Tucker v. City of Shreveport

• Decision Date: 18 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-30247,19-30247
• Citation: 998 F.3d 165
• Parties: Gregory V. TUCKER, Plaintiff – Appellee v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT; C. B. Cisco; T. Kolb; W. McIntire; Y. Johnson, Defendants – Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

998 F.3d 165

Gregory V. TUCKER, Plaintiff – Appellee

v.CITY OF SHREVEPORT; C. B. Cisco; T. Kolb; W. McIntire; Y. Johnson, Defendants – Appellants

No. 19-30247

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED May 18, 2021

Mary Lucia Blacksher, Esq., Supervisory Attorney, Samuel T. Brandao, Clinical Instructor, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, H. Price Ciolino, Rachel L. Jokinen, AsheLee S. Singleton, Tulane Law School, Criminal Clinic, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff - Appellee

Nichole Marie Buckle, Carmouche, Bokenfohr, Buckle & Day, P.L.L.C., Shreveport, LA, for Defendants - Appellants.

Before CLEMENT, HIGGINSON, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

KURT D. ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge.

Alleging that members of the Shreveport, Louisiana Police Department employed excessive force in effecting his November 30, 2016 arrest, Plaintiff–Appellee Gregory V. Tucker ("Tucker") filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant–Appellants Chandler Cisco, William McIntire, Yondarius Johnson, Tyler Kolb (collectively, "Defendant Officers"), and the City of Shreveport. Specifically, Tucker maintains that the police officers’ conduct—forcing him to the ground and then beating him in order to place him in handcuffs—violated his rights protected by federal and state constitutional law, as well as Louisiana tort law. Upon Defendant–Appellants’ motion, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Officers in their official capacities on all claims. The district court denied summary judgment, however, as to all of Tucker's claims against the City of Shreveport, as well as his § 1983 and Louisiana law claims against Defendant Officers in their individual capacities. Contending that the district court erred in concluding that fact issues preclude dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, Defendant Officers filed this interlocutory appeal. As stated herein, we REVERSE and REMAND.

I.

Given the interlocutory and limited nature of this appeal, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's "sufficiency of the evidence" assessments of disputed facts. See, e.g., Cole v. Carson , 935 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted), as revised (Aug. 21, 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Hunter v. Cole, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 111, 207 L.Ed.2d 1051 (2020). Rather, we focus solely on "examining the materiality of factual disputes the district court determined were genuine," that is, our review is limited to determining "the legal significance of the conduct ... deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "An officer challenges materiality [by contending] that taking all the plaintiff's factual allegations as true[,] no violation of a clearly established right was shown." Arizmendi v. Gabbert , 919 F.3d 891, 896 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 220, 205 L.Ed.2d 137 (2019) (quoting Winfrey v. Pikett, 872 F.3d 640, 643–44 (5th Cir. 2017) ). Nevertheless, because there is video and audio recording of the event, we are not required to accept factual allegations that are "blatantly contradicted by the record." Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Rather, we should "view[ ] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape." Id . at 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769.

Our review of the district court's rulings is greatly assisted by the lengthy "Memorandum Ruling" prepared by the district judge, reflecting a painstaking account of the encounter between Tucker and Defendant Officers, as portrayed in the four video and audio recordings taken by the police officers’ vehicle cameras, Defendant Officers’ offense reports, Tucker's complaint, and the parties’ deposition testimony.¹ Indeed, for the most part, we agree with the district court's factual account, including that there are "two distinct moments of force" that must be separately analyzed: (1) [Officers] McIntire and Cisco taking Tucker to the ground, and (2) Defendant Officers punching and kicking him while he was on the ground.² It is only with respect to the legal significance of those facts where we ultimately part ways with the district court.

II.

For purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, excessive force claims arising from an arrest or investigatory stop invoke the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution against "unreasonable seizure." Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however, has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Thus, determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is "reasonable" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the intrusion upon the individual's interests with the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Regarding that analysis, the Supreme Court, in Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, provided the following guidance:

Because "[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application," Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), [ ] its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

Importantly, "[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. Thus, " ‘[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers,’ violates the Fourth Amendment." Id . (quoting Johnson v. Glick , 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) ). Instead, "the calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Although all disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-movant in the summary judgment context, evaluating the reasonableness of an officer's use of force requires consideration of how a reasonable officer would have perceived those facts. Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2016).

"As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham , 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. "An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional." Id.

III.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from suit and liability for damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right. Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). Thus, in determining qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-step analysis: (1) was a statutory or constitutional right violated on the facts alleged; and (2) did the defendant's actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 623–24. The two steps of the qualified immunity inquiry may be performed in any order. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

In excessive force cases, "[t]he second prong of the [qualified immunity] analysis ‘is [itself] better understood as [encompassing] two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in light of that then clearly established law.’ " Tarver v. City of Edna , 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Felton v. Polles , 315 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2002) ). An officer "cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014). "If officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff's rights were violated, the officer's qualified immunity remains intact." Tarver, 410 F.3d at 750.³

"Whether an official's conduct was objectively reasonable [in light of the law that was clearly established at the time of the disputed action] is a question of law for the court, not a matter of fact for the jury." Brown v. Callahan , 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). But, "in certain circumstances where ‘there remain disputed issues of material fact relative to immunity, the jury, properly instructed, may decide the question.’ " Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Presley v. City of Benbrook, 4 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 1993) ); McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2000) (if the court has not decided the issue prior to trial, "the jury ... determine[s] the objective legal reasonableness of the officers’ conduct").

"A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof." Brown , 623 F.3d at 253. Although nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden to negate the defense once it is properly raised. Garza v. Briones, 943 F.3d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 2019...