Tucker v. Williams

• Decision Date: 04 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2013–CA–02100–SCT.,2013–CA–02100–SCT.
• Parties: William Christopher TUCKER v. Gay St. Mary WILLIAMS and Larry Williams.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

198 So.3d 299

William Christopher TUCKER

v.Gay St. Mary WILLIAMS and Larry Williams.

No. 2013–CA–02100–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Aug. 4, 2016.

Michael Andrew Rueff, Toby Justin Gammill, Jackson, Jacob Dane King, Gulfport, attorneys for appellant.

Seth Clayton Little, Chuck McRae, Christopher Anthony Bambach, attorneys for appellees.

Before WALLER, C.J., KITCHENS and COLEMAN, JJ.

KITCHENS

, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Gay St. Mary Williams and her husband, Larry Williams, filed a complaint against William Christopher Tucker and two insurance companies in the Circuit Court of Hinds County, First Judicial District. The Williamses alleged that Gay St. Mary Williams had been severely injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by Tucker. When Tucker failed to answer, the circuit clerk entered a default. The trial court denied Tucker's motion to set aside the entry of default and his motion for reconsideration. After a hearing, the trial court awarded damages in the amount of $2,962,984.60, plus $300,000 to Larry Williams for loss of consortium, and entered a default judgment in favor of the Williamses.

¶ 2. Tucker appeals, arguing that the trial court's refusal to set aside the entry of default was an abuse of discretion. Alternatively, he challenges portions of the damages award. This Court finds that, under Mississippi's liberal standard applicable to setting aside entries of default, which requires a default entry to be set aside in the interests of justice, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the entry of default in this case. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings.

FACTS

¶ 3. On February 4, 2010, Kentucky residents Gay St. Mary Williams and Larry Williams filed a complaint against Tucker, Zurich North American Insurance Company (Zurich), Shelter Insurance Company (Shelter), and John Does 1–5.¹ A “corrected” complaint, filed four days later, alleged that, on or about February 9, 2007, Gay St. Mary Williams was driving a rental car in the left-turn lane of North State Street in Jackson, Mississippi, facing north and preparing to turn left onto Beasley Road. As Gay St. Mary Williams was turning left across the southbound lane, her vehicle was struck by the vehicle of Tucker, who was driving south on North State Street. The Williamses alleged that Tucker recklessly and negligently had failed to keep a proper lookout and that she had failed to yield to oncoming traffic. The Williamses also averred that, due to Tucker's careless, negligent, and reckless acts, Gay St. Mary Williams suffered multiple facial and back fractures and facial lacerations

, and that she experiences permanent, constant pain and suffering and emotional distress. The Williamses claimed damages for Gay St. Mary Williams's physical pain, mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life, medical expenses, lost employment, and lost wages. Larry Williams asserted a loss of consortium claim.

¶ 4. Zurich and Shelter filed answers to the complaint. On June 28, 2010, the court ordered that Zurich be dismissed and that Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland) be substituted as a party defendant. Maryland filed an answer and later moved for summary judgment. Shelter also moved for summary judgment. On July 27, 2011, the Williamses filed a motion for additional time to respond to Shelter's motion for summary judgment. See M.R.C.P. 56(f)

.

¶ 5. On June 15, 2010, more than four months after filing the complaint, the Williamses filed an application for entry of default against Tucker for “failure to plead, answer, or otherwise defend.” See M.R.C.P. 55(a)

.² The clerk entered default against Tucker on the same day. Then, also on the same day, the Williamses filed a motion for a default judgment. See

M.R.C.P. 55(b)

. On October 22, 2010, the Williamses filed an application for a default judgment on the issues of liability and damages.

¶ 6. Tucker filed a motion to set aside the entry of default dated November 5, 2010.³ In the motion, Tucker stated that his “insurance carrier was notified of the entry of default via property damage arbitration.” Tucker argued that he had a meritorious defense to the civil action, that the defendants had not been prejudiced by the delay, and that the default should be set aside for good cause or in the interests of justice. Tucker attached his answer to the motion.

¶ 7. A hearing occurred on the motion on January 24, 2011. During the hearing, Tucker's counsel argued that the default entry should be set aside because Tucker had strong defenses to the Williamses' action. When the trial court asked “what's a good cause, what's your explanation for the default entered,” Tucker's counsel responded that he had no information about why Tucker had not given the complaint to his insurer. He also stated that the insurer had filed an answer immediately upon receiving notice of the lawsuit. On July 1, 2011, the trial court denied the motion to set aside the entry of default.

¶ 8. On July 26, 2011, Tucker filed a motion for reconsideration. Again, Tucker argued that he had colorable defenses to the Williamses' claims and that the Williamses had suffered no prejudice. Tucker averred that, in 2007, he had sued Gay St. Mary Williams in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for damages incurred in the same accident that is the subject of the Williamses' present lawsuit. Tucker attached the October 31, 2008, settlement agreement showing that Gay St. Mary Williams had settled the lawsuit with Tucker for $400,000.⁴ Tucker also attached an accident reconstruction report he had obtained for the district court litigation that concluded that Gay St. Mary Williams had been at fault in the accident. He also attached his own affidavit stating that the reason he had failed to send the complaint to his insurer was that he had thought it was a request for his statement in Williams's suit against her insurer, and he did not realize he also was a defendant in that lawsuit. Tucker argued that the trial court should set aside the entry of default due to his colorable defenses and the lack of prejudice to the Williamses.⁵

¶ 9. At the hearing on October 24, 2011, Tucker argued that the default entry should be set aside due to his allegations of colorable defenses and his contention with regard to lack of prejudice. He raised the colorable defenses of the accident reconstruction report and that the Williamses' lawsuit was barred because Gay St. Mary Williams should have raised any claims arising out of the accident as compulsory counterclaims in the district court litigation. The Williamses argued that the default entry should stand because Tucker had provided no reason for his failure to answer. The trial court asked Tucker's counsel about the reason for the default, and when counsel was unable to provide the reason Tucker had not timely filed an answer, the trial court responded, “That's all I need.” On November 10, 2011, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, because “inasmuch as the Defendant has given no reason for the failure to timely respond to the complaint, good cause does not exist to lift the Clerk's entry of default.”

¶ 10. On June 14, 2013, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on damages. Before the Williamses presented any evidence, Tucker again challenged the default entry, and the trial court again denied relief. The Williamses presented evidence consisting of Larry Williams's testimony, depositions of Gay St. Mary Williams's treating physicians, and medical records and medical bills. The trial court awarded noneconomic damages of $1,000,000, which were included in a total award of $2,962,984.60. In addition, the trial court awarded Larry Williams $300,000 on his loss of consortium claim. On November 22, 2013, finding no just reason for delay, the trial court directed the entry of a Rule 54(b)

final judgment in these amounts against Tucker, with six percent interest to run from the date of judgment. See M.R.C.P. 54(b).

¶ 11. Tucker appeals, arguing that the default judgment should be reversed because the trial court's failure to set aside the entry of default was an abuse of discretion. He also argues that the trial court erroneously considered certain evidence submitted at the damages hearing, and that the damages award was not supported by substantial evidence. The Williamses argue that appellate review of the entry of default is procedurally barred and that other procedural defects prevent this Court's review of this appeal. Alternatively, the Williamses contend that the trial court's refusal to set aside the default entry was not an abuse of discretion, and that substantial admissible evidence supported the damages award. Because we reverse the default judgment, we do not address Tucker's alternative argument on damages.

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED.

¶ 12. Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure

provides that a notice of appeal must be filed “within thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” M.R.A.P. 4(a). Under the final judgment rule, “[g]enerally, only final judgments are appealable.” M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So.2d 897, 899 (Miss.2006) (citing M.R.A.P. 5 ). The Williamses contend that, because Tucker did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days after the date the trial court denied his motion for reconsideration, he is barred from challenging the trial court's refusal to set aside the clerk's entry of default. This argument turns on whether the denial of the motion for reconsideration was a final judgment from which an appeal could have been taken.

¶ 13. The trial court denied Tucker's motion to set aside the default entry on July 1, 2011. On July 26, 2011, Tucker filed his motion for reconsideration of that order, citing Rule 60(b)

, which provides that, on motion, the court may relieve a party of a “final judgment,...