Trustees of Nat. Elevator Pension Funds v. Lutyk
Decision Date | 13 April 2001 |
Docket Number | No. CIV.A.00-2301.,CIV.A.00-2301. |
Parties | TRUSTEES OF THE NATIONAL ELEVATOR INDUSTRY PENSION, Health Benefit and Educational Funds, Plaintiff, v. Andrew LUTYK, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Robert Patrick Curley, O'Donoghue and O'Donoghue, David D. Capuano, O'Donoghue & O'Donoghue, Philadelphia, PA, for Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Pension, Health Benefit and Educational Funds, Plaintiffs.
Louis Rosner, Law Offices of Louis Rosner, Philadelphia, PA, for Andrew Lutyk, Defendants.
MEMORANDAM AND ORDER
This case addresses whether a corporate officer may be personally liable for a company's unpaid contributions to employee benefits funds established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. The issue comes before the court by virtue of cross motions for summary judgment by plaintiff, Trustees of the National Elevator Industry (NEI) Pension, Health Benefit and Educational Funds, and defendant, Andrew Lutyk. For the following reasons, the court a) denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in full, and b) denies defendant's motion in part and grants it in part. In short, genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to 1) whether unpaid contributions qualify under the terms of the parties' agreements as plan assets, as is required to impose liability on defendant Lutyk as a fiduciary pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a) and 1002(21)(A)(i), and 2) whether piercing of the corporate veil, which is required to impose personal liability on the defendant, is appropriate in this case. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect only to i) the claim brought under 18 U.S.C. § 664, as a civil cause of action does not arise under that statute, and ii) the extent that plaintiff's claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
At all relevant times, defendant Lutyk has been the 100% shareholder, president, and sole officer and director of American Elevator Company, Inc. ("American"). See Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. ("Pl.'s Ex.") 4 (jointly executed Uncontested Facts); Pl.'s Ex. 7 ( ). At all relevant times, American has been party to a collective bargaining agreement requiring American to make certain monthly contributions to three funds established pursuant to ERISA, namely, the NEI Pension Fund, the NEI Health Benefit Fund and the NEI Educational Fund (collectively, the "Funds"). See Pl.'s Ex. 4 ( ). In 1998, plaintiff sued American for contribution delinquencies to these Funds, and secured a settlement agreement against the company through a consent judgment in this district. See Pl.'s Ex. 1 (. Plaintiff claims that pursuant to that settlement agreement, American still owes a total of $240,284.60 in delinquent contributions, interest, attorneys' fees and liquidated damages, and that it also owes an additional $24,666.75 plus interest with respect to further unpaid, post-judgment contributions. See Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 15; Compl. Count I. According to plaintiff, Lutyk used money owed to the Funds for other purposes, draining American of assets. American then ceased operations in November of 1999. See Def.'s Ex. 1 ¶ 9 (aff.A.Lutyk). Plaintiff, being unable to procure these funds from the company, therefore brings this separate action against defendant Lutyk, seeking to hold him personally liable under ERISA for the company's unpaid contributions. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction requiring defendant Lutyk to submit timely contributions and reports to the Funds as required under the collective bargaining agreement. See Compl. Count II.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). At the summary judgment stage, the court does not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter; rather, it determines whether or not there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making this determination, all of the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of, the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The moving party has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Mathews v. Lancaster General Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 639 (3d Cir. 1996). In response, the non-moving party must adduce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor, and cannot simply reassert factually unsupported allegations contained in its pleadings. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir.1989).
Section 409 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), imposes personal liability on "[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries." Plaintiff claims that Lutyk is a fiduciary specifically under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i), which states that "a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he ... exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets." Plaintiff's theory is that as American's sole shareholder and sole director and officer, Lutyk directed monies owed to the Funds for other purposes, making him liable as a plan fiduciary.
In the Third Circuit, there is no general rule conferring fiduciary status merely on the basis of delinquent employer contributions.1 See Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F.Supp. 295, 301 (M.D.Pa.1987) (), aff'd without opinion, 932 F.2d 959 (3d Cir.1991) (Table). Rather, because a fiduciary is one who exercises authority over the management or disposition of plan "assets," 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i), a defendant's fiduciary status in cases concerning delinquent contributions often turns on whether the term "assets" includes such delinquent contributions. To answer this question, courts in the Third Circuit look to the terms of the agreement under which the obligation to pay the contributions arise. See Galgay, 677 F.Supp. at 301-02 ( ); Young v. West Coast Industrial Relations Assoc., Inc., 763 F.Supp. 64, 75 (D.Del.1991) (, )aff'd without opinion, 961 F.2d 1570 (3rd Cir.1992) (Table); PMTA-ILA Containerization Fund v. Rose, No. 94-5635, 1995 WL 461269, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Aug.2, 1995) ( ).2
In Galgay, the court found that delinquent employer contributions were "assets" based upon the wage agreement's provision that "all the monies paid into and/or due and owing said fund shall be vested in and remain exclusively in the trustees of the fund." Galgay, 677 F.Supp. at 300-01 (emphasis added). This is in accord with holdings in other Circuits addressing agreements containing the same or extremely similar language. See Hanley v. Giordano's Restaurant, No. 94-4696, 1995 WL 442143, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 26, 1995); Connors v. Paybra Mining Co., 807 F.Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.W.Va.1992). Another court in this district held that unpaid contributions were "assets" based on the agreement's provision that "[t]itle to all of the money, property, and income ... accrued to the fund shall be vested in and remain exclusively in the board of trustees of the fund," where "accrued to" was synonymous with "due and owing." See PMTA-ILA, 1995 WL 461269, at *4.
In this case, the court looks to the Restated Agreement and Declaration of Trust ("Restated Agreement") and the relevant amendment thereto for each of the Funds in order to determine whether unpaid contributions are considered to be "assets." See Pl.'s Exs. 5A ( ), 5B (Restated Agreement pertaining to NEI Health Benefit Fund, and Seventh Amendment thereto adopted Sept. 19, 1990), and 5C (Restated Agreement pertaining to NEI Educational Fund, and Seventh Amendment thereto3).4 The relevant documents relating to each of the Funds have identical provisions with respect to this issue. See id.
A key inquiry is whether unpaid contributions are considered part of the "Trust Fund," as the amended Restated Agreements state that "[n]either ... the Union, Employers, Employees ... shall have any right, title or interest in or to the Trust Fund." Pl.'s Exs. 5A Art. VI Par. 1, 5B Art. VI Par. 1, and 5C Art. VI Par. 1. See United States v. Panepinto, 818 F.Supp. 48, 51 (E.D.N.Y.1993) ( ). The meaning of "contributions" is also significant, as each of the Restated Agreements...
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