate about $100,000, the result of the accumulation of rents of the real estate, and in May, 1831, the trustees, having first obtained the approbation of the Court of Chancery (Laws of 1828, c. 276), purchased land on Staten Island, on which they proceeded to erect the asylum and marine hospital for the purposes specified in the will of Mr. Randall. The asylum was opened in 1833, and thereafter until 1894, with like approbation, the trustees purchased additional lands, and erected buildings thereon, at a cost of upwards of $1,250,000. In 1910 the number of aged, decrepit, and worn-out sailors, inmates of the institution, was about 840.

A portion of the real estate left by the decedent consisted of land in the Fifteenth ward of the city of New York, which the trustees in or about the year 1830 caused to be divided into 253 lots, which were leased upon ground leases for a period of 21 years, with option of renewal of rental, and upon which private residences were erected.

In or about 1880 the land became valuable for business purposes, ceased to be desirable for residential purposes. Since 1890 the trustees have endeavored to repossess themselves of desirable plots of the land by extinguishing ground leases, and such land thus repossessed by them has advantageously been improved by the erection of business buildings, but the moneys in their possession are not sufficient to enable them to erect adequate business blocks on all of the property repossessed by them, and the property still used for residential purposes cannot be rented upon advantageous terms.

The complaint alleges:

‘That unless portions of the said tract shall be sold or mortgaged and the proceeds either shall be applied to the extinguishment of outstanding ground leases, so far as may be necessary, and the erection of large modern business buildings on portions of the said tract, there is a likelihood that the property in the possession of the trustees will be reduced greatly in value, thereby tending to impair the usefulness and scope of the aforesaid charity and thus to defeat the intention of the founder thereof.’

The financial statement of the trustees as of January 1, 1911, is set forth in the complaint. Other and further allegations are contained in the complaint having reference to the property, the funds and management of the same under the charge of the trustees and the prayer for relief is as follows:

‘First. That by a judgment to be made herein it may be judicially determined and decreed whether the plaintiffs, or any of the plaintiffs, have power and authority to sell or to mortgage all, or any part, of the real estate in the First and Fifteenth wards of the city of New York, hereinbefore referred to, of which the aforesaid Robert Richard Randall died seized, and that if it be found that power to sell the real estate or any part thereof exists, or that such power may by the order or judgment of this court be conferred upon the plaintiffs, that the court shall determine, or shall permit the plaintiffs to determine, what part, if any, of said real estate should be sold, and that it will thereupon by its order or judgment, or by an order or orders to be made at the foot of its judgment, sanction, permit, or direct a sale of such real estate, or of such portions of said real estate, if any, as it shall be determined should be sold.

‘Second. That by the judgment to be made herein the plaintiffs be instructed whether they may lawfully employ the personal property in their possession in purchasing improvements erected by their lessees upon the leasehold properties at the expiration of leases, or in purchasing outstanding leases and leasehold estates of their properties, or in the erection of buildings for investment purposes.

‘Third. That by the judgment to be made herein the plaintiffs may be instructed as to their powers and duties under the will of the said Robert Richard Randall, and the statutes hereinbefore...

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