Tucker v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.
| Decision Date | 23 June 1952 |
| Citation | 245 P.2d 597,111 Cal.App.2d 875 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | TUCKER v. SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. et al. Civ. 15033. |
Alexander S. Keenan, Jr., San Francisco, for appellant.
Dion R. Holm, City Atty. of City and County of San Francisco, Walter A. Dold, Chief Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, Irving G. Breyer, San Francisco, of counsel, for respondents.
Clara Tucker, a probationary teacher in San Francisco, sought, by writ of mandate, to compel the San Francisco Board of Education to re-employ her as a school teacher after she had been discharged by the Board. The trial court denied the application for a writ, entered its judgment in favor of the Board, and Tucker appeals.
There is no conflict as to the facts. On September 2, 1949, Tucker became a regularly appointed and properly accredited probationary teacher in the elementary division of the San Francisco Unified School District. It is conceded that at all times here relevant that this school district had an average daily attendance of more than 60,000 pupils as defined in section 13583 of the Education Code. On April 10, 1950, the Superintendent of Schools filed written charges of incompetency and unfitness for service with the Board, and recommended the dismissal of Tucker at the conclusion of that school year in the interest of the schools and pupils. The specific charges were failure to hold her classes' interest, lack of discipline, lack of planning, lack of emotional stability, lack of attention to the appearance of her classroom, and failure to secure good teaching results.
On the same date--April 10, 1950--a copy of the charges, a copy of the rules and regulations of the Board relating to the procedure for the dismissal of probationary teachers, and a letter of transmittal, signed by the Superintendent of Schools, were sent to Tucker by registered mail. They were received and signed for by Tucker's agent on April 12, 1950. On April 17, 1950, a copy of the letter, with its enclosures, was personally served upon Tucker.
The letter of the Superintendent of Schools reads as follows:
'This communication will serve to notify you that the Superintendent of Schools filed with the Board of Education at its meeting of April 10, 1950, charges for your dismissal as a probationary teacher of the San Francisco Unified School District effective as of the close of the school year 1949-50.
'Enclosed you will please find a copy of the charges which were filed together with a copy of the rules and regulations adopted by the Board of Education governing the procedure for dismissal of probationary teachers. You will note that under these regulations an opportunity will be granted to you for a hearing before the Board of Education if you so desire provided that you file a demand for such hearing in conformity with these regulations.
'In this connection, these regulations provide as follows:
'The Superintendent sincerely regrets the necessity of filing these charges, but after reviewing carefully the reports rendered by your administrative superiors concerning your services, he feels that there is no other course to follow under the circumstances.
Encl. A. Copy of Charges
B. Copy of Resolution'
Appellant at no time requested a hearing as required by the quoted rule, and, as a result, she was not notified of the date, time or place of the meeting at which she was dismissed.
The charges were considered by the Board on the evening of May 10, 1950. At that time the charges and the letter from the Superintendent were read, and the Superintendent testified as a witness. He first identified efficiency reports on appellant prepared by her principal, explained how they were prepared, and discussed their function. He pointed out that one such report was filed at the end of each school year for each of the 1,800 probationary teachers, and that additional reports were filed for those teachers whose work was in question. These reports are not filed or prepared in contemplation of a dismissal proceeding. In reference to appellant, there were three such reports filed by her principal. These reports showed the following: Classroom and supplies disorganized and poorly kept; planning not followed through; inadequate training; danger through lack of proper supervision; lack of emotional stability; intimidates her pupils through force and fear; discipline poor; cannot follow through on lesson procedures, etc., etc. The principal, in the reports, discussed each of these complaints. On a rating scale from 1 to 8, 8 being failure and 7 poor, the principal rated personal characteristics, 5; professional qualifications, 7; clerical work, 6; classroom management, 7; teaching ability, 7. One report gives the opinion of the principal that: 'I do not think Miss Tucker has the necessary qualifications for a teacher'; another read: 'In spite of effort and goodwill on Miss Tucker's part, she has not had adequate training in college, and it will take much time and effort to give her the help needed to make her an effective teacher'; while still another concluded: 'I feel that for the safety of the children in Miss Tucker's class, it is inadvisable to have her continue as a teacher.' The Superintendent testified that from an examination of the personnel file, and, as a result of conversations with Miss Tucker's administrative superiors, he had come to the conclusions that Miss Tucker was incompetent as a teacher, and that her retention would not be for the best welfare of the schools or the pupils.
The Board then, by a unanimous vote of the five members present (two members were absent), passed a resolution finding that the charges of incompetency and unfitness for service were true, that appellant's dismissal would be for the best welfare of the schools and the pupils, and appellant was discharged. She was so notified. Thereupon, by writ of mandate in the Superior Court, she sought to be reinstated. The cause was tried on the record and proceedings before the Board. The application for the writ was denied, the trial court concluding that Tucker had waived her right to a hearing and that the dismissal was proper. Tucker appeals.
The basic contention of appellant is that the waiver of the hearing provided for in the rules of the Board is invalid as being in excess of the rule-making powers of the Board. The solution of this problem requires a reference to the pertinent statutes and to the cases interpreting them.
There are several sections of the Education Code to which reference should be made. Division 7, Chapter 11, Article 3, of that code deals with 'Dismissal of Probationary Employees'. There are three sections in that article. Section 13581 provides that: 'Governing boards of school districts shall dismiss probationary employees during the school year for cause only, as in the case of permanent employees.' This section is here inapplicable because it applies only to dismissals 'during the school year', and the dismissal here was at the close of a school year. Such dismissals are regulated by sections 13582 and 13583. Section 13582 provides:
'On or before the fifteenth day of May in any year the governing board may give notice in writing to a probationary employee that his services will not be required for the ensuing year.
'The notice shall be deemed sufficient and complete when delivered in person to the employee by the clerk or secretary of the governing board of the school district or deposited in the United States registered mail with postage prepaid, addressed to the employee at his last known place of address.'
Under this section, probationary teachers, generally, may be notified by the date specified that their services will not be required for the next year, and their employment is terminated without the necessity of a hearing or a finding of cause. But this section is not applicable to probationary teachers employed by school districts such as the one here involved where average daily attendance is 60,000 or more students. Such districts are covered by section 13583, which provides:
Under this section appellant could be dismissed 'for cause only.' That, obviously, implies a hearing and a finding of 'cause.' There is nothing in the statute providing how such cause shall be determined, how the hearing shall be held, for notice of the hearing, or for a waiver of the right to a hearing by failure to make a demand. Such details, in San Francisco, are taken care of by rules and regulations adopted by the Board. Section 2204(a) of the Education Code expressly provides that the governing board of every school district shall have power to: 'Prescribe and enforce rules not inconsistent with law or with the rules prescribed by the State Board of Education, for its own government, and for the government of the schools under its jurisdiction.'
Thus, the precise question presented is whether Rule 2,...
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