Tucker v. Weathersbee

• Decision Date: 13 August 1914
• Docket Number: 9017.
• Parties: TUCKER ET AL. v. WEATHERSBEE ET AL.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

82 S.E. 638

98 S.C. 402

TUCKER ET AL. v. WEATHERSBEE ET AL.

No. 9017.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

August 13, 1914

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Barnwell County; T. H Spain, Judge.

Action by George H. Tucker and others against R. A. Weathersbee and another. From a decree in favor of defendants, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

The following is the decree of the trial court:

This action came on to be tried before me at the regular spring term at Barnwell, upon the report of the master, Mr O'Bannon, which was simply a report of the testimony upon the order of reference to take the testimony; and by consent of counsel the cause was marked heard and to be argued at Aiken. Said cause was heard at Aiken upon said report, and the testimony, oral and documentary, reported by the master and, upon full argument by counsel representing the parties to the action, I have carefully considered the case, which is interesting, and important to all parties concerned.

Succinctly stated, the pleadings developed an action brought by the owners of judgments, as plaintiffs against one of the defendants, R. A. Weathersbee, to be set aside as fraudulent, under the Statute of Elizabeth, as recognized at common law, two deeds one made by R. A Weathersbee, a husband, to his codefendant, E. E. Weathersbee, his wife, on November 5, 1894, said deed conveying what is called the Jack Ashley lot, and another deed made to the wife, not by the husband, but by F. N. K. Bailey, on October 24, 1896, and conveying what is called the "hotel lot." Both of these lots are in the town of Williston, on the line of the Southern Railway between Augusta and Charleston, in the county of Barnwell, a town of several hundred inhabitants. The charge as to both lots is that these conveyances were fraudulent, in that they were made to delay, hinder, and defeat the creditors of R. A. Weathersbee; and as to the hotel lot, that while the deed was made by a stranger to the wife, the purchase money was paid by the husband, and it is claimed that a resulting trust arose to the husband, and that the property should be declared the property of the husband, and subject to the judgment of the plaintiffs and such other creditors of the husband who should come in and contribute to the expense of the proceedings. It seems that no other creditors have come in and contributed to the expenses of the proceedings. It seems that no other creditors have come in, and that the estate of Sloan, the assignee of the Fertilizer Company, and Malsby, are the only creditors of the husband who are pushing the contention. The answer of the defendant E. E. Weathersbee, the wife, denies the fraud charged, sets up the strict statute of limitations of ten years as to both tracts, and claims the same by adverse possession, and also pleads the six years statute as to the alleged fraud.

As to the conveyances from Bailey to the wife of the hotel lot, dated October 24, 1896, there is not a tittle of proof that any money of the husband went to pay the consideration of said deed, but there is ample and complete proof that the consideration was paid by the wife, named as the grantee in the deed, with money loaned to her by her brother, C.J. Owens, and that the improvements, amounting to some $5,000, placed thereon from time to time, were made by her, in part by money borrowed and in part by money made by her own thrift and energy as a hotel keeper. There is no testimony to show that this deed was made to delay, hinder, and defeat the creditors of R. A. Weathersbee; and I find as a matter of fact that the deed from Bailey to the wife conveyed to her, free from fraud, a fee-simple title, and that said property is hers free and discharged from any claims of any of the creditors of the husband, R. A. Weathersbee. There could be no resulting trust unless it was shown by clear evidence that the purchase price was paid by the husband; he being the common debtor of the creditors pressing this controversy.

As to the conveyance from the husband to the wife of the Jack Ashley lot, on November 5, 1894, I find as a matter of fact that said conveyance was made at a full, fair, and adequate price. This is shown by the testimony of the witnesses of the defendant, and there is no testimony to the contrary on behalf of the plaintiffs. I further find that at the time this conveyance was made the testimony does not disclose the fact that any suits were threatened against the husband or the partnership of A. J. Weathersbee & Son in which he was concerned, or that any suits were pending against him, though it seems that afterwards judgment was obtained against him. I further find that the purchase price was paid by the wife, by money which she borrowed from her father. This is testified to by her and not contradicted or rebutted by any fact or circumstance, and the improvements made on this property, amounting to some $3,000, in the shape of brick stores, were made by her with money derived from other sources and from her own thrift and energy, notably from the sale of some property to Sprawls, which she purchased at a low price at public sale from the sheriff of Barnwell county as the property of her husband, the money paid to her by Sprawls amounting to $1,200. Under these findings of fact and all of the testimony as to the facts and circumstances surrounding this transaction, the condition of the debtor husband, R. A. Weathersbee, and the condition of the grantee, his wife, I conclude as a matter of fact that said deed from the husband to the wife is free from any charge of hindering, delaying, and defeating the creditors of R. A. Weathersbee, and that said deed vested in said wife a fee-simple title to said Jack Ashley lot, free and discharged from the claims of the creditors of said R. A. Weathersbee who are pressing this controversy.

The law upon this subject is clear and plain, and is sustained by the authorities referred to by the counsel for the plaintiffs, and amounts to this: "That even if there was valuable consideration for a deed, yet if the deed was made, with the intent on the part of both parties to defeat, delay, and hinder their creditors in the collection of their demands," the law would not hold it valid. Lowry v. Pinson, 2 Bailey, 324, 23 Am. Dec. 140; Archer v. Long, 32 S.C. 186, 11 S.E. 86.

As to transactions between relatives, such as husband and wife, it is very plain that, such relation being proven, they are required to give "the fullest, clearest, and most satisfactory evidence of good faith on the part of the parties concerned before it could be sustained." Braffman v. Glover, 35 S.C. 436, 14 S.E. 935.

Now, in this case, under the

...