Tucker v. Board of Educ. of Town of Norfolk
Decision Date | 21 May 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 2936,2936 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 25 Ed. Law Rep. 364 Cynthia TUCKER v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF NORFOLK. |
Martin A. Gould, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas N. Sullivan, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).
Before HULL, SPALLONE and DALY, JJ.
The plaintiff, a tenured teacher, filed this third appeal in the same dispute with the defendant board of education, claiming that the trial court, L. Dorsey, J., erred in dismissing her appeal from a three year suspension as a teacher, on the ground that the plaintiff could not appeal under General Statutes § 10-151(f) 1 since she was suspended rather than terminated from her employment. In accordance with Tucker v. Board of Education, 177 Conn. 572, 418 A.2d 933 (1979) (Tucker I ), and Tucker v. Board of Education, 90 Conn. 748, 462 A.2d 385 (1983) (Tucker II ), we find no error in the court's judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal.
A brief history of this lengthy litigation will suffice. The plaintiff was employed as a teacher from 1971 to 1976 when her employment was terminated, after a hearing under General Statutes § 10-151(b), for insubordination in taking a four-day leave of absence despite being denied permission to do so. The termination was reversed on appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court which concluded that, although the plaintiff was insubordinate in her conduct, "the drastic disciplinary action of dismissal constituted exceedingly excessive punishment for the plaintiff's misconduct, and an abuse of discretion, especially in the light of the plaintiff's excellent and unblemished school record as a capable, dedicated teacher." Tucker I, supra, 177 Conn. 581-82, 418 A.2d 933. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and ordered the case returned to the board for the imposition of a penalty consistent with the views expressed in its opinion.
On June 4, 1979, the defendant met to consider the plaintiff's case on the basis of the record of the February 4, 1976 hearing and the remand order. As a result of that meeting, at which the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to be heard, the board offered the plaintiff reinstatement to a full-time teaching position and voted to consider her absence from employment from the beginning of the 1976-77 school year to August 29, 1979, as a period of suspension without pay or benefits.
The plaintiff then appealed from the action of the board and also brought an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the legality of her suspension without pay for three years. In the declaratory judgment action, the trial court, Stoughton, J., upheld the board's decision imposing a penalty short of contract termination, and concluded that it should not substitute its discretion for that of the board in determining a proper penalty. The plaintiff appealed again to the Supreme Court which upheld the judgment, stating: Tucker II, supra, 190 Conn. 752, 462 A.2d 385.
The Supreme Court, despite this ruling, considered, in obiter dictum, out-of-state authority cited by the plaintiff to support her claim that the court should have considered the excessiveness of the penalty. The court distinguished such cases and held that "the cases cited by the plaintiff do not support her claim that the action of the board in imposing the suspension was excessive, arbitrary and illegal." Tucker II, supra, 754, 462 A.2d 385. In concluding this, the court stressed the narrowness of the review offered to the plaintiff in her declaratory judgment action, concluding that Tucker II, supra, 190 Conn. 755, 462 A.2d 385.
From the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal to it from the board's decision to reinstate her without back pay, the plaintiff appeals to this court raising three issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff, a tenured teacher, has a right to appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 10-151(f) where her employment was suspended as a result of the defendant board's decision made subsequent to a hearing held under General Statutes § 10-151(b), which hearing was held to consider the termination of the plaintiff's employment; (2) whether the trial court erred in applying, as a standard of review, the standard enunciated in Tucker II, i.e., whether the action of the defendant in suspending the plaintiff was, as a matter of law, within the mandate of the Supreme Court as set forth in Tucker I; (3) whether the action of the defendant Board of Education in suspending the plaintiff without pay for the period beginning with the 1976-77 school year and extending until August 29, 1979, was excessive, arbitrary, illegal and an abuse of its discretion.
Since we conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff did not have the right to appeal from a suspension of employment, we do not reach the second and third grounds of her appeal.
The Supreme Court, in Tucker II stated: Tucker II, supra, 190 Conn. 754, 462 A.2d 385. This statement, and the similar one cited earlier herein, are dicta. We conclude, however, that they represent a correct statement of the law.
The plaintiff argues that she is an "aggrieved person" and is thus entitled to appeal under General Statutes § 10-151(f) even though she was suspended and not terminated. Once again, she cites out-of-state authority sustaining such a right. In considering this issue, we look first to the Delagorges case cited by the Tucker II court. The consolidated cases in Delagorges concerned the transfer of two educators from positions as administrators to position as teachers. The two plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the defendant board's refusal to review their administrative contracts. In dismissing their appeals, the Supreme Court noted the oft-cited law that there is no inherent right to judicial review of administrative actions and that appeals to the courts from administrative boards may be taken only under statutory authority. It further held that the only Connecticut statute authorizing appeals from decisions of school boards is the Teacher Tenure Act, General Statutes § 10-151(f)....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Mirabilio v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 16
...A.2d 1012 (1986). And there is undoubtedly Connecticut authority leaning in the other direction. See Tucker v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of Norfolk, 4 Conn.App. 87, 93, 492 A.2d 839 (1985) (noting that a substantial reduction in employment “has more of the effect of a termination”); Garovoy v. B......
-
Sekor v. Capwell, Civ. No. 5-92-CV-327 (WWE).
...property or liberty interests. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628, 97 S.Ct. 882, 884, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977); Tucker v. Bd. of Educ., 4 Conn.App. 87, 92, 492 A.2d 839 (Conn.App.Ct.1985). Thus, plaintiff has effectively conceded that there is no genuine issue of material fact in connection with......
-
U.S. Vision, Inc. v. Board of Examiners for Opticians, 5563
...cannot conclude that the legislature intended such a bizarre and irrational result when it enacted § 20-153. Tucker v. Board of Education, 4 Conn.App. 87, 92, 492 A.2d 839 (1985). Nor can we conclude that the legislature intended that the health department would be required to police such a......
-
O'CONNOR v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF WETHERSFIELD
...his leave and that his employment was not terminated, his rights under the statute were not implicated. See Tucker v. Board of Education, 4 Conn.App. 87, 90, 492 A.2d 839 (1985) ("plaintiff did not have the right to appeal [under § 10-151] from a suspension of employment"). In support of hi......