Tucker v. State
| Decision Date | 08 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46882 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | Tracy TUCKER, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Idaho; Darrell G. Bolz, in his official capacity as Chair of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; Eric Fredericksen, in his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; Paige Nolta, in her official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; Angela Barkell, in her official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; Dan Dinning, in his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; Jonathan Loschi, in his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; Sen. Chuck Winder, in his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; Rep. Melissa Wintrow, in her official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; and Hon. Linda Copple Trout, in her official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, Defendants-Respondents. |
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho Foundation, Boise; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York; Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington DC, for Appellants. Elizabeth Lockwood argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondents State of Idaho, Hon. Linda Copple Trout, Darrel G. Bolz, Angela Barkell, Sen. Chuck Winder, Rep. Melissa Wintrow and Dan Dinning. Leslie Hayes argued.
Parsons, Behle & Latimer as Special Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for Respondents Eric Don Fredericksen, Paige Nolta, and Jonathan Loschi. Leslie Hayes argued.
This case concerns a systemic challenge to Idaho's public defense system and asks the Court to answer two overriding questions: (1) what is the proper legal standard to be applied to the plaintiffs’ claims at trial, and (2) what is the burden of the respective parties going forward?
The plaintiffs are indigent defendants represented in criminal actions by attorneys provided through Idaho's public defense system. They allege that numerous inadequacies in Idaho's public defense system, as administered by the State and the Idaho Public Defense Commission ("PDC" or together "Respondents"), violate the rights of the named plaintiffs, as well as those of similarly situated criminal defendants across Idaho, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. On March 19, 2019, the district court denied cross motions for summary judgment, citing a lack of precedent as to the controlling legal standard to be applied, and requested this appeal. On April 11, 2019, the Idaho Supreme Court granted the district court's request for permissive appeal to determine the standard of review.
The crux of the issue comes down to how to properly evaluate the deficiencies in Idaho's public defense systems alleged by Appellants. In sum, Appellants insist that the view from 30,000 feet is sufficient, while Respondents demand that the district court examine this issue from three feet away. For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that both views are necessary. A close up view, which allows for greater specificity, must be applied to the individual claims of at least one of the named plaintiffs whose allegations formed the basis of standing; however, a more distant view, which allows for greater overall perspective, is permissible for the examination of the systemic constitutional shortcomings alleged by Appellants.
In June 2015, four named plaintiffs—Tracy Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne ("Appellants")—filed suit in Ada County on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated indigent criminal defendants. They allege that Idaho's public defense system violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Appellants seek equitable relief, including a declaration that Idaho's public defense system is unconstitutional and an injunction requiring Respondents to bring Idaho's public defense system into constitutional compliance.
The suit named the State of Idaho, then-Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and the seven members of the PDC (it now consists of nine members) as defendants. The PDC was created in 2014 pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-849, and its duties include the promulgation of rules concerning: (1) the "[t]raining and continuing legal education" of defense attorneys, (2) "[u]niform data reporting requirements ... which shall include, but not be limited to, caseload, workload and expenditures," and (3) "[p]rocedures for the oversight, implementation, enforcement and modification of indigent defense standards so that the right to counsel of indigent persons, ... is constitutionally delivered to all indigent persons in this state." I.C. § 19-850(1)(a)(i), (ii), and (vi). Additionally, the PDC conducts oversight by "[r]eview[ing] indigent defense providers and defending attorneys to evaluate compliance with indigent defense standards and the terms of state indigent defense financial assistance." I.C. § 19-850(1)(c).
In January 2016, the district court held that Appellants’ claims were not justiciable based on standing, ripeness, and separation of powers and dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the claims related to the Governor; however, we reversed the district court and held that the remaining claims could proceed against the State, as it bears ultimate responsibility for the public defense system, and against the members of the PDC, as related to the agency's rulemaking authority. Tucker v. State , 162 Idaho 11, 394 P.3d 54 (2017) (" Tucker I "). This Court further held that Appellant's claims did not implicate Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and its case-by-case ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. Tucker I at 19–20, 394 P.3d at 62–63. We went on to conclude that "Appellants satisfy the injury in fact standard because the complaint alleged actual and constructive denials of counsel at critical stages of the prosecution." Id . at 20, 394 P.3d at 63.
Following remand, the district court granted Appellants’ Motion for Class Certification on January 17, 2018. The certified class1 is defined as follows:
[A]ll indigent persons who are now or who will be under formal charge before a state court in Idaho of having committed any offense, the penalty for which includes the possibility of confinement, incarceration, imprisonment, or detention in a correction facility (regardless of whether actually imposed) and who are unable to provide for the full payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation in defending against the charge.
In late 2018, both Appellants and Respondents filed cross motions for summary judgment. On March 19, 2019, the district court denied both motions and sua sponte authorized a permissive appeal to this Court to determine the standard to be applied. The Idaho Supreme Court granted permission to appeal on April 11, 2019, stating: The issue is one of first impression for the Idaho Supreme Court.
Idaho Appellate Rule 12 sets forth the standard for granting permissive appeals, providing in part:
Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory order or decree of a district court in a civil or criminal action ... , which is not otherwise appealable under these rules but which involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation.
I.A.R. 12(a). "[T]he intent of I.A.R. 12 [is] to provide an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of first impression are involved." Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc. , 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).
"Because a permissive appeal under I.A.R. 12 from a denial of a motion for summary judgment leads to such an unusual procedural posture, this Court must ‘rule narrowly and address only the precise question that was framed by the motion and answered by the trial court.’ " Miller v. Idaho State Patrol , 150 Idaho 856, 863, 252 P.3d 1274, 1281 (2011) (quoting Aardema , 147 Idaho at 789, 215 P.3d at 509 ). After this Court accepts a permissive appeal, it proceeds in the same manner as an appeal as a matter of right, unless this Court orders otherwise. I.A.R. 12(d).
Appellants allege systemic deficiencies in Idaho's public defense system resulting in unconstitutional denials of counsel, and they seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the State and the PDC. We have granted permissive appeal for the purpose of setting forth the standard of proof Appellants must meet at trial to prove these allegations and obtain the relief they are seeking.
In Tucker I , we acknowledged that Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and State v. Montroy , 37 Idaho 684, 690, 217 P. 611, 614 (1923), manifest the State's obligation "to provide constitutionally adequate public defense at critical stages of the prosecution." Tucker I , 162 Idaho at 19–20, 394 P.3d at 62–63. Importantly, Tucker I primarily addressed the question of standing. We held that to have standing to seek injunctive relief, plaintiffs...
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