Tucker v. City of Hartford

• Decision Date: 20 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 5774,5774
• Citation: 15 Conn.App. 513,545 A.2d 584
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Stanley V. TUCKER v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

Page 584

545 A.2d 584

15 Conn.App. 513

Stanley V. TUCKER v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

No. 5774.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on Briefs March 17, 1988.

Decided Aug. 16, 1988.

Certification Denied Sept. 20, 1988.

Stanley V. Tucker, pro se, appellant (plaintiff), filed a brief.

Richard H. Goldstein, Corp. Counsel, and Richard M. Cosgrove, Deputy Corp. Counsel, filed a brief for appellees (defendants).

Before BIELUCH, EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and STOUGHTON, JJ.

EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, Judge.

The plaintiff is appealing from the judgment of a state trial referee, acting as the trial court, in this tax appeal. He claims (1) that the trial court erred in determining the market value of the three properties which are the subject of this appeal, (2) that the trial court erred in failing to find that the defendants' failure to rectify the assessments on one property for the years 1979 through 1981, in accordance with the judgment in Hartford v. Tucker, 8 Conn.App. 209, 512 A.2d 944 (1986), constituted fraud and rendered all subsequent assessments on that property null and void, and (3) that the trial court was without power to determine the assessments for the properties in question. We find no error.

The plaintiff is the owner of properties in Hartford located at 65 Amity Street, 69 Amity Street, and 121 Allen Place. The plaintiff brought this action under General Statutes § 12-118 seeking review of the board of tax review's refusal to reduce the October 1, 1983 tax assessments on the three properties. ¹ The plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint, extending the appeals to include the October 1, 1984, October 1, 1985, and October 1, 1986 assessments. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the 1978 through 1986 assessments of 121 Allen Place were null and void based on an earlier tax appeal brought by the plaintiff; Hartford v. Tucker, supra; and further alleged that the defendants' failure to comply with that decision constituted fraud. The plaintiff also alleged, pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119, ² that the 1982 and 1983 tax assessments on the 69 Amity Street and 121 Allen Place properties were manifestly excessive.

The trial court found that the market value of the 69 Amity Street property for the years in question was $20,000 as compared with the assessor's market value of $11,790, and that the market value of the property at 65 Amity Street for the years in question was $67,000, as compared with the assessor's market value of $37,500.

With regard to 121 Allen Place, the court found that the judgment in Hartford v. Tucker, supra, set the fair market value to be $86,000 for the years 1978 through 1981 only; it further found the fair market value for 1982 to be $180,000, as compared with the assessor's valuation of $120,000; it found the market value in 1983 to be $60,000 because of fire damage to the property, as compared with the assessor's market value of $120,000; and it found the value for the years 1984 through 1986 to be $120,000, in accordance with the assessor's valuation of $120,000 for those years. The trial court also found that the plaintiff's allegation of fraud, based on the defendants' failure to set the assessments as directed by Hartford v. Tucker, supra, for the years 1979 through 1981, was without merit, and that the subsequent assessments were not vitiated due to the defendants' claimed noncompliance with the remand from this court in that case.

The defendants reduced the assessments on the Allen Place property for the years 1979 through 1981 and 1983, in accordance with the judgment. The defendants have not altered, however, the assessments on any of the three properties for those years in which the market value was found by the trial court to be higher than that set by the city assessor, and the lower assessed values remain in place.

We note that an action pursuant to General Statutes § 12-119 is not directed to bringing about a change in the assessment list, as is an action under General Statutes § 12-118, but is directed to relief against the collection of an illegal tax. Fenwick v. Old Saybrook, 133 Conn. 22, 23-24, 47 A.2d 849 (1946); see also Hartford v. Faith Center, Inc., 196 Conn. 487, 490-91, 493 A.2d 883 (1985); Woodbury v. Pepe, 6 Conn.App. 330, 333, 505 A.2d 723 (1986). This case, however, was handled by both the parties and the trial court as one brought solely under § 12-118. "Where, as here, a case was tried upon a certain theory, we will dispose of the case on the theory on which it was tried and on which the trial court decided it." Crozier v. Zaboori, 14 Conn.App. 457, 463, 541 A.2d 531 (1988).

The plaintiff first claims error in the trial court's determination of the market value of the subject properties. The valuation of property for assessment purposes is a question of fact for the trier. Gorin's, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 178 Conn. 606, 607, 424 A.2d 282 (1979). "The trier arrives at his own conclusions as to the value of land by weighing the opinion of the appraisers, the claims of the parties in light of all the circumstances in evidence bearing on value, and his own general knowledge of the elements going to establish value." O'Brien v. Board of Tax Review, 169 Conn. 129, 136, 362 A.2d 914 (1975). "The conclusions reached by the trier must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law." Id., at 133, 362 A.2d 914.

This claim of error as to the valuation of the properties amounts to no more than an argument that the trial court should have adopted the valuations presented by the plaintiff's appraiser. The trial court's determination of the value of the properties was based on the appraisals offered by both parties as well as a viewing of the subject properties. The court's conclusions as to the value of the plaintiff's properties are adequately supported by the evidence and do not depend on an erroneous rule of law. Id.

The plaintiff's second claim is that the trial court erred in not finding that the defendants' failure to change the assessments on the Allen Place property for the...