Truitt v. Hatfield
| Decision Date | 02 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 02-21-00004-CV |
| Parties | Scott Truitt, Appellant v. Janet Hatfield, as an individual; Janet Hatfield, as trustee of the Trust of Deloris Hatfield; and Janet Hatfield, as the executor of the Estate of Deloris Hatfield, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the Probate Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. PR-2018-01016-01
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Appellant appeals from the trial court's no-evidence summary judgment on his fraud, breach-of-fiduciary-duty breach-of-loyalty, and conversion claims against Appellee. Because Appellee's motion was sufficiently specific under the applicable rules; because Appellant did not respond to the summary-judgment motion regarding his fraud breach-of-fiduciary-duty, and breach-of-loyalty claims; and because the summary-judgment evidence failed to raise more than a scintilla of evidence on each element of his conversion claim, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment.
In the 1990s, Deloris Hatfield opened two Computershare accounts under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA) for the benefit of appellant Scott Truitt, her minor grandson, and placed shares of Walmart stock in the accounts.[2] See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 141.005. Scott's mother Donna Hatfield-Warnock was the custodian of one of the accounts (UTMA 3602); Janet Hatfield, Scott's aunt and Deloris's daughter, was the custodian of the other (UTMA 3629). See id. § 141.004. Janet was also designated as the trustee of Deloris's living trust.[3]
At some point in 2005, Deloris allegedly gave Janet her "power of attorney." A total of 75 shares were transferred out of UTMA 3602 on January 25, 2005, apparently emptying the account. On June 14, 2005, 224 shares were transferred out of UTMA 3629; 374 shares were transferred out on March 31, 2008.[4] Scott seems to allege that the shares in UTMA 3602 and 3629 were transferred to an AG. Edwards account (AG. Edwards 5094), which "became" A.G. Edwards 8508 in 2005. There is no indication that A.G. Edwards 5094 or 8508 were UTMA accounts. At some point (Scott alleges June 10, 2005) when Scott was 19, [5] A.G. Edwards ostensibly received an authorization letter from Scott, authorizing the transfer of 75 shares from A.G. Edwards 8508 to an AG. Edwards account owned by Donna. Scott asserts he did not sign the letter, which is undated and does not reflect that it was either sent to or received by A.G. Edwards. Scott apparently sent another authorization letter, which is again undated with no indication that it was sent or received, authorizing the transfer of the remainder of A.G. Edwards 8508 (374 shares) to a different A.G. Edwards account held by Deloris. Scott alleges that this transferee account was "owned by, and under the control of, Deloris" but that he had not signed the letter.
Deloris died at some point in 2017. In April 2017, Scott alleges that he discovered "the unlawful selling and transfer of the stock" and unsuccessfully attempted to get the shares' proceeds from Janet. In September 2017, Scott filed suit against Janet for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of loyalty, and conversion, claiming that Janet had transferred and sold Scott's stocks without authorization and had placed the proceeds into Deloris's estate.[6] The breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim was asserted against Janet in her alleged capacities as trustee and executor; the breach-of-loyalty claim was against Janet only as trustee.[7] Scott also raised claims against other involved entities and parties, including Donna, but only the claims against Janet are at issue here.
Janet filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on Scott's claims, arguing that he had no more than a scintilla of evidence for most elements.
Scott responded that (1) Janet was impermissibly attempting to "have the Court make an assessment on legal issues and not fact issues" and (2) that his attached summary-judgment evidence established that his signature had been forged and "set forth the facts of an effective conversion and theft of the stocks by moving them from accounts in the name of Scott Truitt to other accounts as yet to be determined." Scott attached his and Donna's affidavits to the response but did not explain how their specific factual averments raised fact issues on any element of his claims. Scott's affidavit generally referred to attached documents regarding A.G. Edwards 8508, UTMA 3602, and UTMA 3629. Scott included a verification in his response; however, he verified that "the attached Interrogatories" were true and correct. Scott did not attach any interrogatories to his response and he did not verify that the factual statements in the response were true and correct. See generally Am. Petrofina, Inc. v. Allen, 887 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. 1994) (); City of Hous. v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979) ("[P]leadings do not constitute summary judgment proof.").
Although Janet objected to Scott's summary-judgment evidence on several bases, including that portions of the affidavits were conclusory, she withdrew "all objections" at the summary-judgment hearing. The trial court granted Janet's no-evidence motion and ordered that Scott take nothing on his claims.
On appeal, Scott argues that the summary judgment was in error because (1) Janet's motion was not sufficiently specific as to which elements of her claims were supported by no evidence and (2) Donna's and Scott's summary-judgment affidavits were more than a scintilla of evidence regarding "the factual scheme utilized by [Janet] to illegally acquire and later conceal the facts surrounding her thief [sic] and conversion of the stocks the subject of the suit." Janet counters that (1) Scott's summary-judgment arguments were insufficiently specific in the trial court and are insufficiently briefed on appeal and (2) Scott failed to proffer more than a scintilla of evidence raising a fact issue on his claims.
We first address Scott's attacks to the specificity (or lack thereof) of Janet's motion. Although Scott did not specially except to the motion, "summary judgments must stand or fall on their own merits, and the non-movant's failure to except or respond cannot supply by default the grounds for summary judgment." McConnell v Southside ISD, 858 S.W.2d 337, 342 & n.5 (Tex. 1993); see also Clear Creek, 589 S.W.2d at 678. Even so, Janet was not required to produce evidence to support her no- evidence motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Indeed, the mere filing of a proper motion shifts the burden to the nonmovant to come forward with enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See id.; B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2020). But Scott argues that Janet's motion was not proper because it set forth only the general elements of his claims and failed to give notice of which elements were supported by no evidence.
To be proper, a no-evidence motion need not be detailed but it must identify the grounds for the motion and state the elements for which there is no evidence, specifically challenging the evidentiary support for the element. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & 1997 cmt.; Cmty. Health Sys. Prof'l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 695-96 (Tex. 2017); Judge David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas: State and Federal Practice, 60 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (2019). Even so, the movant need only provide fair notice of the grounds upon which the motion is based such that the nonmovant is provided adequate information to respond and the issues are defined. Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009). Although a motion that generally asserts there is no evidence to support a claim would be conclusory, a motion that sets out each challenged element and argues there is no evidence for each would be sufficient in a non-complex case such as this one.[8] See id.; see also Cmty. Health, 525 S.W.3d at 695-96.
Here, Janet specified each challenged element of each claim Scott had raised against her and argued that there was no evidence to support the specified element. For example, regarding Scott's claim for breach of fiduciary duty by Janet as trustee:
The motion gave Scott fair notice of the elements Janet argued were supported by no evidence and defined the issues; thus it was not impermissibly conclusory. See, e.g., Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 311; Bryant v. May, No. 06-17-00115-CV, 2018 WL 2708531, at *4 (Tex. App.-Texarkana June 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Vodicka v. Lahr, No. 03-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 2075713, at *5 (Tex. App.-Austin June 6, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); cf. Cmty. Health, 525 S.W.3d at 695-96 (). See generally First United Pentecostal Church of...
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