Trustees of Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki

• Decision Date: 27 May 1987
• Docket Number: 11246,Nos. 11238,s. 11238
• Parties: The TRUSTEES OF the OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne J. YAMASAKI, individually, and in his official capacity as the Director of the Department of Transportation of the State of Hawaii, the Aloha Tower Development Corporation, Susumo Ono, individually, and in his official capacity as the Chairman of the Board of Land and Natural Resources of the Department of Land and Natural Resources of the State of Hawaii, Tany Hong, individually, and in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii, and Jensen Hee, individually, and in his official capacity as Director of Finance, Defendants-Appellants. The TRUSTEES OF the OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tany S. HONG, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii, Susumo Ono, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Board of Land and Natural Resources, and Jensen Hee, in his official capacity as Director of Finance, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 446

737 P.2d 446

69 Haw. 154

The TRUSTEES OF the OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne J. YAMASAKI, individually, and in his official

capacity as the Director of the Department of Transportation

of the State of Hawaii, the Aloha Tower Development

Corporation, Susumo Ono, individually, and in his official

capacity as the Chairman of the Board of Land and Natural

Resources of the Department of Land and Natural Resources of

the State of Hawaii, Tany Hong, individually, and in his

official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of

Hawaii, and Jensen Hee, individually, and in his official

capacity as Director of Finance, Defendants-Appellants.

The TRUSTEES OF the OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tany S. HONG, in his official capacity as the Attorney

General of the State of Hawaii, Susumo Ono, in his official

capacity as Chairman of the Board of Land and Natural

Resources, and Jensen Hee, in his official capacity as

Director of Finance, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 11238, 11246.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

May 27, 1987.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The framers of the United States Constitution, in distributing the powers of the federal government, created three distinct and separate departments--the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. They meant to preclude a commingling of essentially different powers of government in the same hands and thereby prevent a situation where one department would be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to the coercive influence of either of the other departments.

2. While the object was to divide and allocate the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence. The Constitution contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon the branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.

3. The judicial power of the federal courts is restricted by article III of the Constitution to "cases" and "controversies." Embodied in these words are two complementary but different limitations. They serve in part to limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. They also define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation.

4. "Justiciability" describes a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. It is not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding its application has been heightened because justiciability has become a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations. Truly, it can be viewed from many different perspectives.

5. The political question doctrine is the most amorphous aspect of justiciability. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of the Supreme Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.

6. A case should not be dismissed on the ground that it involves a political question without discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and postures of the particular case.

7. Whether a political question is present or not is impossible of resolution by any semantic cataloguing. Still, it is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence.

8. Unlike the federal judiciary, the courts of Hawaii are not subject to a "cases or controversies" limitation imposed by article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution. But like the federal government, the government of Hawaii is one in which the sovereign power is divided and allocated among three co-equal branches.

9. This court has taken the teachings of the Supreme Court to heart and adhered to the doctrine that the use of judicial power to resolve public disputes in a system of government where there is a separation of powers, should be limited to those questions capable of judicial resolution and presented in an adversary context.

10. This court has admonished the judges in the judiciary of Hawaii that even in the absence of constitutional restrictions, they must still carefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy, and timeliness of an exercise of their powers before acting, especially where there may be an intrusion into areas committed to other branches of government.

11. The guideposts enunciated by this court for the application of the rules of judicial self-governance founded in concern about the proper--and properly limited--role of courts in a democratic society, reflect the precepts enunciated by the Supreme Court.

12. The decisions of this court on "political questions" reflect the teachings of the Supreme Court. Like those of the Court, they display somewhat amorphous characteristics.

13. Where a ruling of a court would be rendered possible only by an initial policy determination by the court of a kind normally reserved for nonjudicial discretion, the dispute involves a political question.

14. Where a court is asked to interpret a statute and there are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards that could be employed to resolve the dispute, a political question is present.

Terence S. Yamamoto, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, for defendants-appellants.

Boyce R. Brown, Jr., Honolulu (Brown & Durant, of counsel) and Jerel D. Fonseca (Schutter, Playdon, Glickstein, Honolulu, of counsel; with them on the briefs: David C. Schutter and Stacy Moniz), for plaintiff-appellee.

William C. McCorriston (Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn & Stifel, Honolulu, of counsel), on the brief for amicus curiae Honolulu Airlines Committee.

Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ.

NAKAMURA, Justice.

The "governmental entity established by Article XII--Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii," ¹ acting through its trustees, has instituted two actions in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit against several officers of the State and a public corporation, seeking declarations that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) is entitled to receive twenty per cent of the income derived from certain lands held in trust by the State by virtue of state legislation implementing provisions of the act of Congress admitting Hawaii into the Union, as well as injunctive relief. The Trustees sued the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Board of Land and Natural Resources, and the Director of Finance in the first suit; they sued the foregoing officers, the Director of Transportation, and the Aloha Tower Development Corporation in the second. The defendants moved to dismiss the actions, raising the State's sovereign immunity and a purported lack of standing on the part of the Trustees. The circuit court denied the motions but allowed the defendants to seek interlocutory appellate review of its orders. Concluding that the Trustees are seeking judicial resolution of a nonjusticiable controversy, we reverse the denial of the defendants' motions by the circuit court.

I.

The intra-governmental dispute the Trustees would have the courts decide involves the "public land trust," described in HRS § 10-3 and consisting of "ceded lands"; it is centered on the mandate of HRS § 10-13.5 that "[t]wenty per cent of all funds derived from the ... trust ... shall be expended by [OHA] for the purposes [set forth in HRS § 10-3]." ²

A.

The history of the trust begins with the cession of sovereignty by the Republic of Hawaii under the "Joint Resolution To provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States," 30 Stat. 750, adopted by Congress on July 7, 1898. Along with sovereignty, the Republic "cede[d] and transfer[red] to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands ... belonging to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining[.]" Id. The resolution made "[t]he existing laws of the United States relative to public lands [inapplicable] to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands; but [stated] Congress ... shall enact special laws for their management and disposition." Id. It further provided:

That all revenue from or proceeds of the [public lands], except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the...