Tsutras v. Farrar
| Citation | 155 S.E. 655,109 W.Va. 509 |
| Decision Date | 21 October 1930 |
| Docket Number | 6666. |
| Parties | TSUTRAS v. FARRAR, Justice, et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
Submitted October 14, 1930.
Syllabus by the Court.
Statute requiring entry of judgment within 24 hours, Sundays excepted, after trial, is mandatory and jurisdictional and cannot be waived by consent (Code, c. 50, § 114).
The provision of section 114, chapter 50 of the Code, which requires that in all cases (except enumerated classes where "judgment shall be entered without delay") "judgment shall be entered within twenty-four hours (Sundays excepted) after the trial," is mandatory and jurisdictional, and cannot be waived by consent of parties.
Error to Circuit Court, Mingo County.
Proceeding for writ of prohibition by Gus Tsutras against W. R. Farrar Justice of the Peace of Mingo County, to prevent enforcement of a judgment rendered against relator in favor of respondent Cantees. To review the action of the circuit court dismissing the proceeding, relator brings error.
Reversed and rendered.
W. H. D. Preece, of Williamson, and W. T. Lovins of Huntington, for plaintiff in error.
Hogg & Crawford, of Williamson, for defendants in error.
The circuit court awarded a rule in prohibition on petition of relator (Tsutras), who seeks to prevent the enforcement of a judgment rendered against him in favor of respondent Cantees by respondent Farrar, a justice of the peace of Mingo county. Upon a hearing on the merits, the court dismissed the proceeding. Writ of error was awarded relator.
At the basis of the matter lies a disputed question of fact as to whether the parties to the action of Cantees v. Tsutras, when pending before the justice, agreed, upon submission of the case for decision after evidence taken and argument of counsel, that the justice might take more time in reaching a conclusion and rendering judgment than the twenty-four hour period prescribed by section 114, chapter 50, Code. The pertinent part of that section reads:
The trial court's action in dismissing the proceeding necessarily involved a finding in the affirmative on the issue of fact as to whether there was an agreement as stated. There being very pointed evidence to sustain that finding and the same not being at variance with a clear preponderance of the whole evidence, we must accept that finding as the basis of fact for decision here.
Thus the question of law: Can parties to an action pending before a justice of the peace agree that the justice may take longer than the statutory period of twenty-four hours for the purpose of rendering judgment? The statute says ""shall be entered." This is interpreted to mean "rendered," our cases holding that if the justice announces the judgment within twenty-four hour s, it may be entered in the docket thereafter. Packet Co. v. Bellville, 55 W.Va. 560, 47 S.E. 301; Cross v. Gall, 65 W.Va. 276, 64 S.E. 533.
Parties to a civil proceeding may do many things by agreement, such as waiving process, accepting service of process, waiving the maturing of cases at rules, relaxing strict requirements of pleading and procedure; and may even waive questions of jurisdiction of their persons. But never can parties, by agreement, confer upon a court jurisdiction of subject-matter. Yates v. County Court, 47 W.Va. 376, 35 S.E. 24.
If therefore an agreement between parties to an action in a justice's court does not affect the justice's jurisdiction of the subject-matter, it should be upheld; but if it does affect such jurisdiction, the action of the justice in pursuance thereof is void.
The statute requires, ...
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