Tubbs v. Long
| Decision Date | 17 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-00477 |
| Parties | WANDA TUBBS, Plaintiff, v. JEFF LONG, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Jeff Long and the State of Tennessee (“State Defendants”). (Doc. No. 19, “Motion to Dismiss”). Also pending before the Court is a purported motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendants Darryl Young, Brandon Gullett, Brandon King, and Cannon County, Tennessee (“County Defendants”). (Doc No. 33, “County Defendants' Motion”). Plaintiff responded to both Motions. (Doc. Nos. 27 and 35). Each set of Defendants replied separately. (Doc. Nos. 28 and 37). The motions are ripe for review.
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss and will deny the County Defendants' Motion.
BACKGROUND[1]
On May 3, 2017, Sheriff's Deputy Brandon King visited the residence of Terrance Martin to serve Martin a civil paper related to child support. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). Terrance Martin is the son of Plaintiff Wanda Tubbs. (Id.). He rented the residence from Plaintiff and lived there with his girlfriend Shaundra Smith. (Id.). When Deputy King returned to the Sheriff's Headquarters that day, he reported to Investigator Brandon Gullett (“Gullett”) that the home smelled strongly of marijuana. (Id.). In response, Investigator Gullett sought (and, the Complaint implies, clearly obtained) a search warrant for the property based on the smell. (Id.). In his affidavit in support of his request for a search warrant, Gullett included the averment that three months earlier he had uncovered a “large amount” of marijuana in the home. (Id. at 4).
On May 4, 2017, Gullett and Sheriff Darryl Young executed the search warrant at the residence with the help of other officers. (Id.). Inside the residence, they found various illegal drugs including prescription medication [2] cocaine, and a small amount of marijuana. (Id.). Prior to the search, Plaintiff had left her Michael Kors® purse, containing her “life savings, ” inside the home. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff claims that the purse contained between $95, 000-$97, 000, though official figures from the police counted $93, 740. (Id.). Police seized the purse and money, along with three other containers of money presumed to be drug proceeds. (Id.). The government sought a forfeiture warrant on the grounds that the money constituted proceeds traceable to a violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act.[3] The money in the three other seized containers was forfeited by Martin and Smith as a part of their plea deals. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff, however, filed a claim with the Tennessee Department of Safety (“Department”) for the return of the purse and the money therein. (Id.).
On January 30, 2018, the Department held a hearing on Plaintiff's claim. (Id.). Plaintiff attempted to file a motion to suppress all evidence gleaned from “the unlawful search” of the residence.[4] (Id.). In response, the Department argued that Plaintiff had no Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search, [5] as she did not live at the property and was merely a landlord. (Id. at 7). The administrative judge in charge of the hearing denied the motion to suppress, and ultimately determined that Plaintiff was not “credible” and that the money/purse did not belong to her. (Id. at 8-9).
Plaintiff then petitioned the Circuit Court for Davidson County for review of the order. (Id. at 9). The Circuit Judge deferred to the agency and refused to overturn the result. (Id.). Plaintiff appealed that ruling to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Circuit Judge on April 28, 2020. (Id. at 9-10). In its decision, the Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff was barred by state law from asserting a claim in a forfeiture proceeding unless she could first prove by a preponderance, without suppressing evidence, that the money was hers. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff sought a rehearing from the Tennessee Court of Appeals, but this request was denied.[6]
Plaintiff then filed the instant federal action. Therein, she asserts, against all Defendants, two claims arising under federal law, namely 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”): Count I for deprivation of property and liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and Count II for taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, Plaintiff brings two state-law claims under Tennessee common law: Count III for trespass (against Defendants King and Gullett); and Count IV for conversion (against Defendants King, Gullett, and Young).
In the Motion to Dismiss, State Defendants actually make essentially three different and alternative motions to dismiss. One of these is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(h)(3) is analyzed in the same manner as a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1). The distinction between a Rule 12(h)(3) motion and a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is simply that the former may be asserted at any time and need not be responsive to any pleading of the other party.
Cohan v. MGM Hospitality, Inc., No. 20-cv-10981, 2021 WL 4478744, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2021) (). The Court will thus utilize the standards for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion in evaluating State Defendants' 12(h)(3) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As noted, Rule 12(b)(1) “provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). “Subject matter jurisdiction is always a threshold determination.” Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007).
There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: facial and factual attacks. Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Sherman-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). A facial attack questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading. When reviewing a facial attack, a district court takes the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. If those allegations establish federally-cognizable claims, jurisdiction exists. Id. A factual attack instead raises a factual controversy concerning whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Id.
Where there is a factual attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), no presumptive truthfulness applies to the complaint's allegations; instead, the court must weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter jurisdiction does or does not exist. Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc., 491 F.3d at 330. “[T]he district court has considerable discretion in devising procedures for resolving questions going to subject matter jurisdiction[.]” Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 327 (6th Cir. 1990).
The Sixth Circuit has noted that:
The factual attack, however, differs greatly [from a facial attack] for here the trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56. Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction-its very power to hear the case-there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.
RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1977)). Notably, “the fact that the court takes evidence for the purpose of deciding the jurisdictional issue does not mean that factual findings are therefore binding in future proceedings.” United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994).
In making its decision, the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve jurisdictional facts.[8] Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc., 491 F.3d at 330; see also Nichols v. Muskingum Coll., 318 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 2003) (). As always, the party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to prove that jurisdiction. Global Technology, Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power Steering Sys. Co., 807 F.3d 806, 810 (6th Cir. 2015); Golden v. Gorno Bros., 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005).
State Defendants argue the Court lacks jurisdiction due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rooker-Feldman can be either a facial or factual attack. See Larry E. Parish, P.C. v. Bennett 3:20-cv-00275, 2021 WL 3895187, *2 (M.D. Tenn. July 10, 2020) ( an attack on subject-matter jurisdiction based on Rooker-Feldman was a facial attack inasmuch as it focused only on the sufficiency of the pleadings); Kings v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-01044, 2011 WL 2970915, *5 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2011) ( ); Gilleylen v. Supreme Ct. Clerk Davis, No. 1:05-CV-271, 2005...
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