Tucker v. Thornton
| Decision Date | 26 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-CA-431 |
| Parties | APRIL TUCKER v. REGINALD THORNTON, THORNTON'S CAB SERVICE, GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, AND ATLAS INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 779-380, DIVISION "L" HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING
Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois, Stephen J. Windhorst, and Cornelius E. Regan, Pro Tempore
Plaintiff/appellant April Tucker, appeals the trial court's May 5, 2022 judgment which granted a motion for a directed verdict filed by defendant/appellee, GEICO General Insurance Company, against Ms. Tucker and dismissed the matter with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On January 10, 2017, Ms. Tucker was a passenger in a taxicab owned by Thornton's Cab Service, LLC and driven by Reginald Thornton when the taxicab was struck by a vehicle driven by Ashlinn Grubb. On January 8, 2018, Ms. Tucker filed a petition for damages against Mr. Thornton, Thornton's Cab Service, LLC, its insurer, Atlas Insurance Group, LLC, and Ms. Tucker's uninsured/underinsured insurance carrier, GEICO. Ms. Tucker subsequently amended her petition for damages to name as a defendant, American Service Insurance Company, as Thornton's Cab Service's insurer. Ms. Grubb was never named as a defendant.[1]
On June 8, 2020, Ms. Tucker filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice all claims against Mr. Thornton, Thornton's Cab Service, American Service Insurance Company, and Atlas Insurance Group. An order dismissing these parties with prejudice was signed on June 9, 2020. Thereafter, GEICO remained as the only defendant in the matter.
A jury trial on the merits of the matter began on May 4, 2022. After Ms. Tucker rested her case, GEICO moved for a directed verdict. GEICO argued that Ms. Tucker was insured under a Georgia Family Automobile Insurance Policy and that policy falls under Georgia's Uninsured Motorist Act, OCGA § 33-7-11. Based on the statute, GEICO argued that Ms. Tucker was obligated to sue and obtain a judgment against the underinsured motorist (Ms. Grubb) as a condition precedent to her right to recover underinsured motorist benefits from GEICO. Because Ms. Tucker never filed suit against Ms. Grubb and voluntarily dismissed the other defendants, GEICO argued that she cannot recover against GEICO. The trial court took the matter under advisement. On the following morning, the parties reconvened, and following arguments by both parties, the trial court granted the motion for a directed verdict.
A written judgment was signed on May 5, 2022, granting the motion for a directed verdict filed by GEICO against Ms. Tucker and dismissing the matter with prejudice at Ms. Tucker's cost.[2] In its reasons for judgment, the trial court first found that Georgia law applied to this dispute. It then found that pursuant to Georgia law, because the tortfeasor (Ms. Grubb) was never named in this suit, there exists no vehicle to assign any fault to the tortfeasor. Without this determination, there exists no legal liability under Georgia law on the part of the underinsured motorist insurance carrier (GEICO). Thus, the trial court found that because Ms. Tucker's case presents no opportunity for a finding of legal liability on the part of GEICO, as a matter of law, the motion for a directed verdict must be granted. This appeal followed.
A motion for a directed verdict is a procedural device available in jury trials for purposes of judicial economy. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20-248 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/17/21), 314 So.3d 1010, 1021, writ denied, 21-0402 (La. 5/11/21), 315 So.3d 871. The motion should be granted when, after considering all of the evidence in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the movant's opponent, it is clear that the facts and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of granting the verdict, that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary result. Greene v. Lovisa, 16-660 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/17/17), 221 So.3d 270, 276, writ denied, 17-1017 (La. 10/9/17), 227 So.3d 837. However, the motion should be denied and the case submitted to the jury, if evidence is produced in opposition to the motion that has such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons, exercising impartial judgment, might reach different conclusions. Id.
The trial court has great discretion in determining whether a directed verdict should be granted. Baudy v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut, 13-832 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/9/14), 140 So.3d 125, 131. The standard of review for the appellate court is whether, viewing the evidence submitted, reasonable persons could not reach a contrary result. Id. at 146. Moreover, the propriety of a directed verdict must be evaluated in light of the substantive law related to the claims. Id.
In her first assignment of error, Ms. Tucker argues that the trial court erred in applying Georgia law and not Louisiana law in this case. Ms. Tucker argues that Louisiana policies would be most seriously impaired if its laws were not applied to the uninsured motorist provisions at issue in this case and to Ms. Tucker's uninsured motorist claims. She contends that:1) although she has a Georgia policy, she has changed residences multiple times and will likely continue to do so; 2) her job is primarily remote and requires her to travel to Louisiana and other states; and 3) she has no significant or permanent ties to Georgia.
The GEICO policy in the present case contains a "Choice of Law" provision in Section V, entitled "General Conditions," that states, "[t]he policy and any amendment(s) and endorsement(s) are to be interpreted pursuant to the laws of Georgia."
Under Louisiana law, it is well established that where the parties stipulate to the state law governing the contract, Louisiana conflict of laws principles require that the stipulation be given effect, unless there is statutory or jurisprudential law to the contrary or strong public policy considerations justify not honoring the contract as written. See La. C.C. art. 3540;[3] Clark v. Legion Ins. Co., 06-0320 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/29/06), 947 So.2d 110, 114, writ denied, 07-0368 (La. 3/30/07), 953 So.2d 69; Continental Eagle Corporation v. Tanner &Co., 95-295 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 204, 206. A choice-of-law provision in a contract is presumed valid until proven otherwise. The party seeking to prove the invalidity of the contractual provision bears the burden of proof. Clark, supra.
In Louisiana, there is a strong public interest in providing full recovery for automobile accident victims who suffer damages caused by a tortfeasor who is not covered by adequate liability insurance. Garces-Rodriguez v. GEICO Indem. Co., 16-196 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/21/16), 209 So.3d 389, 393; Henson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 585 So.2d 534, 537 (La. 1991). However, Louisiana also recognizes that other states have an interest in the regulation of the insurance industry conducting business within their borders and in the contractual obligations that are inherent parts thereof. Champagne v. Ward, 03-3211 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 773. In Champagne, the Supreme Court indicated that the integrity of the contract is a substantial and real interest. The Court further stated "[t]he fact that Congress has allowed fifty states to have their own uniform system of regulations governing insurance strongly suggests this is a legitimate public purpose." Champagne, 893 So.2d at 788.
Upon review, we find Ms. Tucker failed to prove that the choice of law provision contained in the GEICO policy is invalid and that any strong public policy considerations justify not honoring the policy provision as written. It is undisputed that this Georgia policy was issued to Ms. Tucker who, at the time, was a resident of Georgia. Ms. Tucker testified at trial that she has never lived in Louisiana, and at the time of the accident, she was only here for a work meeting. We find that the choice of law provision contained in the GEICO policy prevails in the present case, and as such, we find no error in the trial court's determination that Georgia law should be applied to this dispute.
In her second assignment of error, Ms. Tucker argues that even if Georgia law applies, GEICO is estopped from invoking the condition precedent imposed by OCGA § 33-7-11 since GEICO led Ms. Tucker to believe that she would receive payment. She contends that she believed a payment would be coming based on a $10,000 medical payments check she received from GEICO and because GEICO stipulated to the limited release language of Ms. Tucker's settlements with the other defendants. She alleges that the case has been going on for five years, and GEICO's actions led her to believe that it would be forthcoming on her claims without the need to engage in legal action. This caused Ms. Tucker to forfeit her ability to amend and file suit against Ms. Grubb.
Similarly in her fourth assignment of error, Ms. Tucker argues that GEICO's use of the motion for a directed verdict in this case was prejudicial. She contends that she was deceived by GEICO since the UM provision issue GEICO now argues should have been negotiated and/or decided at an earlier stage of litigation.
Under Georgia law, it is well settled that an injured party must first establish that the driver of the uninsured vehicle is legally...
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