Tucker v. Webb Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-547,82-547
• Citation: 4 OBR 367,4 Ohio St.3d 121,447 N.E.2d 100
• Parties: , 4 O.B.R. 367 TUCKER, Appellant, v. WEBB CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 121

4 Ohio St.3d 121

447 N.E.2d 100, 4 O.B.R. 367

TUCKER, Appellant, v. WEBB CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 82-547.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 13, 1983.

Keating, Muething & Klekamp and Mr. William A. Posey, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Clark & Eyrich Co., L.P.A., Steven T. MacConnell and David S. Levine, Cincinnati, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In determining the appropriateness of granting a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56, we noted in Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, at page 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 :

"The appositeness of rendering a summary judgment hinges upon the tripartite demonstration: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor."

While taking these factors into account, the courts below found that the evidence compelled a summary adjudication in favor of the appellee Webb Corporation, as a matter of law. We do not agree.

While we hold that summary judgment here was improper, our focus turns on the preliminary inquiry of whether the trial court had sufficient evidence before it in order to make a just and proper decision. As the United States Supreme Court noted with respect to the corresponding federal rule in Associated Press v. United States (1945), 326 U.S. 1, at page 6, 65 S.Ct. 1416, at page 1418, 89 L.Ed. 2013:

" * * * Rule 56 should be cautiously invoked to the end that parties may always be afforded a trial where there is a bona fide dispute of facts between them. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. [1944], 321 U.S. 620 [64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967]."

In the instant case, we find that appellant Tucker was allotted insufficient time to discover the essential facts surrounding the transactions that took place between Knost, Reed Engineering Co. and the Webb Corporation. These undiscovered facts could not only assist appellant in supporting his cause of action, but could also reveal whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact to be determined. Although the appellant did not cite Civ.R. 56(F) ¹ specifically, he did in effect ask the trial court for more discovery in attempting to justify his opposition to Webb's motion for summary judgment. ²

Hence, this cause presents a different situation than that which was found to exist in Benjamin v. Deffet Rentals (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 86, 419 N.E.2d 883 . In Benjamin, we noted that the plaintiffs involved chose not to avail themselves of the procedure afforded by Civ.R. 56(F) in order to obtain the necessary discovery, supra, at page 92, 419 N.E.2d 883. However, in the case sub judice, the appellant stated initially that he needed more discovery, but he chose not to rest his opposition to appellee's summary judgment motion on that theory alone. Faced with the task of opposing appellee's motion, appellant attempted to include all possible theories contra to appellee's motion, as well as proposing his own motion for summary judgment. Taking into account the ramifications of a summary disposition, we believe that the courts below should have been more cautious in determining whether any genuine issues of material fact existed that could potentially impose liability on the appellee...