Nichols v. Muskingum College

• Decision Date: 03 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-3497.,No. 01-3436.,01-3436.,01-3497.
• Citation: 318 F.3d 674
• Parties: Betsy L. NICHOLS, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. MUSKINGUM COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

318 F.3d 674

Betsy L. NICHOLS, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. MUSKINGUM COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 01-3436.

No. 01-3497.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: September 18, 2002.

Decided and Filed: February 3, 2003.

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Michael N. Budelsky (argued and briefed), Marc D. Mezibov (briefed), Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Cincinnati, OH, for Appellant.

Dennis D. Grant (argued and briefed), Nancy J. Manougian (briefed), Arter & Hadden, Columbus, OH, for Appellee.

Jennifer S. Goldstein (briefed), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae.

Before MARTIN, Chief Circuit Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge; WISEMAN, Senior District Judge.^*

OPINION

WISEMAN, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Dr. Betsy Nichols ("Nichols") appeals the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of her Title VII employment discrimination claim. The district court found that Nichols failed to timely file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Defendant-Appellee Muskingum College ("Muskingum") cross appeals the district court's denial of its motion for attorney's fees. For the following reasons, we REVERSE the district court's decision granting Muskingum's motion to dismiss and REMAND for consideration upon the merits of the claim.

I. Facts

Nichols was an assistant professor at Muskingum, located in New Concord, Ohio. Her contract had been renewed annually three times. On August 6, 1997, Muskingum notified Nichols that it would not renew her contract for the 1998-99 academic year. On May 28, 1998-295 days after she received the notification of non-renewal — Nichols visited the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC") and spoke with an intake officer at the state agency, claiming that she was not re-hired because she did not conform to the college's accepted stereotype of female faculty. The OCRC officer asked Nichols a number of questions about her complaint and assisted her in the completion of her charge. Nichols handwrote the charge on OCRC stationery, signed it, and checked the box next to the signature line labeled "I also want this charge filed with the EEOC." The charge was then forwarded to the EEOC.

On July 30, 1998, the EEOC issued Nichols a right to sue letter, and Nichols filed suit on October 27, 1998. Muskingum responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that because no charge was filed with the OCRC under Ohio law, the 300-day limitations period was inapplicable, and Nichols' charge was therefore untimely. In response, Nichols argued that her actions at the OCRC office constituted "initially instituting proceedings" with the state agency, entitling her to a 300-day limitations period.

The district court initially denied Muskingum's motion, stating that although Title VII "does not define the term `instituted,'" that term "is broad enough to encompass plaintiff's initial presentation of her charge to OCRC personnel at the OCRC offices." Muskingum filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court misapplied the statute by omitting the word "proceeding" from its citation to Title VII. Muskingum argued that it is not enough for a complainant to simply present a charge; rather, the state agency has to consider the charge as filed in order to satisfy the requirement to institute proceedings. The district court granted Muskingum's motion. In its opinion, the court concluded that although the OCRC personnel helped Nichols process her charge, that charge was filed only with the EEOC and not with the OCRC, and thus proceedings were not instituted with the OCRC. Accordingly, the district court found that Nichols failed to file a timely EEOC charge and thus granted Muskingum's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Standard of Review

This Court reviews a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Joelson v. United States, 86 F.3d 1413, 1416 (6th Cir.1996). Factual findings made by the district court in resolving a motion to dismiss, however, are reviewed only for clear error. See Jones v. City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 161 (6th Cir.1993)).

When a defendant moves to dismiss on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion." Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir.1990). In reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes concerning jurisdiction, and both parties are free to supplement the record by affidavits. Rogers v. Stratton Industries, 798 F.2d 913, 916 (6th Cir.1986). However, where a defendant argues that the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts in her complaint to create subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court takes the allegations in the complaint as true. Jones, 175 F.3d at 413.

III. Analysis

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The district court wrongly dismissed Nichols' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Nichols satisfied the administrative prerequisites for bringing an action in federal court under Title VII. Her actions at the OCRC constituted initially instituting proceedings with the OCRC, and thus her filing with the EEOC was timely, giving the district court subject matter jurisdiction to decide her claim on the merits.

Before a plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII can bring suit in federal court, she must satisfy two administrative prerequisites: "(1) by filing timely charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC, and (2) receiving and acting upon the EEOC's statutory notices of the right to sue." Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir.1989)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(f)(1); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), a charge is timely when the aggrieved filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the allegedly unlawful practice occurred. An exception lies for charges initially instituted with a state agency:

[I]n a case of unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier ...

Id. The central issue in this case is whether this provision is properly understood to provide that an individual who has presented her written and signed charge to the state agency has "initially instituted proceedings" with that agency, regardless of whether the state agency takes further action on the claim.

Because the OCRC is an authorized state agency under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), the determination turns on whether Nichols initiated proceedings with the OCRC when she presented her claim to an OCRC intake officer. Nichols and the EEOC argue that Nichols' actions were sufficient to trigger the 300-day filing period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Muskingum asserts that the EEOC and Nichols are improperly construing Title VII statutory language, specifically, that the language of Title VII is not ambiguous and the EEOC may not confer broader rights on claimants or more prejudicial rules on charged parties than those enacted by Congress.

It is well settled law that if the EEOC fails to refer a charge to the state charging agency, the EEOC's misfeasance is not held against the plaintiff. See Toombs v. Greer-Smyrna, Inc., 529 F.Supp. 497, 503 (M.D.Tenn.1982)("When a complainant has done all that the Supreme Court has stated is required of her in filing a charge with the EEOC, she should not be penalized because the EEOC ignores its own regulations and fails to refer the charge to the appropriate state agency."); Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 466 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir.1972) ("It is clear that (plaintiff) should not lose her cause of action because of the failure of the EEOC to refer her complaint to the state agency."). Accord Roberts v. Arizona Board of Regents, 661 F.2d 796, 799 (9th Cir.1981)("We are ... unwilling to allow the EEOC's violation of its own procedural regulations to redound to the (plaintiff's) detriment ... To require a plaintiff ... to protect herself against the EEOC's possible violation of its own regulations by simultaneously filing a charge with the appropriate state agency would be wholly inconsistent with the rationale of Love")(citing to Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972)); White v. Dallas Independent School District, 581 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1978). In this case, we have the bizarre result where the state charging agency has failed to refer the charge to itself for purposes of state filing. Following the reasoning in this line of cases, we find the misfeasance, this time by the state charging agency, should not be held against the Plaintiff. The spirit and focus of Title VII is to provide a venue of just review for laypersons who have suffered alleged discrimination whether they be pullman car operators or college professors. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 124, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988). Although the state worksharing agreements are designed to allow states a "first bite" at resolving such cases, mechanisms created to give states such opportunity must not stand in the way of the necessarily simple claims-making procedure. See ...