Tuel v. Tuel

• Decision Date: 01 February 2022
• Docket Number: No. COA21-187,COA21-187
• Parties: Laura Sue TUEL, Plaintiff, v. Anthony Ryan TUEL, Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

867 S.E.2d 428 (Table)

Laura Sue TUEL, Plaintiff,

v.Anthony Ryan TUEL, Defendant.

No. COA21-187

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed February 1, 2022

Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, L.L.P., by Alicia Jurney, for plaintiff-appellee.

Tharrington Smith, LLP, by Jeffrey R. Russell and Evan B. Horwitz, for defendant-appellant.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

¶ 1 Anthony Ryan Tuel ("defendant") appeals from the trial court's order for child custody. Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to follow this Court's mandate set out in Tuel v. Tuel , 270 N.C. App. 629, 840 S.E.2d 917 (2020) ("Tuel I "). Defendant further argues the trial court erred by failing to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law and abused its discretion by allowing Laura Sue Tuel ("plaintiff") to relocate to Indiana with the parties’ children. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's order.

I. Background

¶ 2 Plaintiff and defendant were married on 21 December 2002. Two children were born of the marriage on 17 April 2014 and 12 September 2016. The parties separated on 17 May 2017.

¶ 3 On 16 May 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint for child custody. On 17 May 2017, plaintiff left the marital residence and moved with the children to her parent's home in Rushville, Rush County, Indiana. On 16 June 2017, the parties reached an agreement for temporary custody and visitation to allow defendant to visit the children on 17-18 June 2017 for Father's Day weekend. The parties later resolved the issue of temporary child custody by entering a Memorandum of Judgment/Order ("MOJ") on 21 August 2017. The MOJ established payments from defendant to plaintiff for temporary child support and postseparation support, and provided that plaintiff would return to North Carolina with the minor children, and that defendant would have custody every other weekend from Friday to Monday and every Wednesday as either a dinner visit or an overnight.

¶ 4 On 5 July 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ claims for permanent child custody, Judge Rawls presiding. The trial court heard evidence of plaintiff's strained relationship with her family, from whom she had been estranged up until separating from defendant. Defendant requested the trial court award "50/50" custody to the parties in North Carolina; plaintiff asked the trial court to allow her to relocate with the children to Indiana.

¶ 5 On 18 March 2019, the trial court entered an Order for Permanent Child Custody and Temporary Child Support, granting the parents joint legal and physical custody of the children, and primary custody to plaintiff, allowing her to relocate with the children to Indiana. The trial court made several findings describing Rushville, Indiana, the children's relationships with extended family members, and the circumstances that led to the parties’ separation. The trial court found that "[i]t would be in the best interest of the minor children for them to be able to locate with the plaintiff to Rushville, Indiana given the strong ties of the Plaintiff's family and other support systems that would assist the Plaintiff with the care of the minor children." The trial court further found that defendant was "opposed to the relocation of the minor children and he fails to accept responsibility for the relationship between the plaintiff and her parents and what he might have done to bring about the estrangement between the plaintiff and her parents[,]" which the trial court considered "unreasonable." The trial court also found that "plaintiff's compliance with the temporary order and willingness for the defendant to continue to see the children indicates that she will comply with orders providing for the defendant's visitation with the children after they move to Indiana." The order included a total of thirty-one numbered findings of fact.

¶ 6 Defendant filed notice of appeal from the order on 11 April 2019. On 17 March 2020, this Court filed an opinion vacating the trial court's order and remanding for further proceedings. Tuel I , 270 N.C. App. 629, 840 S.E.2d 917.

¶ 7 In Tuel I , we stated that the "trial court failed to make findings" on several factors relevant to determining custody upon relocation of a parent to a foreign jurisdiction, and that many of the findings upon which it based its conclusion of law were internally inconsistent. Id. at 631, 840 S.E.2d at 920 (citing Ramirez-Barker v. Barker , 107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675 (1992) ). Specifically, apart from the advantages of a family support network to assist with childcare, "none of the trial court's findings engage in any comparison between Rushville, Indiana and defendant's home in Johnston County, North Carolina, or each area's relative potential to enrich the children's lives." Id. at 633, 840 S.E.2d at 921. "Additionally, the [trial] court g[ave] short shrift to several of the other Ramirez-Barker factors, reciting them as findings without engaging in any substantive analysis of its conclusions or relating them to the best interests of the children." Id. at 634, 840 S.E.2d at 921. Several of the findings the trial court did make were noted for "unresolved contradictions" which "undermined" the finding that carried the weight of the trial court's conclusion of law. Id. at 635, 840 S.E.2d at 922. Defendant additionally argued that numerous findings of fact were not supported by competent evidence, but because the findings were "facially deficient and inadequate to support the trial court's conclusion of law," the question of evidentiary support was not reached. Id. at 636, 840 S.E.2d at 923.

¶ 8 The trial court conducted a hearing on remand on 25 August 2020. Defendant's trial counsel offered that the trial court had three options: (1) enter an order based on the same evidence requiring the children to remain in North Carolina; (2) order a new trial; or (3) conduct an additional hearing "where new evidence is presented to make findings, whatever Your Honor thinks is appropriate given the Court of Appeals opinion, and issue an order based upon that."

¶ 9 Judge Rawls responded:

Okay. I thought it was -- if I recall what I read, it -- it is that the Court felt like that my findings did not support my conclusions or were inconsistent with the conclusion and said that they didn't even consider the issue of whether or not I had abused my discretion in the area of allowing the relocation because they felt like the findings that were set forth on Ramirez -- and I keep looking back because I had jotted the Ramirez findings that were remanded and those findings are the custodial parents interested in trying to make the move and the other noncustodial parents interest in objecting to the move and whether or not said move would disrupt the relationship of the noncustodial parent to the child.

Of course, I've read in detail the Ramirez opinion and in reading that opinion, of course, the finding there was a little different and the circumstances were a little slightly different from what we have here, but in reading the Court's opinion, the Court felt like I did not address particularly, in detail enough, how the children's relocation there would be in their best interest or their life would improve based on the finding that their knowledge of the people that I felt were there to provide additional support for them, they had not had that much time with them to know whether or not they had developed what we call longstanding relationship.

....

I certainly understand what the Court had said, but in essence, when the Court sent it back to me, I don't know that they said anything any more direct to -- to direct me on what it is they were asking this Court to do.

¶ 10 Plaintiff's trial counsel argued that this Court's opinion did not include "any reference to needing another hearing[,]" and that the trial court had discretion "to just do another order." Plaintiff's trial counsel presented a proposed order that counsel "tried to prepare ... in such a way that was drawn from the evidence and supported [the trial court's] ultimate decision in the case." Defendant's trial counsel agreed that the trial court could "just enter a new order[,]" but added his belief that this Court "did not think that the ... evidence was there sufficient to make ... the findings and conclusions."

¶ 11 Judge Rawls responded:

I don't necessarily want to receive new evidence. I think I've received the evidence that the Court needs to make a decision, but I also recognize that in drafting the opinion, and I dictated this opinion, I went back and listened to that, that there are four things that I probably need to be more specific concerning them and that is these four things that are relocation improve the life of the child, the motives of the custodial parent requesting the move, integrity of the noncustodial parent in opposing the move, will realistic visitation be possible and will it preserve and foster the parental relationship of the noncustodial parent. Those are the primary Ramirez factors for the purposes of relocation.

I hinted on some. I touched on some, but I didn't particularly, I think, say some things that probably could be said, but in all fairness to the parties, I'm willing to go back and listen and redraft an opinion. I think that is the believable evidence before the Court. What may have happened that transpired afterwards certainly is subject to whatever that might be, but I think if I receive new evidence, that's the types of things that I'm going to be receiving and I think at this point I need to look at these things, listen to what the conceivable evidence says, and try to draft an opinion taking into consideration those things and those things for that.

I think the Court was particular because it didn't like the drafting of it that they were not willing to go a step further in saying you were wrong with what you've done. They just said we can't analyze what you've done, because you have not done this.

¶ 12 Ultimately, ...